

THE SOVIET UNION
AND
THE PATH TO PEACE

LENIN — STALIN — MOLOTOV —
VOROSHILOV — LITVINOV —
TUKHACHEVSKY

(A collection of statements and documents 1917-1936)

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OF THE WORKS OF

JOHN MILTON

WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR

BY RICHARD H. BURTON

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FOREWORD

This book consists of a series of the most important statements and articles of the leaders and statesmen of the Soviet Union and of a number of important documents on the problem of war and peace. It opens with the historic decree on peace, of 8 November, 1917, drawn up by Lenin. This decree marked the beginning of the existence of the new Soviet power. The book contains a number of Lenin's statements during the first years of the existence of the Soviet Union, showing how the young Soviet state, striving for peace and friendly relations with its neighbours and all other states, first had to win peace in bitter struggle against a world of enemies in order to be able to pass over to peaceful construction. The speeches of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Litvinov and Tukhachevsky, down to the present time, show how, despite all provocation, and while building up its might through the two Five-Year Plans, the Soviet Union is more and more becoming a decisive factor in the maintenance of peace throughout the world. The speeches and documents show the increase in the war danger occasioned by fascism in the last few years and brought about primarily by the most threatening warmongers in the East and in the West—Japan and Germany—but which has also found expression in the annexationist war of Italian fascism. It becomes clear that the strongest force for the maintenance of peace to-day is the Soviet Union, its sincere and firm peace policy and its Red Army.

The friends of peace, who are rallying in a united front throughout the world, will find most valuable material in this book.

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Decree on Peace¹

The workers' and peasants' government created by the revolution of 6-7 November (24-25 October) and backed by the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies calls upon all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace.

By a just or democratic peace, for which the vast majority of the working and toiling classes of all belligerent countries, exhausted, tormented and racked by the war, are craving, a peace that has been most definitely and insistently demanded by the Russian workers and peasants ever since the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy—by such a peace the government means an immediate peace without annexations (*i.e.*, the seizure of foreign lands, or the forcible incorporation of foreign nations) and indemnities.

The government of Russia calls upon all the belligerent nations to conclude such a peace immediately, and expresses its readiness to take the most resolute measures without the least delay, pending the final ratification of the conditions of this peace by plenipotentiary assemblies of the people's representatives of all countries and all nations.

In accordance with the sense of justice of the democracy in general, and of the toiling classes in particular, the government interprets the annexation, or seizure, of foreign lands as meaning the incorporation into a large and powerful state of a small or feeble nation without the definitely, clearly and voluntarily expressed consent and wish of that nation, irrespective of the time such forcible incorporation took place, irrespective of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed to, or forcibly retained within, the frontiers of the given state, and finally, irrespective of

¹ Adopted by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, November 8, 1917.

whether the nation inhabits Europe or distant, overseas countries.

If any nation whatsoever is forcibly retained within the boundaries of a given state, if, in spite of its expressed desire—no matter whether that desire is expressed in the press, at popular meetings, in party decisions, or in protests and revolts against national oppression—it is not permitted the right to decide the forms of its state existence by a free vote, taken after the complete evacuation of the troops of the incorporating or, generally, of the stronger nation, without the least pressure being brought to bear upon it, such incorporation is annexation, *i.e.*, seizure and coercion.

The government considers that it would be the greatest of crimes against humanity to continue this war for the purpose of dividing up among the strong and rich nations the feeble nationalities seized by them, and solemnly declares its determination to sign immediately conditions of peace terminating this war on the conditions indicated, which are equally just for all peoples without exception.

At the same time the government declares that it does not regard the above-mentioned terms of peace as an ultimatum; in other words, it is prepared to consider any other conditions of peace, but only insists that they be advanced as speedily as possible by any of the belligerent nations, and that in the conditions of peace proposed there should be absolute clarity and the complete absence of ambiguity and secrecy.

The government abolishes secret diplomacy and, for its part, expresses its firm determination to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the whole people. It will immediately proceed to the full publication of the secret treaties ratified or concluded by the government of landlords and capitalists during the period March (February) to 7 November (25 October), 1917. The government proclaims the absolute and immediate annulment of the contents of all such secret treaties, since they are aimed, as in the majority of cases they are, at securing advantages and privileges for the Russian landlords and capitalists and at the retention, or extension, of the annexations made by the Great-Russians.

Appealing to the governments and peoples of all countries immediately to begin open negotiations for the conclusions of peace, the government, for its part, expresses its readiness

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to conduct such negotiations in writing or by telegraph, or by negotiations between representatives of the various countries, or at a conference of representatives. In order to facilitate such negotiations, the government is commissioning its plenipotentiary representatives to neutral countries.

The government proposes to all the governments and peoples of the belligerent countries to conclude an immediate armistice and, for its part, considers it desirable that the armistice should be concluded for no less than three months, *i.e.*, for a period long enough to permit the conclusion of negotiations for peace with the participation of the representatives of all peoples and nations involved in or compelled to take part in the war, without exception, and the summoning of plenipotentiary assemblies of the representatives of the peoples of all countries for the final ratification of the terms of peace.

While addressing this proposal for peace to the governments and peoples of all the belligerent countries, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia appeals in particular to the class-conscious workers of the three most advanced nations of mankind, the largest states participating in the present war, namely, Great Britain, France and Germany. The workers of these countries have made the greatest contributions to the cause of progress and socialism; they have furnished the great examples of the Chartist movement in England, a number of revolutions of world and historic importance made by the French proletariat, and, finally, the heroic struggle against the Anti-Socialist Law in Germany and the example shown to the workers of the whole world in the protracted, persistent and disciplined work of creating mass proletarian organizations in Germany. All these examples of proletarian heroism and historical creative work serve as a pledge that the workers of the countries mentioned will understand the duty that now lies upon them of emancipating mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences. For these workers, by comprehensive, determined, and supremely energetic action, can help us to bring to a successful conclusion the cause of peace, and at the same time the cause of the emancipation of the toiling and exploited masses of the population from all forms of slavery and all forms of exploitation.

*From the Report at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on
the Activity of the Council of People's Commissars
(22 December, 1920)*

And we are convinced that all the neighbouring states, which have suffered great losses owing to the support they gave to the whiteguard conspiracies hatched against us, have drawn the undeniable lesson of experience and have properly appreciated our conciliatory spirit, which was generally construed as weakness. After three years of experience, they must have convinced themselves that although we exhibit persistent peaceful intentions, we are at the same time prepared from the military point of view. And every attempt to start war on us will mean for the states resorting to war that the terms they will get after and as a result of the war will be worse than those they could have got without war or before war. This has been proved in the case of several states. And this is an achievement of ours, which we shall not surrender and which not a single one of the powers surrounding us, or in political contact with Russia, will forget. And thanks to this our relations with neighbouring states are steadily improving. You know that peace has been finally concluded with a number of states bordering on the Western frontiers of Russia, which were part of the former Russian Empire and which received from the Soviet government an unequivocal recognition of their independence and sovereignty in conformity with the fundamental principles of our policy. Peace on such a basis has every chance of being far more durable than the capitalists and certain of the West-European states would like.

*From the Report of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
and the Council of People's Commissars at the Ninth All-Russian
Congress of Soviets on the Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic
(29 December, 1921)*

We see that a certain equilibrium has been established. This is a political situation which is objective and independent of our victories, and which shows that we have appreciated the depth of the contradictions connected with the imperialist war and gauge them more accurately than has ever been done

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before, than has ever been done by other powers, which, despite all their victories, despite all their strength, have not found a way out. This is the essence of the international situation which explains what we are now observing. We have before us a certain equilibrium, highly unstable, but nevertheless indubitable and indisputable. Whether it will last long, I do not know, and I think it is impossible to know this. And therefore, the utmost caution must be observed by us. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson which must be drawn from our state activity for the year, a lesson which must be learned by all the workers and peasants, is to be on guard, to remember that we are surrounded by people, classes, governments that openly express the most profound hatred for us. It must be remembered that we are always a hair's breadth removed from invasion. We must do all in our power to forestall this disaster. During the imperialist war, we experienced hardships such as scarcely any other people has experienced. After this, we experienced the hardships of the Civil War, which were forced on us by the representatives of the ruling classes, defending the Russia of the émigrés—the Russia of the landowners, the Russia of the capitalists. We know, we know only too well, what unheard of affliction war brings to the workers and peasants. Therefore, we must regard this question with the greatest caution and circumspection. We are prepared to make the greatest concessions and sacrifices, we are prepared to do this only in order to maintain peace, which we have purchased at such a great price. We are prepared to make the greatest concessions and sacrifices, but not every concession and sacrifice, and not without limit—let those, fortunately few, representatives of military parties and annexationist cliques in Finland, Poland and Rumania, who are banking on this, take good note.

Whoever reasons at all sensibly or clearly, like a politician, taking things into account correctly or incorrectly, will admit that there never was and never can be a government which would make such concessions and such sacrifices in relation to the nationalities existing within our state as we have made. There is not and cannot be another government which would recognize as clearly as we and speak and declare so precisely, before all, that the attitude of old Russia, of tsarist Russia, of the Russia of military parties, towards the nationalities

inhabiting Russia was criminal, inadmissible, that it evoked the most legitimate, indignant protests and resentment of the oppressed nationalities. There is not and cannot be another government which would acknowledge this situation so openly, which would carry on this propaganda, anti-chauvinist propaganda, propaganda admitting the criminality of old Russia, of the Russia of tsarism and the Russia of Kerensky, a government which would carry on propaganda against the forcible annexation of other nationalities to Russia. These are not mere words—it is a simple political fact, which is clear to everyone, which is absolutely indisputable. So long as there are no intrigues against us on the part of any nationalities, intrigues binding these nationalities, subjecting them to imperialist enslavement, so long as they do not make a bridge for the purpose of crushing us, we shall not stop at formalities. We shall not forget that we are revolutionaries. But there are facts which irrefutably and indisputably prove that in Russia, which has defeated the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the smallest, wholly unarmed nationality, no matter how weak it is, may and should be absolutely assured that we have none but peaceful intentions towards it, that our propaganda concerning the criminality of the old policy of the old governments is not abating and that our desire to maintain peace, by all means and at the cost of tremendous sacrifices and concessions, with all nationalities that were formerly part of the Russian Empire and that wished to stay with us, remains firm. We have proved this. And no matter how fierce the execrations that are heaped on us from all sides we shall continue to prove this. It appears to us that we have proven this excellently, and we declare to the assembly of the representatives of the workers and peasants of all Russia, to the many millions of workers and peasants, that we shall do everything in our power to guard further peace, that we shall not stop at great concessions and sacrifices in order to maintain peace.

But there is a limit beyond which we cannot go. We shall allow no mockery of the peace treaties, we shall allow no attempts to disrupt our peaceful labour. We shall not allow this under any condition and shall rise as one man to defend our existence. . . .

This, comrades, is what I consider necessary to say on the

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subject of our international situation. A somewhat unstable equilibrium has been achieved. Materially, we are immeasurably weak in economic and military respects, but morally—understanding this concept not from the point of view of abstract morality, of course, but as the correlation of all forces of all classes in all countries—we are stronger than anybody. This has been tested in practice, this is being proven not in words but in deeds. This has already been proven once and perhaps, if history takes a certain course, this will be proven not only once. That is why we say of ourselves: Having undertaken our peaceful construction work, we shall bend all our efforts to continue it without interruption. At the same time, comrades, be on your guard, cherish the defensive power of our country and our Red Army as the apple of your eye, and remember that we have no right to permit even a second's relaxation in regard to our workers and peasants and their victories.

*From the Interview given to Mr. Michael Farbman, Correspondent of the Observer and Manchester Guardian
(27 October, 1922)*

Question: The anti-Russian press interprets Herriot's reception in Moscow and the Franco-Russian negotiations as a distinct turn in Soviet Russia's foreign policy.

Is this true? Is it true that Russia regards British policy in the Near East as a challenge, and is prepared to conclude an agreement with France directed against England?

Answer: I consider it absolutely incorrect to interpret Herriot's reception in Moscow and the Franco-Russian negotiations as a turn, even the slightest, in the policy of Soviet Russia in general and as a turn against England in particular. Undoubtedly, we set an extremely high value both on Herriot's reception in Moscow and on the step towards a *rapprochement* with France or towards negotiations with her, which have now become possible, probable, and, we would like to believe, necessary. Any *rapprochement* with France would be for us highly desirable, especially in view of the fact that Russia's trade interests imperatively demand a *rapprochement* with this powerful Continental power. But we

are convinced that this *rapprochement* does not in the least degree imply the necessity for any change in our policy towards England. We consider that the friendliest relations with both powers are quite possible, and that is our aim. We consider that the very development of trade relations will inevitably exert extremely strong pressure towards attaining this aim. We consider that, correctly understood, the interests of England and France will likewise work in this direction. We consider that the mutual interests of England and France, as far as they concern Russia, will under no circumstances contain elements of inevitable hostility between England and France. On the contrary, we even think that the peaceful and friendly relations of these powers with Russia will provide one of the guarantees (I am almost ready to say, the strongest guarantee) that peace and friendship between England and France will be most durable, and that every disagreement possible and likely under present conditions between France and England will most rapidly and most surely arrive at a happy solution.

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*From the Report of the Central Committee at the Sixteenth Congress
of the C.P.S.U.
(27 July, 1930)*

Our policy is a policy of peace and of strengthening trade relations with all countries. The result of that policy is the improvement of relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, etc. Its result also is the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the Kellogg Pact, our signature of the well-known protocol referring to the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, etc., and the signing of the protocol extending the validity of our treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. Lastly, the result of that policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the warmongers. We shall continue this policy of peace in the future with all our might and with all resources. We don't want a single foot of foreign territory; but we will not surrender a single inch of our territory to anyone.

That is our foreign policy.

Our task is to continue to pursue this policy in the future, with all the persistence characteristic of the Bolsheviks.

*From the Interview given to Mr. Walter Duranty, Correspondent
of the New York Times
(25 December, 1933)*

Duranty: Is your position in regard to the League of Nations always a negative one?

Stalin: No, not always and not under all circumstances. You perhaps do not quite understand our point of view. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of Germany and Japan from the

League of Nations—or perhaps just because of this—the League may become something of a check to retard the outbreak of military actions or to hinder them.

If this is so and if the League could prove to be somewhat of an obstruction that could, even to a certain extent, hinder the business of war and help in any degree to further the cause of peace, then we are not against the League.

Yes, if historical events follow such a course then it is not impossible that we should support the League of Nations in spite of its colossal defects.

*From the Report of the Central Committee at the Seventeenth Congress
of the C.P.S.U.
(27 January, 1934)*

The Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist States

It is quite easy to understand how difficult it has been for the U.S.S.R. to pursue its peace policy in this atmosphere poisoned with the miasma of war combinations.

In the midst of this eve-of-the-war hullabaloo which is going on in a number of countries, the U.S.S.R. during these years has stood firmly and indomitably by its position of peace, fighting against the menace of war, fighting to preserve peace, going out to meet those countries which in one way or another stand for the preservation of peace, exposing and tearing the masks from those who are preparing for and provoking war.

What did the U.S.S.R. rely on in this difficult and complex struggle for peace?

(a) On its growing economic and political might.
(b) On the moral support of millions of the working class in every country who are vitally interested in the preservation of peace.

(c) On the common sense of those countries which for this or that motive are not interested in disturbing the peace, and which want to develop commercial relations with such a punctual customer as the U.S.S.R.

(d) Finally—on our glorious army, which is ready to defend our country against attack from without.

On this basis arose our campaign for the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression and of pacts defining the aggressor with

our neighbouring states. You know that this campaign has been successful. As is known, pacts of non-aggression have been concluded not only with the majority of our neighbours in the West and in the South, including Finland and Poland, but also with such countries as France and Italy; and pacts defining the aggressor have been concluded with these same neighbouring states, including the Little Entente.

On this basis also the friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey was consolidated, relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy have improved and have become indisputably satisfactory, relations with France, Poland and other Baltic states have improved, relations have been restored with the U.S.A., China, etc.

Of the facts reflecting the successes of the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. two, of indisputably serious significance, should be noted and singled out.

(1) I have in mind, first, the change for the better that has taken place recently in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland, between the U.S.S.R. and France. As is well known, our relations with Poland in the past were not at all good. Representatives of our state were assassinated in Poland. Poland regarded herself as the barrier of the Western states against the U.S.S.R. All and sundry imperialists looked upon Poland as the vanguard in the event of a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and France were not much better. It is sufficient to recall the facts in the history of the trial of the Ramzin wreckers' group in Moscow in order to restore in one's mind the picture of the former relations between the U.S.S.R. and France. But now these undesirable relations are gradually beginning to disappear. They are being replaced by other relations, which cannot be otherwise described than relations of *rapprochement*. It is not only that we have concluded pacts of non-aggression with these countries, although these pacts in themselves are of very serious importance. The most important thing first of all is that the atmosphere charged with mutual distrust is beginning to be dissipated. This does not mean, of course, that the incipient process of *rapprochement* can be regarded as sufficiently stable, and as guaranteeing ultimate success. Surprises and zigzags in policy, for example in Poland, where anti-Soviet sentiments are still strong, cannot be regarded as being excluded by a

long way. But a change for the better in our relations, irrespective of its results in the future, is a fact worthy of being noted and put in the forefront as a factor in the advancement of the cause of peace.

What is the cause of this change? What stimulates it?

First of all, the growth of the strength and might of the U.S.S.R. In our times it is not the custom to give any consideration to the weak—consideration is only given to the strong. Then there have been certain changes in the policy of Germany which reflect the growth of *revanche*-ist and imperialist sentiments in Germany.

In this connexion certain German politicians say that now the U.S.S.R. has taken an orientation towards France and Poland, that from being an opponent of the Versailles Treaty it has become a supporter of it and that this change is to be explained by the establishment of a fascist regime in Germany. This is not true. Of course, we are far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in Germany. But fascism is not the issue here, if only for the reason that fascism, for example in Italy, did not prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing very good relations with that country. Nor are the alleged changes in our attitude towards the Versailles Treaty the point of issue. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into the throes of a new war for the sake of this treaty. The same thing must be said in regard to the alleged new orientation taken by the U.S.S.R. We never had any orientation towards Germany nor have we any orientation towards Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is towards the U.S.S.R. and towards the U.S.S.R. alone. And if the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand *rapprochement* with this or that country which is not interested in disturbing peace, we shall take this step without hesitation.

No, that is not the point. The point is that the policy of Germany has changed. The point is that even before the present German politicians came into power and particularly after they came into power, a fight between two political lines broke out in Germany, between the old policy which found expression in the well-known treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Germany and the “new” policy which in the

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main recalls the policy of the ex-Kaiser of Germany who at one time occupied the Ukraine, undertook a march against Leningrad and transformed the Baltic countries into a *place d'armes* for this march; and this "new" policy is obviously gaining the upper hand over the old policy. The fact that the supporters of the "new" policy are gaining supremacy in all things while the supporters of the old policy are in disgrace cannot be regarded as an accident. Nor can the well-known action of Hugenberg in London, nor the equally well-known declarations of Rosenberg, the director of the foreign policy of the ruling party in Germany, be regarded as accidents. That is the point, comrades.

(2) Secondly, I have in mind the restoration of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. There cannot be any doubt that this act has very serious significance for the whole system of international relations. It is not only that it improves the chances of preserving peace, that it improves the relations between the two countries, strengthens commercial intercourse between them and creates a base for mutual co-operation; it is a landmark between the old, when the United States in various countries was regarded as the bulwark for all sorts of anti-Soviet tendencies, and the new, when this bulwark was voluntarily removed, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

Such are the two main facts which reflect the successes of the Soviet peace policy.

It would be wrong, however, to think that everything went smoothly in the period under review. No, everything did not go smoothly, by a long way.

Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear upon us by England, the embargo on our exports, the attempt to interfere in our internal affairs and to put out feelers to test our power of resistance. It is true that nothing came of this attempt and that later the embargo was removed; but the aftermath of these attacks is still felt in all things that affect the relations between England and the U.S.S.R., including the negotiations for a commercial treaty. And these attacks upon the U.S.S.R. must not be regarded as accidental. It is well known that one section of the English conservatives cannot live without such attacks. And precisely because they are not accidental we must bear in mind that attacks on the U.S.S.R.

will be made in the future, that all sorts of menaces will be created, attempts to damage it will be made, etc.

Nor can we lose sight of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan which stand in need of very considerable improvement. Japan's refusal to conclude a pact of non-aggression, of which Japan stands in need no less than the U.S.S.R., once again emphasizes the fact that all is not well in the sphere of our relations. The same thing must be said in regard to the rupture of negotiations concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway due to no fault of the U.S.S.R., and also in regard to the outrageous deeds the Japanese agents are committing on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the illegal arrests of Soviet employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway, etc. This is quite apart from the fact that one section of the military men in Japan are openly advocating in the press the necessity for a war against the U.S.S.R. and the seizure of the Maritime Province with the avowed approval of another section of the military, while the government of Japan, instead of calling these instigators of war to order, is pretending that this is not a matter that concerns it. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances cannot but create an atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty. Of course, we will continue persistently to pursue the policy of peace and strive for an improvement in our relations with Japan because we want to improve these relations. But it does not entirely depend upon us. That is why we must at the same time adopt all measures for the purpose of guarding our country against surprises and be prepared to defend it in the event of attack.

As you see, besides successes in our peace policy we also have a number of negative phenomena.

Such are the foreign relations of the U.S.S.R.

Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody—let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer blow for blow against the instigators of war. Those who want peace and are striving for commercial intercourse with us will always receive our support. But those who try to attack our country will receive a stunning

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rebuff to teach them not to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet garden again.

Such is our foreign policy.

The task is to continue to pursue this policy with all persistence and consistency.

From the Interview given to Mr. Roy Howard, President of the American Scripps-Howard Newspapers
(1 March, 1936)

Howard: What in your opinion would be the consequences of the recent events in Japan for the situation in the Far East?

Stalin: So far it is difficult to say. Too little material is available to do so. The picture is not sufficiently clear.

Howard: What will be the Soviet attitude should Japan launch the long-predicted military drive against Outer Mongolia?

Stalin: If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. Stomonyakov, Litvinov's assistant, recently informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow of this and pointed to the immutable friendly relations which the U.S.S.R. has been maintaining with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.

Howard: Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulan-Bator make positive action by the U.S.S.R. a necessity?

Stalin: Yes.

Howard: Have recent events developed any new Japanese activities in this region which are construed by the Soviets as of an aggressive nature?

Stalin: The Japanese, I think, are continuing to concentrate troops on the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic, but no new attempts at frontier conflicts are so far observed.

Howard: The Soviet Union appears to believe that Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union and are planning military co-operation. Poland, however, protested her unwillingness to permit any foreign troops using her territory as a basis for operations against a third nation.

How does the Soviet Union envisage such aggression by Germany? From what position, in what direction would the German forces operate?

Stalin: History shows that when any state intends to make war against another state, even not adjacent, it begins to seek for frontiers across which it can reach the frontiers of the state it wants to attack. Usually the aggressive state finds such frontiers. It either finds them with the aid of force, as was the case in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium in order to strike at France, or it "borrows" such a frontier, as Germany, for example, did from Latvia in 1918, in her drive to Leningrad. I do not know precisely what frontiers Germany may adapt to her aims, but I think she will find people willing to "lend" her a frontier.

Howard: Seemingly, the entire world to-day is predicting another great war. If war proves inevitable, when, Mr. Stalin, do you think it will come?

Stalin: It is impossible to predict that. War may break out unexpectedly. Wars are not declared nowadays. They simply start. On the other hand, however, I think the positions of the friends of peace are becoming stronger. The friends of peace can work openly. They rely on the power of public opinion. They have at their command instruments like the League of Nations, for example. This is where the friends of peace have the advantage. Their strength lies in the fact that their activities against war are backed by the will of the broad masses of the people. There is not a people in the world that wants war. As for the enemies of peace, they are compelled to work secretly. That is where the enemies of peace are at a disadvantage. Incidentally, it is not precluded that precisely because of this they may decide upon a military adventure as an act of desperation.

One of the latest successes the friends of peace have achieved is the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance by the French Chamber of Deputies. To a certain extent this pact is an obstacle to the enemies of peace.

Howard: Should war come, Mr. Stalin, where is it most likely to break out? Where are the war clouds the most menacing, in the East or in the West?

Stalin: In my opinion there are two seats of war danger. The first is in the Far East, in the zone of Japan. I have in

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mind the numerous statements made by Japanese military men containing threats against other powers. The second seat is in the zone of Germany. It is hard to say which is the most menacing, but both exist and are active. Compared with these two principal seats of war danger the Italian-Abyssinian war is an episode. At present the Far Eastern seat of danger reveals the greatest activity. However, the centre of this danger may shift to Europe. This is indicated, for example, by the interview which Herr Hitler recently gave to a French newspaper. In this interview Hitler seems to have tried to say peaceful things, but he sprinkled his "peacefulness" so plentifully with threats against both France and the Soviet Union that nothing remained of his "peacefulness." You see, even when Herr Hitler wants to speak of peace he cannot avoid uttering threats. This is symptomatic.

Howard: What situation or condition, in your opinion furnishes the chief war menace to-day?

Stalin: Capitalism.

Howard: In which specific manifestation of capitalism?

Stalin: Its imperialist, usurpatory manifestation.

You remember how the first World War arose. It arose out of the desire to re-divide the world. To-day we have the same background. There are capitalist states which consider that they were cheated in the previous redistribution of spheres of influence, territories, sources of raw materials, markets, etc., and which would want another redivision that would be in their favour. Capitalism in its imperialist phase is a system which considers war to be a legitimate instrument for settling international disputes, a legal method in fact, if not in law.

Howard: May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear existent in what you term capitalistic countries of an intent on the part of the Soviet Union to force its political theories on other nations?

Stalin: There is no justification whatever for such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to change the face of surrounding states, and by forcible means at that, you are entirely mistaken. Of course, Soviet people would like to see the face of surrounding states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding states. I fail to see what danger

the surrounding states can perceive in the ideas of Soviet people if these states are really sitting firmly in the saddle.

Howard: Does this, your statement, mean that the Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans and intentions for bringing about a world revolution?

Stalin: We never had such plans and intentions.

Howard: You appreciate, no doubt, Mr. Stalin, that much of the world has long entertained a different impression.

Stalin: This is the product of a misunderstanding.

Howard: A tragic misunderstanding?

Stalin: No, a comical one. Or, perhaps, tragi-comic.

You see, we Marxists believe that a revolution will also take place in other countries. But it will take place only when the revolutionaries in those countries think it possible, or necessary. The export of revolution is nonsense. Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made it, and now we are building a new, classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated.

Howard: At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., President Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged identical notes concerning the question of propaganda. Paragraph four of Litvinov's letter to President Roosevelt said that the Soviet government undertakes "not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group—which has as its aim the overthrow or preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of its territories or possessions." Why, Mr. Stalin, did Litvinov sign this letter if compliance with the terms of paragraph four is incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union or beyond its control?

Stalin: The fulfilment of the obligations contained in the paragraph you have quoted is within our control; we have fulfilled, and will continue to fulfil, these obligations.

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According to our constitution political emigrants have the right to reside on our territory. We provide them with the right of asylum just as the United States gives right of asylum to political emigrants. It is quite obvious that when Litvinov signed that letter he assumed that the obligations contained in it were mutual. Do you think, Mr. Howard, that the fact that there are on the territory of the U.S.A. Russian whiteguard emigrants who are carrying on propaganda against the Soviets and in favour of capitalism, who enjoy the material support of American citizens and who in some cases represent groups of terrorists, is contrary to the terms of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement? Evidently these emigrants enjoy the right of asylum, which also exists in the United States. As far as we are concerned, we would never tolerate on our territory a single terrorist, no matter against whom his criminal designs were directed. Evidently the right of asylum is given a wider interpretation in the U.S.A. than in our country. But we are not complaining.

Perhaps you will say that we sympathize with the political emigrants who come on to our territory. But are there no American citizens who sympathize with the whiteguard emigrants who carry on propaganda in favour of capitalism and against the Soviets? So what is the point? The point is not to assist these people, not to finance their activities. The point is that official persons in either country must refrain from interfering in the internal life of the other country. Our officials are honestly fulfilling this obligation. If any of them has failed in his duty let us be informed about it.

If we were to go too far and to demand that all the whiteguard emigrants be deported from the United States, that would be encroaching on the right of asylum proclaimed both in the U.S.A. and in the U.S.S.R. A reasonable limit to claims and counter-claims must be recognized. Litvinov signed his letter to President Roosevelt, not in a private capacity, but in the capacity of a representative of a state, just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement is an agreement between two states. In signing that agreement both Litvinov and President Roosevelt, as representatives of two states, had in mind the activities of the agents of their states who must not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. The right of asylum proclaimed in both countries could not be affected

by this agreement. The Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, as an agreement between the representatives of two states should be interpreted within these limits.

Howard: Did not Browder and Darcy, the American Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress of the Communist International last summer, appeal for the overthrow by force of the American government?

Stalin: I confess I do not remember the speeches of Comrades Browder and Darcy; I do not even remember what they spoke about. Perhaps they did say something of the kind. But it was not Soviet people who formed the American Communist Party. It was formed by Americans. It exists in the U.S.A. legally. It puts up its candidates at elections, including presidential elections. If Comrades Browder and Darcy made speeches in Moscow once, they made hundreds of similar, and certainly stronger speeches at home, in the U.S.A. The American Communists are permitted to advocate their ideas freely, are they not? It would be quite wrong to hold the Soviet government responsible for the activities of American Communists.

Howard: But in this instance, is it not a fact that their activities took place on Soviet soil contrary to the terms of paragraph four of the agreement between Roosevelt and Litvinov?

Stalin: What are the activities of the Communist Party; in what way can they manifest themselves? Usually their activities consist in organizing the masses of the workers, in organizing meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. It goes without saying that the American Communists cannot do all this on Soviet territory. We have no American workers in the U.S.S.R.

Howard: I take it that the gist of your thought then is that an interpretation can be made which will safeguard and continue good relations between our countries.

Stalin: Yes, absolutely.

M O L O T O V

*From the Report at the Seventh Congress of Soviets on the Work of
the Government
(28 January, 1935)*

Soviet Initiative for the Preservation of Peace

There are therefore no internal obstacles to the further development of our country. But as regards external hindrances the case is different. The crisis still prevailing in the capitalist countries has accentuated the danger of external complications, the danger of war.

In their search for a way of escape from the crisis and the prolonged depression the bourgeois classes are increasing the pressure on the workers and toilers. The domestic policy of the bourgeois governments is determined by this effort to escape from the crisis by bringing pressure to bear on the working class and the toiling peasants. Openly or covertly, the last remnants of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy are being abolished. The bourgeoisie is coming increasingly to favour a policy of direct violence and terror against the toilers.

The result of all this is an aggravation in the internal situation in the capitalist countries.

But the relations between these countries are also tending to become ever more acute to intensify the struggle for foreign markets and more and more to assume the form of commercial and currency wars. Pacifist talk is becoming a thing of the past. Pacifists are no longer in fashion. Out-and-out imperialist wirepullers are increasingly approaching power in the bourgeois countries and are speaking more and more frankly of new wars of annexation, of war as a way of escape from the crisis.

In spite of the danger that the outbreak of a new imperialist war would involve for the ruling classes themselves in the capitalist countries, certain countries have already resorted to open action. Thus, Japan has not hesitated to start a war

on China, has occupied Manchuria and is generally making herself at home in the country of the great Chinese people. Not only Japan, but Germany also has withdrawn from the League of Nations, and the meaning of this policy is patent to all. They did so in order to leave their hands free in the matter of armaments and preparations for war. Quite recently the Washington agreement on naval armaments, concluded thirteen years ago by America, Great Britain, Japan and other states, collapsed, because certain people had come to regard it as a hindrance in the race for naval armaments and in the preparations for a new armed conflict for the Pacific. The diplomacy and foreign policy of the bourgeois countries are more and more becoming the servants of those who are already seeking allies for a war for a new redivision of the world among the imperialist powers at the expense of the weaker countries.

We must bear in mind that the direct danger of war against the U.S.S.R. has increased. Certain influential circles in Japan have long been openly talking of a war on the Soviet Union. Nor should it be forgotten that there is now a ruling party in Europe which has frankly proclaimed its historical mission to be the seizure of territories in the Soviet Union. Not to perceive the approach of a new war is to close one's eyes to the principal danger.

The Soviet Union replied to all this firstly by intensifying its efforts for peace.

Everybody knows the wide initiative displayed by the U.S.S.R. in the matter of the pacts of non-aggression. During the period under review the Soviet Union has concluded pacts with the neighbouring Baltic states and with a number of European countries. It is not the fault of the U.S.S.R. that attempts to conclude a pact of non-aggression with Japan have proved fruitless.

Of great significance was the proposal made by the U.S.S.R. for defining an aggressor. Statements may be heard at international conferences and met with in a number of international treaties regarding the necessity of adopting specific measures against the attacking side, against the aggressor state which starts the war. But in spite of this the governments of bourgeois countries have never betrayed a desire to state clearly who is to be regarded as the attacking

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party, in other words, the country responsible for the outbreak of war. It became necessary for Soviet diplomacy, which is particularly interested in the maintenance of peace and in measures for preventing military aggression, to tackle the task. And this task too has been fulfilled by Soviet diplomacy with honour. The proposal we have made in this connexion was submitted to an international conference for consideration. But in order to advance this matter immediately in a practical way, we proposed to several countries to conclude pacts of this kind, that is to say, treaties defining the aggressor party. As you know, such pacts have been signed by all the European states bordering on our frontiers, and also by Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Our government has always attributed considerable importance to a clear statement of the question of disarmament, or at least of a maximum reduction of armaments. And it was in this direction that the efforts of Soviet diplomacy at the International Disarmament Conference were directed. It may be said that the numerous sessions of the International Disarmament Conference have been barren of result. But nobody can assert that the Soviet Union has not done everything it could to insist on general disarmament, or at least on the maximum disarmament possible. It is not for us to defend the Geneva Disarmament Conference, but we have no doubt at all that the efforts made by Soviet diplomacy at this Conference, which have become widely known in numerous countries, will not be in vain. A logical corollary of this policy was our proposal to convert the Disarmament Conference, of which some would like to rid themselves as soon as possible, into a permanent peace conference, into a body whose constant concern will be the prevention of war. This proposal has still to be discussed by other countries at an international conference and we shall insist on it.

The question of our attitude to the League of Nations has recently taken on a new form. As you know, the League of Nations was formed by states which at that time would not recognize the right of existence of the new workers' and peasants' state, but on the contrary participated in the military intervention against the Soviets. Strong efforts were at one time made to convert the League of Nations into a weapon directed against the Soviet Union. It was to help to bring

about an understanding among the imperialists for this purpose. But this attempt failed.

Since then much water has flowed under the bridge. Recent events have served to emphasize the change that has occurred in the position of the League of Nations. The more bellicose and aggressive elements have begun to withdraw from the League of Nations. The League of Nations under existing circumstances proved to be an incumbrance, an inconvenience for them. But the majority of the members of the League of Nations at present for one reason or another are not interested in the outbreak of war. It behoved us to draw our own concrete, Bolshevik conclusions from this state of affairs. We therefore responded sympathetically to the proposal made by thirty states to the U.S.S.R. to join the League of Nations. Inasmuch as the League of Nations may now play a certain favourable part in maintaining peace, the Soviet Union could not but admit the expediency of collaborating with the League of Nations in this matter, although we are not prone to overestimate the importance of such organizations. It need hardly be said that the invitation extended by thirty states to the U.S.S.R. to join the League of Nations does not in any way diminish the international prestige of the Soviet Union, but rather the contrary. We enter this fact to our credit.

Not only has the Soviet government itself displayed initiative; it has also supported the measures taken by other governments on behalf of peace and international security. In this connexion reference should be made to the active support we gave to the proposal of France for what is known as an Eastern pact of mutual assistance. In addition to the U.S.S.R., this pact is to embrace other countries, such as France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The signatories to this treaty are to render each other every form of support, including military support, in the event of attack by one of the countries which have signed the pact. Negotiations for the conclusion of such a pact have been proceeding for several months between the countries mentioned. I shall not now stop to discuss the pretexts on which Germany, and Poland with her, has so far refused to consent to sign this pact. But the significance of the Eastern pact for all supporters of peace in Europe is obvious. And

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therefore, in spite of the resistance and objections so far offered by the countries mentioned, the Soviet government regards its attitude towards this matter as unchangeable. We shall look upon success in this matter as a forward step in the cause of preserving peace in Europe.

From this will be seen the basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The basis of our foreign policy is to preserve peace and to develop peaceful relations with all countries.

The rôle of the U.S.S.R. as a durable factor of general peace is now widely recognized. It has become the rule for other countries to address themselves to the Soviet Union in all matters relating to the preservation of peace. And that is natural.

There is not a single country, not even the smallest state bordering on the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., which has any grounds for uneasiness with regard to the Soviet Union, and this is more than can be said of certain other large states. The prestige and might of the workers' and peasants' state in international relations now serve only one cause, the cause of general peace. The Soviet Union has become the spokesman of the vital interests of the toilers of all countries in the sphere of international relations. Whatever our class enemies may say, the political significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. under present conditions, when the danger of war is becoming more and more real, is that nowhere in the world can there be found a more reliable stronghold of peace than our workers' and peasants' government.

*From the Speech on the National Economic Plan for 1936 at the Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
(10 January, 1936)*

The International Situation, the Growing War Menace and our Policy

I shall now pass to problems of foreign policy.

During the past year the relations between the Soviet Union and other countries have on the whole developed normally. In nearly all cases our relations with foreign states developed in a direction favourable to the cause of peace. At any rate, everything that depended on the Soviet government was done

to strengthen the cause of universal peace and, primarily, to strengthen peace in Europe and Asia.

There is no need just now to dwell in detail on the relations between the U.S.S.R. and individual countries. As compared with the period in which the Seventh Congress of Soviets met, no essential changes have taken place, and on certain important points I shall have occasion to dwell later.

As an example illustrating the idea behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, one might point to our relations with our immediate neighbours, the states on our borders.

Along the whole of our vast land frontiers in the West, South and East, a total length of about 20,000 kilometres, there are situated many large, middle-sized and small states which are not always as friendly towards the U.S.S.R. as, let us say, Turkey. Throughout all this period not a single one of these states has had any cause for anxiety as far as we are concerned. On the contrary, even the smallest states, including those whose policy frequently wavers under the pressure of the anti-Soviet forces of larger imperialist powers, have never had, nor have now, any reason to express anxiety with regard to the Soviet Union. However, I must deal separately with our relations on the Far Eastern frontiers, where, in connexion with the occupation of Manchuria by Japan, a specific situation, as you know, has been created.

With a view to insuring peace in Europe, the Soviet government and also the governments of France, Czechoslovakia and certain other states attached great importance to the conclusion of what is known as the East-European Pact of Mutual Assistance, which, on the proposal of France, was to be signed, apart from the U.S.S.R., France and Czechoslovakia, also by Germany, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. However, owing to the counteraction of Germany, and then of Poland, the East-European Pact of Mutual Assistance fell through.

This did not prevent the conclusion last May of a treaty of mutual assistance between France and the Soviet Union. During the visit paid to Moscow by M. Laval, the present Prime Minister of France, there was re-affirmed the common desire of the U.S.S.R. and France to facilitate the conclusion of a regional East-European pact between the states already mentioned, imposing the obligations of non-aggression, consultation and non-assistance to an aggressor.

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Following on this a treaty of mutual assistance was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. In doing so the representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia declared that they regarded both the treaty between the U.S.S.R. and France and the treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia merely as a partial accomplishment of the aim of insuring peace in Eastern Europe.

In the report of the conversations which took place in Moscow with M. Benes, now President of Czechoslovakia, it was stated that the representatives of both countries at the present time attach exclusive significance "to the actual realization of a comprehensive collective organization of security on the basis of the indivisibility of peace." This is the policy to which the government of the Soviet Union adhered and still adheres.

I shall also mention the visit paid to Moscow by Mr. Eden, now the British Foreign Secretary. The importance of this visit will be gathered from the fact that as a result of the conversations between the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Mr. Eden it was possible to announce that "at the present time there is no conflict of interests between the two governments on any important question of international policy." The conditions therefore favour a further development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the whole developed normally, chiefly in the commercial and economic field. In this connexion one cannot ignore the repeated attempts which are being made artificially to fan an anti-Soviet campaign in a certain section of the American press by circles which are definitely reactionary and inclined towards fascism, with the object of undermining the policy of closer relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—a policy which is of tremendous importance to the preservation of universal peace.

During the past year diplomatic relations were established by the U.S.S.R. with Belgium, Luxembourg and Colombia.

On the other hand, the government of Uruguay, under the pressure of Brazilian and, it is said, also of certain European reactionaries, has broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

If the Uruguayan gentlemen are to be believed, one might

think that the Soviet government has nothing else to occupy it than the internal affairs of Brazil and Uruguay, which those gentlemen, the Brazilian and Uruguayan rulers, evidently understand very badly if they attribute all their misfortunes to others. If you have read Demyan Byedny's New Year poem "A Political Lout," which gives a fairly adequate explanation of the Uruguayan incident and its connexion with the question of Uruguayan cheese and so on, there is no need to dwell on the Uruguayan gentlemen any longer.

However, the Soviet government cannot ignore acts, even on the part of Uruguay, which are not only absolutely unjustified in regard to our country, but are also a direct violation of the covenant of the League of Nations, to which both the U.S.S.R. and Uruguay belong. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has therefore addressed a complaint to the League of Nations on the action of the Uruguayan government, as expressed in a rupture of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. without first submitting the dispute to a court of arbitration or to the Council of the League, as the covenant of the League of Nations requires.

I shall now pass to the relations with Germany and Japan, which, for obvious reasons, attract the particular attention of the toilers of our country.

I shall begin with Germany.

I must say quite frankly that the Soviet government would have desired the establishment of better relations with Germany than exist at present. This seems to us unquestionably expedient from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples both of the U.S.S.R. and of Germany. But the realization of such a policy depends not only on us, but also on the German government.

And what is the foreign policy of the present German government? I spoke of the principal trend of this foreign policy at the Seventh Congress of Soviets, when I quoted from Herr Hitler's book *My Struggle*, which is in a sense a programme, and which is being distributed in Germany in millions of copies. In this book Herr Hitler definitely speaks of the necessity of adopting "*a policy of territorial conquest*." And in this connexion, Herr Hitler makes no bones of declaring: "*When we speak of new lands in Europe to-day we can only think in the first instance of Russia and her border states.*"

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Since the time these statements of Herr Hitler's were read from the rostrum of the Congress of Soviets, the German government has not made any attempt to deny these plans of aggrandizement at the expense of the Soviet Union, but, on the contrary, by its silence has fully confirmed that Herr Hitler's statements referred to still retain their validity. For us, this was not unexpected. Carrying their plans to extremes, Messieurs the National-Socialists, as we all know, are driving their preparations for aggrandizement precisely in this direction, although not in this direction alone.

This criminal propaganda for the seizure of foreign territory had now found new followers outside of Germany. All sorts of echoers of German capital are to be found in neighbouring Poland, such as M. Studnitsky and the other harebrained gentlemen on the Cracow newspaper *Czas*, who have gone to such lengths as to blab openly in the press of the seizure of certain territories belonging to the U.S.S.R., of which certain dotards have frequently dreamt in their drunken ravings. Such hallucinations are not unknown to certain elements in neighbouring Finland who are orienting themselves more and more on the most aggressive imperialist states.

Everybody knows that German fascism is not merely confining itself to elaborating plans of conquest, but is preparing to act in the immediate future. The German fascists have in the sight of all turned the country which has fallen into their hands into a military camp, which, owing to its position in the very centre of Europe, constitutes a menace not only to the Soviet Union. Even if we do not mention other countries, who does not know that over Czechoslovakia, for instance, which is not threatening any of her neighbours and is engaged in peaceful toil, the dark clouds of German fascism have gathered, bristling with soldiers' bayonets and gun muzzles, supplied with every known, and yesterday still unknown, chemical for poisoning and infecting people, and with swift and silent warplanes for the purpose of unexpected attack armed with everything which converts modern warfare into a mass slaughter not only of soldiers at the front, but also of simple, peaceful citizens, women and children?

All this constitutes a growing menace to the peace of Europe, and not of Europe alone.

How contradictory is the situation in present-day Germany can be seen from the following.

Side by side with the desperate anti-Soviet foreign policy of definite ruling circles in Germany, at the initiative of the German government an agreement between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was proposed and concluded on 9 April, 1935, for a credit of 200,000,000 marks for a period of five years. On the whole, this credit is being successfully utilized by us, just as is the five-year credit of 250,000,000 kroner accorded to us last year by Czechoslovakia. During the past few months representatives of the German government have offered us a new and larger credit, this time for a period of ten years. Although we are not chasing after foreign credits and, in contradiction to past days, are now to a large extent purchasing abroad for cash, and not on credit, we have not refused, and are not now refusing, to consider also this business proposal of the German government.

The development of commercial and economic relations with other states, irrespective of the political forces that are temporarily ruling those countries, is in conformity with the policy of the Soviet government. We think that it is also in conformity with the interests of the German people, and it is the business of the government of Germany, of course, to draw its practical conclusions.

Finally, as regards relations with Japan.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated its peaceable and accommodating spirit by concluding an agreement for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. The agreement for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was signed last March. The railway has been handed over to the Japanese-Manchurian authorities. The payments to the Soviet Union of the sums due for the Chinese Eastern Railway and the purchase of goods with these sums in Japan and Manchuria are proceeding normally. On all other practical questions the Soviet Union has also hitherto found ways of reaching agreement with Japan.

However, the principal question in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Japan remains unsettled. Japan so far has evaded the proposal we made three years ago for the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese treaty of non-aggression. Such conduct cannot be regarded otherwise than as suspicious.

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On the other hand, there is no cessation or reduction in the number of attempts made by Japanese-Manchurian troops to violate our frontiers. I will mention one incident that took place on 12 October in the Novo-Alexeyevka district, when about fifty Japanese and Manchurian soldiers crossed the frontier line and penetrated more than two kilometres into Soviet territory, opening rifle and machine-gun fire on our frontier troops. As a result of the exchange of shots, Kotelnikov, a commander of a frontier unit, was killed and two other frontier men were wounded. Meeting with an energetic repulse and having suffered corresponding losses, the frontier violators withdrew to Manchurian territory. But the provocative nature of such incidents will be obvious without further explanation.

Here is another example of the conduct of representatives of the Japanese government, conduct which is also incompatible with normal relations.

Nearly six months have already elapsed since our ambassador to Japan, Comrade Yurenev, submitted a draft agreement for the creation of Soviet-Japanese-Manchurian frontier committees for the examination and liquidation of frontier incidents. But so far the Japanese government has not replied to our proposal.

It is said that the frontier incidents on the Soviet borders were required by certain Japanese military circles in order to divert attention from the way they are lording it in Manchuria and from their expansionist activities in North China and on the territory of the Chinese Republic generally. It is asserted that these and similar frontier incidents were required by certain persons in Japan in order to demonstrate to the foreign world the "firmness" and "strength" of Japanese policy. One thing is clear, that this playing with fire along our Far Eastern frontiers is not ceasing, and that the Japanese militarists are drawing nearer to our frontiers both directly and through the territory of others.

A report recently appeared of the conclusion of a military agreement between Japan and Germany and of Poland's connexion with this matter. There is nothing unexpected in this for us. It is not for nothing that both Japan and Germany left the League of Nations in good time, in order to leave their hands free, and, with good reason, are regarded by the

whole world as the powers with the most aggressive foreign policy.

The fascist rulers of Germany sometimes endeavour to divert the attention of naïve people from their plans of conquest with regard to the Soviet Union by referring to the absence of common frontiers between Germany and the U.S.S.R. But we know, on the other hand, that Germany, encouraged by certain foreign powers, is feverishly preparing to occupy a dominant position in the Baltic and has established special relations with Poland, which has fairly extensive common frontiers with the Soviet Union.

And therefore in respect both to our Eastern and our Western frontiers, we must place our defence on a proper footing.

Not a little has been done in this direction during the past few years. But when it is a question of protecting the peaceful labour of the workers and collective farmers of our country from foreign attack, when it is a question of defending our gains and the great work of socialist construction, we cannot rest content with the results achieved in the matter of defence.

We must find all the necessary material resources for this, without stint, and therefore we must this year considerably increase that part of our state budget which is connected with the defence of the country. We have trained a powerful Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and we must now work still more persistently and see to it that our entire army consists of devoted fighters who have completely mastered their job—airmen, artillery men, chemical fighters, tank operators, sharpshooters and fighters of all other necessary arms. We have introduced personal titles for the commanding ranks of the Red Army in order still further to strengthen and enhance the importance of the leading cadres of our army. Only such a Red Army can effectively serve the cause of peace, the cause of the defence of the frontiers of the Soviet Union, the cause of socialism.

We must continue to strengthen our Red Army and at the same time utilize every opportunity of maintaining peace and of explaining to the toilers of all countries the special line of principle we are pursuing in the international policy of peace.

The fact that we have joined the League of Nations does not mean that there is no longer a radical difference in principle between Soviet foreign policy and the policy of

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capitalist powers. The Italo-Abyssinian war shows that the contrary is the case.

The Italo-Abyssinian war is a typical imperialist war for colonies. Italian fascism is openly advocating the policy of seizing Abyssinia and transforming her into an Italian colony. Regarding herself as a slighted power in the matter of the colonial spoils which the principal imperialist states divided up among themselves after the World War, Italy has launched a new war in order to extend her colonial possessions by force of arms at the expense of Abyssinia. Fascist Italy in this case is acting as the pioneer for a new partial re-division of the world, which is pregnant with great consequences and many unexpected surprises for the ruling capitalist classes in Europe. The fascist government is demanding that the other imperialists and the League of Nations as a whole should support its colonial offensive.

The true policy of the powers is revealed in their attitude towards the Italo-Abyssinian war. It is the major decisive powers that must be chiefly borne in mind here.

At a superficial glance it may appear that there are differences of principle between these powers with regard to the policy of colonial conquest. Actually, of course, this is not so. The difference in the positions of the various capitalist states belonging to the League of Nations by no means consists in a difference in principle with regard to colonial conquest. This difference is to be explained primarily by the fact that the various major powers are differently interested in the degree to which Italy's imperialist might should be strengthened. This may also be said of the powers which do not belong to the League of Nations. There is not a single capitalist power which would place the independence of any weak country above the interests of its own selfish participation in the division of colonies.

The Soviet Union alone has taken up a definite position of principle with regard to the Italo-Abyssinian war, a position hostile to imperialism, a position hostile to a policy of colonial conquest of any kind. The Soviet Union alone declared that it bases itself on the principle of the equality and independence of Abyssinia which, in addition, is a member of the League of Nations, and that it cannot support any action of the League of Nations or of individual capitalist states which aims at

violating this independence and equality. This policy of the Soviet Union, which distinguishes it in principle from the other members of the League of Nations, is one of exclusive international significance and one which will yet yield valuable fruit.

The Soviet Union has demonstrated in the League of Nations its fidelity to this principle—the principle of the political independence and national equality of all states—in the case of one of the small countries—Abyssinia. The Soviet Union has also taken advantage of its membership of the League of Nations to put into practice its policy towards an imperialist aggressor.

The first year of the Soviet Union's membership of the League of Nations has fully borne out the correctness of our decision to join the League. Despite all the shortcomings inherent in the League of Nations, as an organization of capitalist states, the League has to a certain degree served as a restraining force on warmongers and aggressors. The League of Nations can and should be criticized for not having taken adequate measures, for instance, in connexion with the Italo-Abyssinian war, in respect to which the League of Nations after all was obliged to express its opinion as to who was the aggressor. It must also be admitted that the League did nothing to prevent this war. However, the fact cannot be ignored that in the present case the League of Nations hampered not those who served the cause of peace, but those who wanted to help the aggressor. It is in this light that we must consider the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the decisions of the League in the matter of the Italo-Abyssinian war and, in particular, in the economic sanctions against Italy, which was considered by the League to be the aggressor.

The Italo-Abyssinian war shows that the threat of a world war is growing and is steadily spreading over Europe.

This war has only just begun and it is impossible at present to say when and how it will end, who, however, does not see that Italian fascism is playing with big stakes?

The fact that the dominant forces in Italy regard the principal way of strengthening their position to be not internal cultural economic and progress, but a hazardous war for new colonies, speaks for itself. Even now, when the capitalist countries are more or less—and, it should be said, very

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unevenly—emerging from the economic crisis of the past few years, they themselves no longer believe in the possibility of achieving any considerable increase of strength by the development of their internal forces. It is only in this way that one can understand the launching of new imperialist wars for colonies. And this, too, is the underlying reason for the Italo-Abyssinian war.

Countries like Japan and Germany, and now Italy, have already advanced, or are prepared any day to advance, to the foreground in new conflicts between the imperialist powers of the whole world. There is not a single capitalist state which is not in one way or another affected by the activity of the foreign policy of the three mentioned powers. In this international situation the responsibility of the Soviet Union is particularly great.

Whoever launches into a new imperialist war may succeed in breaking his neck before accomplishing his plans of aggrandisement. The possibility is not excluded that the calculations of the imperialist cliques on the passivity of the masses of the people may be upset at the most unexpected moment, as has been the case before. It is not difficult for us Bolsheviks to understand such strivings on the part of the masses of the people. We also know that the masses of the people in capitalist countries have no sympathy for the predatory plans of the imperialists of all shades, especially of the imperialists in the fascist camp.

But we, the toilers of the Soviet Union, must rely for the defence of our cause on our own strength, and on the defence of our fatherland—first and foremost on our Red Army. We shall take every measure to frustrate every possibility of an external attack on our country by the imperialists. But if they attack us notwithstanding, we have no doubt that our Red Army will inflict the repulse they deserve.

The working class of Russia, together with the revolutionary peasantry, has flung off the yoke of the landlords and capitalists and has helped to bring about the national emancipation of all the peoples of the former tsarist empire. The toilers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are now working harmoniously to build a new life and are really advancing towards a happy life.

And yet there are imperialist gentlemen who dream of

robbing the peoples of the Soviet Union of their freedom and of saddling us with foreign landlords and capitalists. To this we reply: "Dear sirs, open your eyes, you were born too late!"

There was a time when we suffered the rigours of foreign military intervention, but then we were weak and hungry and had not yet really managed to breathe the fresh air. But even then the imperialist plans to destroy our state collapsed ignominiously.

Since then conditions in our country have radically changed.

The national economy is not now like what it was ten and fifteen years ago. Every important branch of industry has been technically reconstructed, and on this basis new people have already grown up who have mastered technique and are advancing the productivity of socialist labour with Stakhanovite speed.

Since that time the most backward part of our country—the village—has been reconstructed to its very foundations. The collective farms and the liquidation of the last of the capitalist classes—the kulaks—have put the finishing touches to the liquidation of classes in our country. With the destruction of the last of the capitalist class strata in the countryside, which, like small parasites, were particularly tenacious, the whole revenue of our country now passes into the hands of the toilers and their state. Life has improved, and now as never before the doors to a happy and cultured life for all the peoples of our Union stand wide open. We are already enjoying the first fruits of our victory and we see that an unparalleled rise in the standard of living and culture of all the peoples of the Soviet Union awaits us.

And in spite of all this, we have not yet seen the last of people who in their blind hatred of the new world are planning the seizure and dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Well, what shall we say to them? It is true, we appeared in the world without the permission of these gentlemen, and undoubtedly against their wishes. . . .

This means that the time has come when the old world must make way for the new.

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*From the Interview given to M. Chastenet, Editor-in-Chief of
Le Temps
(19 March, 1936)*

Chastenet: What is the position of the Soviet government in the present international crisis? Does it not consider that the primary purpose of the military reoccupation of the left bank of the Rhine, which enables Germany to construct a line of fortifications along the French frontier, is to leave Germany greater freedom for aggression in the East?

Molotov: The remilitarization of the Rhineland has undoubtedly increased the menace to countries lying to the east of Germany, and to the U.S.S.R. in particular. It would be wrong not to see that. Nevertheless, the movement of German troops into the Rhineland bordering France and Belgium, and the construction of fortifications along the Franco-Belgian frontier, in violation of certain international treaties, are a threat primarily to the western neighbours, France and Belgium. In this connexion we well understand that there should be particular anxiety in France and Belgium.

Chastenet: Since it is clear from this that the interests of the Soviet Union and France in the present international crisis are to a certain extent identical, the question arises: what action should be taken in the face of this crisis and what is the attitude of the Soviet government towards it?

Molotov: In connexion with your question I might refer to the speech made by Comrade Litvinov in London which was published in the newspapers to-day. It throws a clear light on the policy of the Soviet government in relation to the present international situation and deals with this situation as a whole, which relieves me of the necessity of dwelling on this subject in detail.

Chastenet: In the event of Germany undertaking an attack in the West, and of Poland remaining neutral, what practical assistance could the U.S.S.R. give to France? The question is somewhat of a strategical character. Evidently, the assistance rendered by the U.S.S.R. would have to be rendered through Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Poland's neutrality would, however, considerably hamper the action of the U.S.S.R. How could Soviet assistance to France be rendered practically?

Molotov: In order to answer this question one must know the

concrete situation in which it would arise. Whatever aid will be required by France in the event of an attack on her by a European state, inasmuch as it follows from the Franco-Soviet Pact, which contains no limitations in this respect, will be given to France by the Soviet Union. Assistance will be rendered in accordance with this Pact and the political situation as a whole.

Chastenet: Does the Soviet government consider an improvement in Polish-Soviet relations possible, and, if so, how does it consider this improvement could be brought about?

It is desirable that Poland should be on the side of France and the Soviet Union. This would also be in the genuine interests of Poland herself. However, with the state of Soviet-Polish relations as they are at present there is a possibility that Poland may adopt a position of neutrality. Does not the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars consider it desirable to find some way of improving Soviet-Polish relations?

Molotov: The Soviet government considers an improvement in Soviet-Polish relations both desirable and possible. One of the ways of achieving this was proposed last year in the shape of the Eastern Pact, which Poland could join.

Chastenet: Some Poles assert—I am not giving this as my own opinion, but am simply transmitting what I have heard—that Communist propaganda in Poland, which at one time ceased entirely, was renewed with fresh vigour in the middle of 1935. If this is so, could not an attempt be made to put a stop to it, as a means of improving Soviet-Polish relations?

Molotov: I have no knowledge of facts of Communist propaganda in Poland which you mention, and, in general, this question seems to me artificial and dragged in by the hair by those Poles who informed you of such cases.

Chastenet: I stayed in Poland four days and came to the conclusion that influential persons in Poland consider that Poland has common interests with the U.S.S.R. and that the two sides are divided only by questions of a sentimental and historical character.

Molotov: The Soviet Union has definitely renounced the imperialist and oppressive tendencies of tsarism. We are opposed to every kind of national oppression and have proved it in practice, both by our home policy and our foreign policy.

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This also determines our attitude to the historical past of nations, of Poland in particular. If Polish statesmen really desired to strengthen peace in Europe, in which the Polish nation is undoubtedly highly interested, sufficient opportunities to improve Polish-Soviet relations would be found.

Chastenet: Do all the trends in the Soviet Union to-day equally consider a *rapprochement* between Germany and the Soviet Union impossible under present conditions? I am referring to the reports that within the Reichswehr there are groups who from purely political considerations favour *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. Are there analogous tendencies in the U.S.S.R.?

Molotov: There is a trend among a certain section of the Soviet people which is absolutely irreconcilable in its attitude towards present ruling Germany, especially in view of the recurrent hostile utterances made by German rulers against the Soviet Union. However, the main trend, the trend which determines the policy of the Soviet government, considers an improvement in relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. possible. Of course, there are various ways of achieving this. One of the best ways is for Germany to join the League of Nations, provided, however, that Germany proves in practice her respect for international treaties, that she proves in practice that she will keep her international obligations in conformity with the true interests of peace in Europe and the interests of universal peace. If these conditions are observed, the participation of Germany in the League of Nations would be in the interest of peace and would be favourably regarded by us.

Chastenet: Even of Hitler Germany?

Molotov: Yes, even of Hitler Germany.

Chastenet: What is the attitude of the Soviet government to the possibility of a Franco-German *rapprochement*? If such a *rapprochement* were to take place, would it regard it favourably?

Molotov: We are aware of France's desire to preserve peace. If the German government also proved in practice its desire for peace and its respect for treaties, if, in particular, it proved this in relation to the League of Nations, then on this basis of defending the interests of peace we would regard a Franco-German *rapprochement* as desirable.

Chastenet: How, after the recent Japanese crisis and Mr.

Stalin's interview, does the Soviet government conceive its relations with Japan in the near future?

Molotov: There have been signs recently of a certain improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations. This was reflected in the recent negotiations between the Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Stomonyakov, and the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ota. The substance of these conversations has been published. The negotiations are not yet completed, but there is a possibility of an improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Chastenet: Does the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars think that after Mr. Stalin's declaration there have been any new signs of an intention on the part of the Japanese to attack Outer Mongolia?

Molotov: There have been no new facts pointing in this direction.

Chastenet: How in the opinion of the Soviet government could France most usefully co-operate with it just now in the matter of military preparations? What I have in mind is, should this co-operation take the form of contacts between the General Staffs, or should it take the form of the supply of military materials by France to the Soviet Union?

Molotov: The question requires special study. The military experts would have to deal with it.

Chastenet: I should like to put the same question with regard to industry. Does the Soviet government propose just now to place orders with French industry, and what kind of orders?

Molotov: The trade agreement concluded at the beginning of January 1936 will be fully complied with by us. Our orders are mainly connected with the purchase of metals, the products of the machine-building and chemical industries and of certain other branches of industry. Our total imports have lately shown a tendency to increase. If technical and financial conditions in France will be no worse than in other countries, it is possible that our orders to France will be increased.

V O R O S H I L O V

*From a Speech delivered on the occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary
of the Red Army
(23 February, 1933)*

We are not thinking of attacking anyone and are protecting ourselves by such expensive works from possible attacks by those who so readily and falsely accuse our country of Red imperialism and similar nonsense. The Red Army does not exist for purposes of conquest; its mission is to defend the land of the workers and peasants. Of course, this chain of fortifications involved the state in considerable expenditure. But we had to do this in order to protect ourselves against those who are anxious to lay their hands on Soviet property. . . . We now have an army, an army devoted to the cause of Socialism, an army that is intensively and successfully striving to become worthy of the weapon that Soviet industry is providing us with, to justify the vast sums spent on it by our country. The Red Army is doing everything to become worthy of the great task laid on it by the working class and the toilers, by our Party, its Central Committee and the friend of the Red Army, Comrade Stalin, namely, to defend our state, which is building Socialism, at all costs and under all circumstances.

Our army will accomplish this task. Every commander, every political worker, every fighter is prepared at any minute, day or night, to carry out any order of his Party, of his workers' and peasants' Government. We have already had a small trial, a brief one, in 1929 in the Far East. True, the examination was a feeble one, the "teachers" proved unworthy of their "pupils." We passed this examination easily, without effort, but like true Bolsheviks. Now we are many times stronger than we were in 1929. A whole five years have elapsed since then. And no matter who the instigators of a new war may be, a war which we do not want, which we are trying and will continue to try with all our power to avoid, our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, supported by the

toilers of all countries, with its reserve in the millions of members of the Osoviakhim and the numerous heroes of the Civil War—our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, headed by our Party, headed by the best of the Leninists—Comrade Stalin, headed by the workers' and peasants' government and Comrade Molotov, will be able to cope with any fomentor of war and defend the cause of the great people that is building Socialism.

*From the Speech at the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.
(10 January, 1934)*

The Situation in the Far East

Comrades, up to now the wise policy of our Central Committee, with Comrade Stalin at its head, in the sphere of international relations has assured us freedom to manoeuvre, and we have not allowed ourselves to be involved in a war. At the present time, as Comrade Stalin has said, we constitute a factor of peace for the whole world. All those states, which, from one consideration or another, for a longer or shorter period, do not want to go to war, are grouping themselves round us, want to secure themselves against attack, against war, which they either do not want or are unable to wage.

Comrade Stalin in his report enumerated all the countries and gave an impartial estimate of our relations with them. In the Near East our relations are excellent. Our relations with the Turkish Republic are of the most friendly and stable. Relations with Persia and Afghanistan are fairly good. You know our relations with our European neighbours—Comrade Stalin has spoken of them in detail. But thunder-clouds are gathering in the Far East. A tempest of war may burst out from that direction.

Despite the efforts made by our diplomats, we have not yet succeeded in persuading the ruling circles of Japan that peace is better than war, that war with us will not be an easy, a simple or a little war for the Japanese imperialists. The war, if they force it on us, will be a big and serious war. This will be a war with the Bolsheviks in *our* day. This war will cost its instigators dear. And those of our distant neighbours who

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think to profit easily at the expense of others should not lose sight of this fact.

I do not by any means want to say, comrades, that a war with Japan will be easy. If the Japanese imperialists resort to a warlike venture, which, in addition would be a highly risky and difficult business for them, they will do so, of course, after having prepared themselves for it in earnest—staking everything on one card, so to speak. The war will therefore be a serious one.

But what have we done in order to make the advanced detachment of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Special Far Eastern Army on our Far Eastern frontiers, capable of destroying the enemy if he should trespass upon our territory?

During these last two years the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin first and foremost have busied themselves and continue to do so with the Far East. We have somewhat strengthened the armed forces of this region. Permit me not to mention the figures.

I have already told you that in the Far East we have also taken certain steps to consolidate the frontiers. On the more vital sections we have created barriers which it will not be easy for the enemy to cross in order to reach our Soviet soil. [Voroshilov went on to mention the chief measures taken to strengthen the defences of the Far East.]

This, comrades, in a few brief and of course incomplete words, is what we have done for the defence of the borders of our state in the Far East. In 1922 Vladimir Ilyich, speaking before the Moscow Soviet on 19 November after the Japanese army had evacuated Vladivostok, said: "Vladivostok is far off, but it is our own town." And this town of ours, like the whole of our Maritime Province, like our Northern Sakhalin, like our Kamchatka, like every foot of our territory in the Far East, we must defend at all costs. And we surely will defend it!

I know, comrades, that all of us like one man are convinced not only that we will defend our Far Eastern territory but also that we will come out victorious from *any* war, if it is forced upon us.

In conclusion I must say that only unbounded obtuseness, only profound ignorance and desperation can explain the

fond dreams of our enemies that they can make any conquests at our expense, that they can in any way destroy communism. Only narrow-mindedness and stupidity, which are evidently the inevitable consequences of the doom of capitalism, can suggest such thoughts to our class enemies.

During the ten years that have elapsed since the day of Lenin's death we have carried out a tremendous work, comrades. Our Party, the working class, all the toilers of the Soviet Union at the present time represent such a tremendous giant force, such a might, such an army of organized fighters that those small shortcomings, those small deficiencies which still accompany our work of construction are nothing but tiny scratches on the magnificent edifice which we have already erected. We have built, it is true, only the foundations of socialism; we have as yet only set about the building of the superstructure; but, comrades, a colossal building is already there and we are living in it to-day. Its name is the U.S.S.R. We are already living not so badly in this building. Having such a mighty Party, such a splendid and well-organized working class as ours is, having such a wonderful ally as our collective farm peasantry was and has now, more than ever, become, having such a well-tried, wise and supremely great leader as our Stalin, we can face the future unafraid. From day to day we will win ever-fresh victories, and no swinish or even fouler snout, wherever it may appear, can terrify the Bolsheviks or will hold up our irresistible march forward.

*From the Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites
(17 November, 1935)*

We are surrounded by numerous enemies. True, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is at present a formidable force. Its strength lies in its unlimited devotion to the cause of Lenin and Stalin. Its strength lies in the unprecedented love it enjoys among the people. Its strength lies in its organization, its solidarity, its new and numerous weapons. The Red Army is invincible. But we must not close our eyes to the strength of our enemies. Our enemies have not the slightest intention of making way for the socialist state. On

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the contrary, it is their most cherished dream to attack us and to destroy the Soviet Union.

We, Bolsheviks, the disciples of Lenin and Stalin, never doubted our final victory. Now, when our strength has increased tenfold, we do not even ask ourselves whether we shall defeat the enemy or not. We shall defeat him without the slightest doubt. That is not the question now. The question now is, at what price, at the cost of what effort and sacrifice will we win? *I personally think—as does Comrade Stalin, Comrade Orjonikidze, and our entire Central Committee and the government—that should the enemy dare to attack us, we must defeat him with the least bloodshed, the minimum expenditure of resources, and with the least possible loss of the lives of our glorious fighters.* And if that is the case—and it cannot be otherwise—we must at all costs see to it, and see to it rapidly, that the arms, the equipment, the supplies for our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army should be first class, the finest in the world. Can we achieve this? Absolutely! We already have everything required for the purpose, we must achieve it, and we will achieve it!

There are people on this earth, in the East and in the West, who openly express their hatred for us and are feverishly preparing to strike at us. We must be constantly on our guard.

T U K H A C H E V S K Y

*Speech at the Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of
the U.S.S.R.
(15 January, 1936)*

Problems of Defence

Comrades, the appropriations for military purposes from the consolidated state budget mentioned by Comrade Grinko, of course, constitute no small sum in absolute figures. But it must be borne in mind, firstly, that the proportion of our military expenditures to the total budget is far less than is the case in the majority of countries. I will not mention those countries which are particularly zealous in their preparations for aggressive war. Secondly, it must also be borne in mind that from the standpoint of the tasks involved in the practical organization of our defence, this figure is actually a modest and minimal one.

I. The Position in the East and West

Comrade Molotov pointed out in his report that the Japanese militarists are creeping towards our frontiers, gradually preparing for military action. Comrade Molotov stated that there was information of a military agreement being concluded between Japan and Germany and of a certain connexion of Poland with this agreement. Comrade Molotov added: "The fascist rulers of Germany sometimes endeavour to divert the attention of naïve people from their plans of conquest with regard to the Soviet Union by referring to the absence of common frontiers between Germany and the U.S.S.R. But we know, on the other hand, that Germany, encouraged by certain foreign powers, is feverishly preparing to occupy a dominant position in the Baltic and has established special relations with Poland, which has fairly extensive common frontiers with the Soviet Union."

I must remind you of the strategical views of the German General Staff, which is now being restored. At the celebra-

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tions in honour of the opening of the Military Academy of the German General Staff the inviolability was proclaimed of the strategical principles of the old German General Staff, from Scharnhorst to Count von Schlieffen. As you know, when Schlieffen was working on the preparations for the offensive against France, he in fact prepared to strike his main blow not where Germany had common frontiers with France, but precisely where Germany had no common frontiers with France. On the outbreak of the war the German army passed through the territory of Belgium, violating the latter's neutrality, and invaded France. It goes without saying that under present conditions, when between Germany and us lie certain states which have special relations with the Germans, the German army, if it really wants to, can find means of invading our territory. How it will end is another question, but of this allow me to speak a little later.

In preparing her imperialist plans, Germany is carrying on very intensive military work. It is not without good reason that Comrade Molotov stated that Germany has in point of fact been converted into a military camp.

Particularly intensive work is being carried on in the development of a powerful air force. Dorothy Woodman, in her book on Germany's air armaments, enumerates a large number of plants engaged in the production of aeroplanes and engines. Aeroplanes are being produced in more than fifty plants. In addition, there are some score of plants manufacturing aeroplane parts. More than twenty plants are producing aeroplane engines and parts, and about twenty plants are engaged in the production of various aircraft instruments and accessories. You therefore see that Germany is keeping her vast aviation industry fully employed, with the result that the development of the German air fleet is making gigantic strides.

This air threat affected British public opinion first of all. Baldwin stated that owing to the achievements of modern aviation the frontiers of Great Britain lie not at Dover but on the Rhine. The British Parliament has sanctioned a vast increase in the air force. Last year an expansion of the air force by 150 per cent was sanctioned. Great Britain had fifty-two squadrons and seventy-one more squadrons are to be formed.

France also was obliged to react to the development of German aviation. She supplemented her budget by an additional vote of 1,000,000,000 francs for the development of her air fleet.

Intense aviation development is also taking place in other countries bordering on our frontiers.

We observe in certain states, in Finland, for instance, an increase in the number of aerodromes, which is in excess of the requirements of the Finnish air fleet.

Germany is making great efforts to develop her artillery. General Spears of the British army declared last March in Parliament that according to available information German industry was producing 300 guns a month and that this figure was to be raised to 500 in the immediate future. I think the figures quoted by General Spears are not far from the mark.

Germany is not only intensively arming her infantry and cavalry units, but is creating a powerful tank force. According to data relating to the production of guns and certain other data which appeared in the world press, we may expect a production in Germany of no less than 200 tanks a month.

The programme for the creation of twelve army corps and thirty-six divisions is being carried out at a feverish speed and far more rapidly than was at first intended. Attention must also be directed to the fact that this armed force consists very largely of regulars, and this means that the German army will be always prepared to carry out unexpected invasions. Its power of mobilization is very great. This fully corresponds with the statements made by General von Seeckt, the former chief of the Reichswehr. I should add to this that, with the object of increasing her ability to carry out sudden attacks, Germany is practising mass transfers of troops both by automobile and rail. For this purpose advantage is taken of the various fascist holidays and celebrations, which are also designed to facilitate preparations for war.

During the National-Socialist Party Congress held in Nuremberg from 9 September to 18 September last year, the Germans transferred 850,000 men to Nuremberg, utilizing 532 trains for this purpose. How intense this transfer of units was is shown by the following figures: on the outbreak of the war, in 1914, troop-trains were despatched to the French

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frontier on 13 railway lines at a rate of 40 trains per day on each line. During the war the intensity of these transfers reached 60 trains a day on each line. In the case of the Nuremberg celebrations the transfers were as follows: on 12 and 13 September, 140 trains arrived at Nuremberg each day. On 17 September, 179 trains left Nuremberg. It should be mentioned in addition that certain military manœuvres were also going on in the vicinity of Nuremberg, which entailed additional movements of troops.

Similar exercises were observed during the celebrations of the harvest festival on 6 October last year at Mt. Buckenberg, to which 300,000 men were transported in the course of twelve hours, requiring 160 trains for the purpose.

Preparations no less intense and, I should say, even more noticeable, are being made in the case of automobile transport. This is proceeding, firstly, in the direction of building super-highways, that is to say, perfected roads which are free of intersections and which provide tremendous opportunities for uninterrupted and unobstructed movements of troops. Plans have been drawn up for the construction of 7,000 kilometres of super-highways in the next few years. Three super-highways will run from west to east. Three thousand kilometres of super-highways were in course of construction in the autumn of 1935. The first few hundred kilometres are already in operation. Three and a half billion marks have been assigned for this purpose, and about thirty per cent of this sum has already been spent.

If alongside of this you bear in mind that a motor corps of National-Socialists has been formed with 150,000 automobiles at its disposal, which carries on systematic training in mass transfers of men, you will understand the significance of this in case of war. At one time this corps concentrated 200,000 men at Tempelhof in the course of seventeen hours. The automobile corps will, of course, play a tremendous role in a period of strategical concentration.

Germany's efforts in creating a powerful military force on land and in the air are being supplemented by an intense development of her naval forces. Since the conclusion of the agreement on naval armaments between Great Britain and Germany the latter has been laying down a large number of vessels, and by 1937 the size of her navy is to be double that

of 1935. But this will be only half of what is provided for in the programme.

One's attention is particularly drawn to the fact that Germany is now building vessels which she was forbidden to build under the Versailles Treaty. That treaty permitted her to build battleships of not more than 10,000 tons displacement, but now it is intended to build battleships up to 26,000 tons; formerly she was allowed to build cruisers of 6,000 tons, now 10,000 tons; destroyers correspondingly—800 tons and 1,650 tons. Formerly, Germany was not allowed to build submarines, she is building them now. Formerly, Germany was not allowed to build aeroplane carriers, she is building them now.

Such, comrades, are the vast preparations being made by the German militarists for war on land and sea and in the air which, considering the political views of the National-Socialists referred to by Comrade Molotov, cannot but compel us to pay serious attention to the protection of our Western frontiers, in order to create the necessary degree of defence.

The position is just as serious on our Far Eastern frontiers. The process here is of older date, and Japanese imperialism each year presents us with new proofs that its intentions are far from peaceable.

To-day's *Pravda* prints extracts from an article by Sudzuki Mosaburo, a Japanese economist. This economist deals with the development of the Japanese budget from 1931 to 1935, and we find that the appropriations for the development of aeroplane construction increased fivefold, and for the development of certain forms of artillery threefold. Appropriations for field artillery increased more than tenfold, and so on. This economist states that if the development of the Japanese munitions industry continues at the present rate it will definitely land Japan into war.

To-day's *Pravda*, too, gives the contents of an article by a prominent official in the Japanese Ministry of War, Sigenomi, who says that the Japanese army must prepare for a protracted war and states that, in particular, preparations must be made to accustom Japanese soldiers to the food of Mongolia and Siberia, since the Japanese soldier is not accustomed to such a diet. Sigenomi openly speaks of a war of conquest and openly threatens the Soviet Union.

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The development of the air force, artillery and tanks is proceeding at an extremely rapid rate in Japan. Even more significant are the preparations in the sphere of railway construction in Manchuria. It will be clear to anybody who glances at the map of Manchuria that it is not from economic considerations that railways are being constructed in that country. The railway construction is of a purely strategical character and is intended to facilitate attack on our Far East. The Japanese built 280 kilometres of railway line in Manchuria in 1932, 500 kilometres in 1933, 900 kilometres in 1934 and 1,200 kilometres in 1935. In addition, over 1,000 kilometres of railway line are still in course of construction.

The development of Japanese naval forces is progressing extremely rapidly. The Japanese have replaced their navy during the past few years. Their first programme, drawn up in 1930, is already almost completed, and they have already begun work on a second naval programme.

II. Increasing the Might of the Red Army

The situation that has arisen both on our Eastern and Western frontiers has necessitated a most serious revision of our defensive measures. We are still in a situation in which we must be prepared for simultaneous and absolutely independent defence on both fronts, fronts which are 10,000 kilometres apart. But to this has been added the necessity of considerably increasing our permanent military preparedness, which has found expression in the energetic adoption of an enlarged form of the regular army system for infantry and other formations. There was also the necessity of further developing our armed forces in general. There has been considerable growth on our Western frontiers as well as compared with former years.

1. Land Forces

Until 1935 the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army consisted predominantly of territorial divisions. As much as 74 per cent were territorial divisions and only 26 per cent regular divisions. With the object of improving the permanent preparedness of the army, in other words, with the object of increasing power of mobilization for the purpose of repulsing sudden attack, we, on the initiative of Comrade Stalin,

reorganized the infantry formations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on the very opposite principle: 77 per cent regular divisions and only 23 per cent territorial divisions.

I should add that the regular divisions have been brought up very close to war-time strength. This greatly enhances the fighting capacity of our numerous infantry regiments: it not only leads to permanent military preparedness, but also creates the most perfect conditions for military training.

Developing the army on the lines of a regular army is of course a very expensive business. Additional barracks must be built, training-grounds and artillery ranges extended, and additional sums spent on the maintenance of personnel. But, on the other hand, as a result of this system military preparedness in peace time approximates most closely to actual conditions in time of war. This is the most perfect system from the standpoint both of power of mobilization and military training.

It can be definitely stated that until 1935 the Red Army never enjoyed such favourable conditions for perfecting its manœuvring capacity and firing practice.

We can at any moment, on the demand of the government, confront an enemy on the Eastern and Western frontiers of our Union with a formidable armed force prepared for action at all times.

In addition to definitely adopting the larger regular army system, we have perfected the defence of our frontiers by an additional development of our mechanized and cavalry formations. And mechanized formations and cavalry, as you know, are distinguished by their high state of military preparedness and their ability to carry out rapid and decisive manœuvres.

It should also be added that the infantry, mechanized and cavalry formations are now far more conveniently distributed from the point of view of defence.

Our air defence has also been strengthened.

All this, together with the powerful development of aviation, provides exceptional opportunities for military operation.

We may rest assured that if there is anybody hankering to violate our frontiers, the Red Army will deal a crushing blow to all who attempt to invade Soviet territory.

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2. Aviation

There has also been an intensive development in aviation in the course of 1935.

Training and auxiliary aviation has grown considerably both in quantity and quality, but the development of independent aviation has been particularly energetic. The latter is undoubtedly the most powerful instrument of modern warfare, and those who are dreaming of seizing Soviet territory cannot but reckon with the might of our air fleet. They should also reckon with the difference in the size of our countries. The size of the Soviet Union creates insuperable difficulties for an attack by hostile aircraft on the majority of our industrial centres, whereas our potential antagonists do not enjoy such advantages.

The quality of the training of our airmen is generally known, and a number of foreign military missions were able to convince themselves of this at last year's manœuvres.

I should also like to add a few words about the training of our army in landing raiding parties from the air. Comrade Voroshilov spoke about this in his speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites. Comrade Voroshilov quoted some examples illustrating how the landing of raiding parties from the air is developing. I will add to this that tens of thousands of men in our army have received parachute badges.

In addition, 16,000 jumps from aeroplanes and more than 800,000 jumps from parachute towers have been made under the auspices of the Society of the Friends of Aviation and Chemistry.

3. The Navy

We are creating a powerful navy. We first concentrated our efforts primarily on the development of the *submarine fleet*, but in the future in addition to building submarines we shall steadily develop our surface fleet.

Our navy must under all circumstances become strong and powerful and on a par with our armed forces generally.

Coastal defence is being considerably strengthened as regards the amount of artillery.

Naval aviation, which plays a big part in modern naval warfare, has been supplemented by new planes of modern design and the number of planes has been increased several fold.

Work on a big scale is being carried out in connexion with extending and perfecting naval bases and aerodromes, and also in connexion with the construction of new naval bases and aerodromes.

It need hardly be said that in developing our navy we are drawing all necessary conclusions in respect to the defence of our coasts both in the East and the West.

4. *Numerical Strength*

All these measures for the defence of the country were inevitably accompanied by an increase in the numerical strength of the armed forces. By 1936 the numerical strength of our Red forces, in all arms, had increased to 1,300,000 men.

5. *Technical Qualification of the Forces*

Carrying out Comrade Stalin's slogan regarding the training of people who have mastered technique, the People's Commissariat of Defence, and Comrade Voroshilov in particular, are paying great attention to the creation of cadres devoted to the cause of the Party and highly qualified in military technique.

The introduction of military titles by the government creates a firmer basis for the training of commanding and technical forces.

The numerical increase of the armed forces which we have been obliged to undertake from year to year has necessitated a big increase both in the number of military schools and in the number of students.

The military schools are fully specialized in accordance with the extensive and advanced technique of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

The number of aviation, tank, artillery, infantry, cavalry, engineering, communications and other schools is growing and great attention is being paid to improving equipment, accessories, laboratories, and so on.

For the training of cadres, the existing army and navy schools have been considerably extended as regards both the number of students and the equipment of lecture rooms and laboratories.

The training of specialists of the reserve in all arms is being considerably extended. It embraces not only intermediate

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commanders but also junior commanders and rank-and-file specialists.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has thirteen military academies specializing in various branches and six military faculties in civil universities. Over 16,000 students are undergoing instruction in the academies alone.

With the object of improving the qualifications of the students in the technical academies, the length of the course has been increased from four years to five years.

There is a considerable increase in the number of aerodromes, training-grounds and rifle and artillery ranges in order to improve marksmanship and the tactical training of the army.

6. Improved Cultural and Living Conditions

Considerable expenditures are necessitated by the improvement of the cultural and living conditions of the Red Army. The general rise in the cultural level and the improvement in the conditions of life of the country must, of course, be reflected first and foremost in an improvement in the living conditions of the Red Army.

It should be said that the tsarist barracks we inherited are of a very unattractive kind. Vast sums will still have to be spent on installing water supply, heat, light, etc. We are also building new, modern cantonments, provided with clubs, libraries, dining-rooms, and so forth.

We have in the Red Army to-day about 1,000 clubs alone. We have to-day a large number of Red Army Houses, and twenty-six more are in course of construction. Red Army theatres are being built. The Red Army has more than 2,000 libraries with over 12,000,000 books, not counting tens of millions of pamphlets. All these measures are extremely costly. I would add that in order to improve the living conditions of the commanding ranks we are in 1936 building a large number of dwelling houses, with more than 47,000 rooms.

There has been an increase of pay in the Red Army. In 1936 the payroll will increase by 57 per cent.

Comrades, the new recruits that are now called up for the Red Army are on a higher cultural level than was formerly the case. True, the present level of culture still does not satisfy us by a long way. We are demanding far more, and we think that the quality of the recruits, as regards education and

culture, will improve from year to year. But even to-day the young people we receive are more cultured and educated, including foremost Stakhanovites among their number, and they compel our commanders, our political workers, our Party organizations to show far more concern, to pay far more attention to the improvement of their military training.

There can be no doubt that the spirit of organization and discipline of the young men is enhanced when they come into the Red Army, and, as you know, our spirit of discipline is based on the development of a conscious, but strict and organized discipline. And these young men emerge even better organized—Stakhanovites—and transplant the knowledge and habits they acquired in the Red Army to the field of production.

But I must say that we in the army are not inclined to lose our heads over our successes, and there is not a year, not a minute, when we might be disposed to rest content with our achievements. Thanks to this, we are improving our work from year to year. Noting our shortcomings, we set about removing them in an organized way, and we are directing our work so as to make still further progress. This work of self-criticism is a guarantee that the military training of the Red Army will achieve a level unattainable by any other state.

I hope, comrades, that this Session will endorse the military expenditures announced by Comrade Grinko and, for its part, the Red Army, its entire personnel, all its Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, will devote all their energies, all their enthusiasm to mastering the complex art of modern warfare, and, headed by our Marshal, Comrade Voroshilov, and guided by our Party and by our leader, Comrade Stalin, should the enemy attack our frontiers, they will answer by a blow that will be at once crushing and victorious.

L I T V I N O V

*From a Speech at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of
Armaments
(11 February, 1932)*

The U.S.S.R. is for Disarmament

In the very thick of the war, the voice of protest against war made itself heard and the cry "war on war" was raised. The war itself could only be kept going, and millions of victims engulfed, by calling it "the last war."

Yet, the whole history of international relations since this so-called "last war" has been marked by a steady and systematic increase in the armed forces of all States and by a colossal increase in the burden of militarism.

The creation of the League of Nations itself and Article 8 of its Covenant, already referred to by several speakers, were nothing but a faint tribute to popular demands for the fulfilment of the promises given by the Governments that the Great War should indeed be the "last war," to the demands of the masses of the workers, grown more enlightened and beginning to take a direct part in political life. In the years ensuing on the war—years of universal impoverishment, of the healing of wounds, both on the part of the defeated and the victorious—the popular clamour for the abolition of war increased, and cannot, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, be satisfied by the stabilization or slight reduction of armaments or war budgets. What is required is to find a way for putting an end to war.

The Soviet Government is not taking part in this Conference on account of formal obligations, and not under any stimulus from outside. From the very first days of its existence it condemned war as an instrument of national policy, by deeds as well as by words, declared against all contributions and territorial annexations, and the oppression of one nation by another, and proclaimed the principle of national self-determination. Ever since, it has in its own policy pursued with

strict consistency the line of peaceful and loyal co-operation with other States. Once war is excluded as an instrument of national policy, the Soviet Government sees no need for maintaining armies or navies and other armed forces and, on its first appearance at an international conference—at Genoa, ten years ago—it proposed total general disarmament as the only way of putting an end to war. It renewed this proposal as soon as it was invited to take part in the work of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament. In making this proposal, my Government took into consideration the demands and claims of the peoples throughout the world, as well as the spirit of its own people.

In the Preparatory Commission, the Soviet delegation urged the speediest possible realization of its proposal. At the same time, we pointed out the imminent danger of new wars and that the only means of averting this danger under the economic system prevailing in most countries, would be total disarmament, and that no treaties, pacts, protocols or international organizations could create real security for all nations. Our point of view was disputed in the Commission. Our warnings as to the imminent possibility of new wars were ridiculed. We were accused of pessimism and of exaggerating the danger. We were told that it was "security" that was required and that this security could be achieved by a system of treaties, protocols and other international undertakings suggested by the League of Nations, and that there was no hurry about disarmament.

Only a few years have passed since this controversy, and what do we see now? The Disarmament Conference had to begin to the accompaniment of the distant rumbling of cannon and the explosions of bombs from the air. Two States, mutually bound by the League of Nations Covenant, and the Paris Pact of 1928, have been in a state of war, *de facto* if not *de jure*, for five months. No war may as yet have been registered with a notary public, but vast territories in one of these countries have been occupied by the armed forces of the other, and battles, in which all sorts of armaments are being employed and thousands are being killed and wounded, are being waged between the regular troops of both countries.

True, all this is going on far away from Geneva, far away from Europe, but who is so optimistic as to assert in good

faith that the military activities which have begun will be limited to two countries only or even to one continent only? Who is so optimistic as to assure us confidently that the events in the Far East are not the beginning of a new war, which, in extent, scope and—thanks to the latest technical inventions—horror, may eclipse the sinister fame of the last war?

Continents are no longer economically and politically isolated. There are countries belonging to more than one continent. There are not many neighbours in Europe without serious territorial accounts to settle. The extent of disputed frontiers is greater now than it was before the war. Can we be sure that these differences will not be thrown into the melting-pot, if a single one of the European States should be dragged into war?

Granted that all this may not happen, that the fire in the Far East may be kept within local bounds, even then can we be sure that similar fires will not break out in other parts of the world? What is to prevent this? International organizations and pacts? But we have seen that they are incapable of either preventing or ending military activities in the Far East, with all the consequences of these activities. Public opinion? It is still more impotent. And, after all, what is public opinion? Has it ever been unanimous anywhere, or served a common purpose? Public opinion, as expressed in the Press or through public bodies, serves various interests, the multiple interests of various countries and of capitalist groups, of private enterprises and even of individuals in these countries.

Have not the acts of violence going on under our very eyes in the Far East their advocates and instigators in the Press, even the Press of countries not immediately concerned? Have we not read quite lately articles in both European and American papers urging the necessity and efficacy of the extension of the war in the Far East and actually suggesting that war would be a way out of the crisis, of that very crisis the acuteness of which must be ascribed to the late war and its consequences?

Nor can the limitation of armaments be expected to prevent the arising of fresh wars. At the present moment, all States are sufficiently supplied with armaments—and armaments sharp enough and destructive enough—to conduct a war, in comparison with which the Great War would appear

mere child's play. The reduction of armaments is equally incapable of guaranteeing us against war, especially if such reduction is not very substantial and is not carried out with the conscious purpose of placing obstacles in the way of war.

The Soviet delegation, basing its attitude upon the needs of the present moment and the demands of the popular masses, those demands which necessitated all the preliminary work of the Conference and which called the Conference itself into being, would sum up the problem before us in the words: "security against war." It is this that distinguishes our conception of security from the conception of other delegations, many of whom, when they speak of security, mean the assuring of the utmost possible chances of victory to a State subjected to attack. The Soviet delegation considers that we must endeavour to make war itself impossible, since it is the people who suffer, both in the victorious and defeated countries, and, moreover, as the last war has shown us, the people in all countries. The Soviet delegation appraises from this standpoint all proposals made to the Preparatory Commission or to be made to this Conference, including the French proposals, which are worthy of more than a casual reference. It is, indeed, as a mark of respect that I respond to the invitation of M. Tardieu, of the French delegation, to criticize and discuss its proposal.

First and foremost it must be stated that, from the point of view of the reduction of armaments, the French proposals scarcely bring us nearer to our aim, inasmuch as they are preliminary conditions requiring to be accepted before any sort of reduction of armaments is to be made on the part of France. The discussion of these conditions would actually convert this Conference into a preparatory conference for a future disarmament conference, requiring perhaps no less time than did the Preparatory Commission. It must be remembered that these proposals represent the further development and materialization of what is known as the Geneva Protocol, which has been before the League of Nations for seven years, provoking wide controversy and so far unaccepted. We have no grounds to assume that the same Protocol, pushed to its logical conclusion, will meet with greater unanimity than before. It would become a question of the creation of a new international organization with

considerable powers and, consequently, of the creation of a new covenant, with regulations for the disposition of an international army, for the definition of aggression; a host of problems fruitlessly debated for ten years in the League of Nations, with the addition of new and still more complicated ones which would spring up. Even now, as far as I know, there is no precise interpretation recognized by all members of the League of Article 16 and other articles of the Covenant, and the rules for their application passed in 1921. To spend time over these questions in the present acute state of political and economic international antagonisms would mean, as far as disarmament is concerned, to put the clock back years if not decades.

The French proposals, however, as I have already said, interest us most of all from the point of view of their capacity to create security against war, and I should like to dwell upon this question in somewhat more detail.

What is the gist of the proposals of the French delegation? It is proposed to create a new army, to consist of a certain number of military bomb-carriers, scattered over various countries or concentrated in a single place, and a certain number of troops reserved in various countries for special purposes. In other words, an army of, say, a few hundred thousand men is to be adequately equipped for the purpose of joining the forces of a State recognized to have been the victim of attack. A State which intends to attack another will have in advance to reckon, not only with the forces of its immediate enemy, but also with those of an army, so to speak, allied to it. Does this imply that the aggressive party will inevitably refrain from attack? Have we not had experience enough of allies and allied armies, and have they ever been the slightest guarantee against war? Many a State in the past, when preparing for war, has had to reckon in advance that it would be up against more than one State, and this consideration has not invariably prevented it from carrying out its war-like intentions. Either it has provided itself with allies, or made its program of armaments to outweigh all possible forces of the enemy side. All that an aggressive State would have to do then would be to take into consideration the forces of the international army also, in laying its plans.

Again, it is obvious that such an international army is not

likely to be very big. We cannot assume that even those States which are adjacent to the theatre of war will be able or willing (except in very special cases) to send large forces to take part in a war not directly concerning them, especially when they themselves have accounts to settle with the State they are called upon to assist. Supposing then that a strong State, capable in time of war of mustering an army running into millions, attacks a State many times weaker than itself! It is quite obvious that a few hundred thousand more soldiers on the side of the weaker State would not be a decisive factor, and therefore such an international army, far from preventing war, could not even always insure the victory to the side attacked.

This is not all. What guarantees would there be that such an international army would be put into operation, and that in good time, before the weaker party to a conflict was crushed? What guarantees would there be that the aggressor will really be found and that when found will be the real aggressor? These questions are by no means idle, by no means theoretical, but have been suggested by well-known facts of international life very present in the minds of us all. Let us suppose that an armed conflict is going on somewhere, whether it has the official stamp of war or not. First of all, it must be established who is the aggressor and who the victim, and whether there has been an infringement of international treaties and undertakings binding upon both parties. In most cases, this is by no means a complicated matter. The unsophisticated man-in-the-street would have little difficulty in giving an answer to these questions and no doubt his answer would be the right one. But when it is international organizations and individual governments which have to give the answer, they might not always be ready with it, and may be reduced to issuing appeals, exhortations and threats simultaneously to both sides. I merely use this supposition for the sake of argument.

But now I would ask—should such a conflict arise in the future—what guarantees would there be that the existing, or some new international organization, at whose disposal the international army would be, would be able or desirous to establish which is the guilty side? After all, it can hardly bomb both sides simultaneously, so as to make sure of hitting the aggressor! What, I ask, are the guarantees that a new inter-

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national organization, or the existing one with increased actual power, will really be able or willing to use such power for the defence of the weaker, for the protection of the attacked against the attacker?

National egoism has been mentioned here as an obstacle to international action. Apparently this egoism shows itself, not only in the decisions of individual governments, but finds its way into the proposals and decisions of the representatives of these Governments at international organizations, paralysing their action or giving it an undesirable turn. If such cases have occurred in the past what is to prevent them from occurring again? Further, what are the guarantees that, since this egoism admittedly exists, an international army would not be exploited in the interests of some State which has won for itself a leading position in the international organization through separate alliances, *ententes* and agreements? There is not a word about the prohibition of such alliances in the French proposals.

I shall be told that the stronger and more actual the means of pressure at the disposal of an international organization, the more resolutely will it act. I venture to doubt this. If States represented in such an organization, either from fear of upsetting their relations with the aggressor, or from other egoistic nationalist considerations, cannot always agree to the use of even feeble means of pressure for the averting and ending of conflicts, how much more are they likely to hesitate before applying such a powerful weapon as the despatch of their own armies? This being so, is it to be expected that States will be sufficiently imbued with the necessary confidence in an international organization and in its impartiality to entrust their security to it and place their own national troops at its disposal?

The question of an international army arose and was discussed, if I am not mistaken, thirteen years ago, when the Covenant of the League of Nations was being drawn up, and it was then decided in the negative. At that time, there was much more faith in international organizations than now. Five months ago, there was still more faith in international organizations than exists now. As for international differences and national egoism, surely these have not been diminished during the last thirteen years! A glance over events in the

sphere of international economic relations will suffice to convince us of this.

I pass over the question of the extent to which the Soviet Union could be expected to confide its security and a part of its own armies to an international organization consisting largely of States openly hostile to it, even to the extent of refusing to maintain normal relations with it. The workers and peasants of the Soviet Union are more likely to see in an international army created in such conditions a threat to their country.

I feel bound, therefore, to state frankly that, as far as security against war, and, therefore, security of States, is concerned, the French proposals arouse grave doubts in our minds. The Soviet delegation is thereby only strengthened in its conviction that the only infallible way to solve the problem of the organization of peace, the problem of averting war, the problem of assuring security to all nations, is the way recommended by it—the way of general and total disarmament.

It would, however, be wrong to infer from what I have said that the Soviet delegation denies the importance and efficacy of all other ways of consolidating peace short of total disarmament. The Soviet Government has shown its readiness for international co-operation by taking part in a series of international congresses and organizations and by the proposals which it has brought before them.

Nor do we underrate the importance of international treaties and undertakings for peace. My Government acceded to the 1928 Paris Treaty at the time and even put it into force with neighbouring States earlier than was done by the Treaty's own initiators. My Government itself makes a practice of concluding mutual non-aggression pacts which it considers infinitely more significant than multilateral or general treaties. It has always proposed non-aggression pacts to all states. These pacts are a kind of acid test for making other states display their spirit, whether peaceful or the reverse. When a pact proposed to a state is immediately accepted and put into force, a certain stability in the relations between the two states may be affirmed. When such a proposal is not immediately accepted but considered for years, and even after the first letter of the signature has been appended to it a period of meditation ensues, and the com-

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pletion of the signature is postponed, there is naturally less feeling of confidence. But still more serious doubts of a peaceful spirit arise with regard to states which categorically reject proposals for the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression, either on some excuse or other, or without giving any excuse. It is then obviously impossible to deny the importance of international pacts as a means of discovering the peaceful or hostile attitude of another state. In addition it must be admitted that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact increases the guilt of the aggressor in cases of disturbance of the peace. Such pacts cannot, however, be considered an actual guarantee against war. Total and general disarmament is the only effective guarantee against war and its devastating effects.

The Soviet delegation submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference a draft convention for total disarmament, to be realized in the course of four years. This was four years ago, and it will hardly be denied that, if our proposal had been accepted at the time, the events in the Far East would not have occurred, there would have been no threats of a new world war, and the economic crisis now being almost universally experienced would undoubtedly have been less acute.

The idea of total disarmament is distinguished from all other plans by its simplicity and by the ease with which it could be carried out and with which its realization could be controlled. A plan for total disarmament would eliminate all those difficult and thorny questions which made the work of the Preparatory Commission so long drawn out, condemned to sterility the innumerable international conferences of the last few years held in various capitals on the question of disarmament, and gave rise to those gloomy forecasts with which this Conference has been met.

Identical security and equality of conditions for all countries could only be arrived at by means of total disarmament. As regards control, it is sufficiently obvious that it would be much easier to find a state out when making tanks, cannon, machine-guns, bombing-planes, in spite of an international undertaking, than if it were only increasing its output of these weapons above the percentage internationally established. It would be easier to find a state out when training its popula-

tion in the use of machine-guns and bomb-throwing, in the face of international prohibition, than if it were merely increasing its army above the percentage laid down.

I must, however, once again emphasize the fact that the Soviet delegation has by no means come here merely to put before you, yet another time, its proposal for total and general disarmament, or to declare that we are determined to have all or nothing, complete disarmament or none at all. We have no illusions whatsoever as to the fate in store for our proposition. Our delegation is ready to discuss with you any proposals tending to reduce armaments, and the further such reduction goes, the more readily will the Soviet delegation take part in the work of the Conference. Considering the draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission altogether inadequate, the Soviet delegation will advocate here its own draft for the reduction of armaments, which, however, it regards merely as the first step towards total disarmament.

I would remind the Conference that the Soviet delegation was the first to propose in its second draft convention put before the Preparatory Commission, the complete destruction of the most aggressive types of armaments, including:

1. Tanks and super-heavy long-range artillery;
2. Ships of upwards of 10,000 tons displacement;
3. Naval artillery of over 12 inches calibre;
4. Aircraft carriers;
5. Military dirigibles;
6. Heavy bombing-planes, all stock of air bombs and any other means of destruction for use from aeroplanes;
7. All means and apparatus for chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare.

The Soviet delegation proposed the complete prohibition of air bombing, and not only beyond the limits of a definite area. It also proposed not merely to refrain from chemical warfare but actually from preparing for it in time of peace.

All these proposals remain in full force for the present Conference.

The Soviet delegation will recommend the progressive proportional method as the most impartial and equitable

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method for the reduction of armaments, allowing for facilities and exceptions in favour of weaker countries in danger of aggression. It will warmly support any proposals approaching or outstripping its own. It will support the equal rights of all participants in the Conference, and equal security for all states.

*From the Speech delivered at the Plenary Meeting of the World Economic Conference
(14 June, 1933)*

The U.S.S.R. Strictly and Steadfastly Pursues a Policy of Peace.

I am sure, gentlemen, that you all realize that economic peace is only possible against the background of peace in all phases of international life. However excellent may be the resolutions passed by the Economic Conference they will have no influence whatsoever in the alleviation of the economic crisis so long as we continue to be in the present state of general political uneasiness and perturbation, with the uncertainty as to what the morrow will bring forth, and the fear of the outbreak at any moment of that most terrible manifestation of economic conflict—war. This sentiment of general anxiety has not only not been allayed of late but, if anything, has increased, in spite of international consultations and the conclusion of pacts. Indeed we are now cognizant of international consultations and pacts which have actually added to political mistrust. Nothing but radical measures in the sphere of disarmament and the strengthening of security guarantees by the signing of bi-lateral and general pacts of non-aggression, could to some extent calm those fears and create the proper atmosphere for peaceful economic relations.

One factor, and that no inconsiderable one, in the creation of political uncertainty is the attitude of the capitalist world to the state of a hundred and seventy million inhabitants which has adopted the Soviet system and is endeavouring to bring about socialism, that is to say, the realization of a theory which would make all international wars and economic crises an impossibility. Although the International Economic Conference of 1927 adopted a resolution admitting the

principle of the peaceful co-existence at the present historical stage of two systems—the capitalist and the socialist—this principle has up to the present not been put into practice by all states. Even in the sphere of economics, special barriers have still been preserved, hampering the free development of economic co-operation between certain countries and the country of the Soviets. Some countries in which these barriers have been removed, are from time to time putting them up again. The Soviet government for its part has always adhered strictly and consistently to the principle of peaceful co-existence and abstained from all possible measures of aggression in all spheres of international life, in which, of course counter-reprisals cannot be included. Soviet delegations have acted in the spirit of the peaceful policy of their government and the peoples represented by them, at all international conferences in which they have taken part. The Soviet delegation attends this Conference in the same spirit.

*From the Speech at the Fourth Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.
(29 December, 1933)*

The Guiding Principle of the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.

The guiding principle of our foreign policy has been put very briefly, but very expressively, by Comrade Stalin: We desire no foreign land, but we shall not surrender a single inch of our own land to anyone. Once we do not desire any foreign lands, then we cannot want war. As for our own land, we have every possibility of defending it and to prevent any attempt at its invasion. Our growing armed forces could teach a lesson to any of our near or distant neighbours which would prevent them for decades from again attempting to invade us, but this would be an unproductive waste of our means and energies. It would distract us for a time from our fundamental work of constructing socialism.

Intensifying Struggle for Peace.

We are therefore doing everything possible to defend our territory by peaceful means even though this may not be a radical means for removing the threat of aggression against

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us. We consider that even military activities commenced outside the immediate frontiers of our Union may be a menace to us, hence we not only continue but are intensifying our struggle for peace which has always been and still is the basic problem of our diplomacy. As Comrade Molotov rightly said: This struggle corresponds with the desire of the masses of the people of all countries.

During the last year we have extended the system of non-aggression pacts. Such pacts are now in force between the U.S.S.R. and not only all our neighbours, with the exception of Japan and China, but also with France and Italy. We have made a further step towards the intensification of the significance and effectiveness of the non-aggression pacts by proposing an exhaustive definition of the idea of aggression itself. This proposal of ours is already contained in agreements with a solid chain of our neighbours from Finland to Afghanistan and with all the three countries of the Little Entente.

The definition of aggression which we have given is generally recognized to be a valuable contribution to the science of international law, and also of international practice, at the same time it forms an excellent measure for determining the absence or presence in any state of aggressive, annexationist aims. We shall, therefore, continue to struggle for the universal recognition of this definition.

*From the Speech at the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference
(29 May, 1934)*

The U.S.S.R.—a Consistent Fighter for Peace

The Disarmament Conference had been called at a time when, to many, war seemed only a theoretical or an historical possibility. Could the Conference, must the Conference, close down completely and disappear without a trace? Could delegations peacefully disperse to their homes with the consciousness that they had not done their duty—just now of all times, when the peril of a most bloody war, or rather of a series of such wars, overhung every continent and the whole of humanity? There were few states at present which could

consider themselves removed from such a peril. It might affect some earlier, others later, but it was not to be escaped.

There were, he knew, politicians whose sum-total of wisdom consisted in beating out a track for this peril away from themselves, in the hope that, having selected one direction, the peril would never seek another. Vain hopes! History knew of no case in which imperialist states, bent upon conquest and the extension of their power, displayed affection for only one part of the globe—south, west, east or north. Consolidated in one direction, they hurled themselves with renewed and increased energy to new conquests in other directions, and most frequently in all directions. In face of such a danger, not a single state—if only in the interests of self-preservation—had the right to wash its hands of responsibility and refuse to participate in the common international cause of averting this terrible danger. The governments would thereby do a service, not only to their own peoples, but to those peoples who, against their own will, and for purposes foreign to their desires and real interests, might be thrown into the furnace of sanguinary and adventurist experiments.

The Soviet government looked back, not without pride, to those measures of security which, on its initiative, had been adopted during recent years in that part of Eastern Europe with which it was particularly concerned. By means of pacts for the definition of aggression, pacts of non-aggression and their prolongation for the maximum periods possible, the Soviet government had succeeded in strengthening mutual confidence with the vast majority of its neighbours, and in reinforcing their feeling of security. It had thought out a new variety of pacts and declarations which, he trusted, might in the future find widespread practical application—namely, pacts and declarations by stronger states which guaranteed the independence of weaker states lying between them or close to them. Not on all occasions had the Soviet government succeeded in these efforts, and not always had it found a response from those states which it had approached. But, even in such cases, the Soviet proposals had done their service to the cause of peace, by helping to bring out into the light of day the points at which a breach of the peace might be expected.

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But the Soviet government was prepared to add its contribution to even wider measures for the safeguarding of universal peace. And the co-operation of the Soviet government in an international cause, or with any international organization, brought with it the tremendous moral force of an increasingly powerful state of one hundred and seventy millions, which had finally broken with the common past—of military conquest, plunder and annexation—and during the sixteen years of its new existence had given abundant proof of its sincere devotion to peace.

*From the Speech at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations
(On the Occasion of the Entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, 18 September, 1934)*

The entry into the League, in the fifteenth year of its existence, of one of the greatest States in the world does undoubtedly call for some explanation.

I will speak with that frankness and moderation which many of you, knowing me of old, will, I am sure, grant me, and which can only be helpful to our mutual understanding and our future co-operation.

We represent here a new state—new, not geographically, but new in its external aspects, its internal political and social structure, and its aspirations and ideals. The appearance in the historical arena of a new form of state has always been met with hostility on the part of old state formations. It is not surprising that the phenomenon of a new state with a social and political system radically different from any heretofore known should come up against intense hostility from without and manifested by literally all other countries in the world. This hostility has been not merely theoretical, but has found expression even in military action, assuming the form of prolonged externally organized attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the new state for the purpose of getting it back to the old lines. At the time when the League of Nations was being formed to proclaim the organization of peace, the people of our country had as yet not been enabled to enjoy the blessings of peace. They still had to defend their in-

ternal peace with arms, and to contend for long for their right to internal self-determination and their external independence. Even after the most extreme forms of intervention in the affairs of our State were over, the hostility of the outer world continued to be manifested in the most varying degrees and forms.

All this makes it quite obvious that the relations between the Soviet state and the League of Nations could not be other than those existing between itself and the states belonging to the League. Not only this, but the people in the Soviet Union naturally feared that these nations united in the League might give collective expression to their hostility towards the Soviet Union and combine their anti-Soviet activities. It can hardly be denied that at that time, and even very much later, there were still statesmen who thought, or at least dreamed, of such collective action. On the one hand, they were inclined to underrate the internal powers of resistance of the new state, and, on the other hand, to overrate that harmony of political and economic interests in the other states which, it seemed to them, the League should have embodied. They continued to believe that the last world war would be the last war in the world, and that the order established by it was immutable and secure against any attempts at alteration by force. They dreamed of establishing at least temporary peace, which would, however, by no means have been extended to the new Soviet state. The history of the last ten years, the history of the League of Nations itself, the increasing conflicts of international interests, the prolonged economic crisis, and, finally, the development of the Soviet state, have shown the world how Utopian were these dreams and aspirations.

Today we are happy to be able to state that the exponents of those Utopias and the advocates of the policy of ignoring and isolating the Soviet Union are no longer to be met among broad-minded statesmen, among the representatives of the more important states moulding international life who think on realistic lines and understand the needs of the present day, but must be searched for among narrow-minded politicians unable to rise above their petty political passions and strong prejudices and deriving their knowledge of countries and peoples from muddled sources. It remains only to pity such

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people and to wish them a speedy enlightenment and a return to more reliable sources of information.

I take this opportunity of expressing my conviction that, in the meantime, the League will see to it that such people have nothing to do with the settlement of affairs affecting the interests of the soviet State, in which impartial judgment and at least an elementary understanding of world events are necessary.

I have already described the attitude of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations both at its formation and during the first stages of its development and have given the reasons for that attitude. To this I must frankly add that the Soviet government could not have agreed with all the decisions of the League at that time and that, had we taken part in drawing up the Covenant of the League, we would have contested certain of its articles. In particular, we should have objected to the provision in Articles 12 and 15 for the legalization, in certain instances, of war, and that is why I stated in my letter of 15 September to the President of the Assembly our satisfaction at the proposals to alter these articles. Further, we should have objected to Article 22 on the system of mandates. We also deprecate the absence in Article 23 of an undertaking to ensure race equality.

All this, however, has not been important enough to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the League, especially since any new member of an organization can be morally responsible only for decisions made with its participation and agreement.

In order to make our position quite clear, I should like further to state that the idea in itself of an association of nations contains nothing theoretically unacceptable to the Soviet state and its ideology. The Soviet Union is itself a league of nations in the best sense of the word, uniting over 200 nationalities, thirteen of which have a population of not less than one million each, and others, such as Russia and the Ukraine, a population running into scores of millions. I will make so bold as to claim that never before have so many nations coexisted so peacefully within a single state, never before have so many nations in one state had such free cultural development and enjoyed their own national culture as a whole and the use of their own language in particular.

In no other country are all manifestations of race and national prejudice so resolutely put down and eradicated as in the Soviet Union.

Here, as regards equality of rights, are neither national majorities nor minorities, since no nation, either in theory or practice, has less rights and fewer opportunities for cultural and economic development than another. Many nationalities which seemed to have been doomed to die out altogether have received a fresh lease of life and begun to develop anew, and this on territories where, before the Soviet regime, all nationalities except the dominating Russian were being stamped out by violence and oppression.

At the present time the periodical Press in the Soviet Union appears in fifty languages. The national policy of the Soviet Union and the results of this policy have received their due both from friends and foes visiting the Soviet Union and studying the national question on the spot.

All the nationalities in our Union are, of course, united by a common political and economic regime and by common aspirations towards a single ideal, for the attainment of which they vie among themselves. The Soviet state has, however, never excluded the possibility of some form or other of association with states having a different political and social system, so long as there is no mutual hostility and if it is for the attainment of common aims. For such an association it considers that the essential conditions would be, first, the extension to every state belonging to such an association of the liberty to preserve what I might call its state personality and the social economic system chosen by it—in other words, reciprocal non-interference in the domestic affairs of the states therein associated; and, secondly, the existence of common aims.

As to the first condition, which we have named, the peaceful coexistence of different social-political systems at a given historical stage, we have advocated it again and again at international conferences. We have managed to get it recognized by inclusion in some of the resolutions of these conferences. But further developments were necessary before this principle was able to gain for itself wider recognition. The invitation to the Soviet Union to join the League of Nations may be said to represent the final victory of this principle. The Soviet Union is entering into the League to-

day as representative of a new social-economic system not renouncing any of its special features, and—like the other States here represented—preserving intact its personality.

With regard to common aims, these have long ago been established in many spheres. Workers in the fields of science, art and social activities in the Soviet Union have long been co-operating fruitfully with representatives of other states, both individually and on organized lines, in all spheres of science and culture and on problems of a humanitarian nature.

The co-operation of the Soviet Union with other states within the framework of the League of Nations has also long ago shown itself to be both desirable and possible in the sphere of economics. Soviet delegations have taken part in the Committee of Enquiry for European Union, which occupied itself chiefly with economic questions; in both Economic Conferences, and in other Conferences of a lesser range. It will not be out of place here to remark that at all these Conferences proposals were put forward by the Soviet delegations with a view to the utmost reduction of the existing chaos in international economic relations and in the interests common to all concerned.

Neither has the Soviet government abstained from co-operation of a political nature whenever some alleviation of international conflicts and increase of guarantees of security and consolidation of peace might reasonably be expected from such co-operation. I will only mention the active part taken by the Soviet delegation in the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference and in the Conference itself, when, on behalf of the Soviet government, it declared its readiness for any degree of disarmament, taking its stand on far-reaching proposals for the ensuring of peace, none of which have received world-wide recognition and even application. In this respect I remember, not without pride, the Soviet definition of aggression, which has been made the basis of innumerable international acts.

It needed, however, one great dominating common aim to prove uncontestedly to all nations, including those of the Soviet Union, the desirability—nay, the necessity—for closer co-operation between the Soviet Union and the League of Nations, and even for the entry of the Soviet Union into the

League. The discovery of such a common aim has been greatly facilitated by the events of the last two or three years.

Thirty delegations to the Assembly, comprising most of the Members of the League and representing all the big states and those of importance in international life, declared in their address to the Soviet Union that the mission of the League was the organization of peace, and that the success of this mission demanded the co-operation of the Soviet Union. They knew that the state which they were addressing had not spared, throughout the seventeen years of its existence, its efforts for the establishment of the best possible relations with its own neighbours, on the most solid foundations, for *rapprochements* with all states desiring this, thus making itself a powerful factor for international peace.

For its part, the Soviet government, following attentively all developments of international life, could not but observe the increasing activity in the League of Nations of states interested in the preservation of peace and their struggle against aggressive militarist elements. More, it noted that these aggressive elements themselves were finding the restrictions of the League embarrassing and trying to shake them off. All this could not be without its influence on the attitude towards the League of Nations of the Soviet government, ever searching for further means for the organization of peace, for co-operation in which we have been invited to come here.

The organization of peace! Could there be a loftier and at the same time more practical and urgent task for the co-operation of all nations? The words used in political slogans have their youth and their age. If they are used too often without being applied, they wear themselves out and end by losing potency. Then they have to be revived and instilled with new meaning. The sound and the meaning of the words "organization of peace" ought now to be different from their sound and meaning twelve or fifteen years ago. Then, to many members of the League of Nations, war seemed to be a remote theoretical danger, and there seemed to be no hurry as to its prevention. Now, war must appear to all as the threatening danger of to-morrow. Now, the organization of peace, for which so far very little has been done, must be set against the extremely active organization of war. Then,

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many believed that the spirit of war might be exorcised by adjurations, resolutions and declarations. Now, everybody knows that the exponents of the idea of war, the open promulgators of the refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are not to be intimidated by paper obstacles. members of the League of Nations know this by experience. We are now confronted with the task of averting war by more effective means.

The failure of the Disarmament Conference, on which formerly such high hopes were placed, in its turn compels us to seek more effective means. We must accept the incontestable fact that, in the present complicated state of political and economic interests, no war of any serious dimensions can be localized, and any war, whatever its issue, will turn out to have been but the first of a series. We must also tell ourselves that sooner or later any war will bring misfortune to all countries, whether belligerents or neutrals. The lesson of the world war, from the results of which both belligerents and neutrals are suffering to this day, must not be forgotten. The impoverishment of the whole world, the lowering of living standards for both manual and brain workers, unemployment, robbing all and sundry of their confidence in the morrow, not to speak of the fall in cultural values, the return of some countries to mediaeval ideology—such are the consequences of the world war, even now, sixteen years after its cessation, which are making themselves acutely felt.

Finally, we must realize once and for all that no war with political or economic aims is capable of restoring so-called historical justice, and that all it could do would be to substitute new and perhaps still more glaring injustices for old ones, and that every new peace treaty bears within it the seeds of fresh warfare. Further, we must not lose sight of the new increase in armaments going on under our very eyes, the chief danger of which consists in its qualitative still more than in its quantitative increase, in the vast increase of potential destruction. The fact that aerial warfare has with such lightning speed won itself an equal place with land and naval warfare is sufficient corroboration of this argument.

I do not consider it the moment to speak in detail about effective means for the prevention of impending and openly promulgated war. One thing is quite clear for me, and that

is that peace and security cannot be organized on the shifting sands of verbal promises and declarations. The nations are not to be soothed into a feeling of security by assurances of peaceful intentions, however often they are repeated, especially in those places where there are grounds for expecting aggression or where, only the day before, there have been talk and publications about wars of conquest in all directions for which both ideological and material preparations are being made. We should establish that any state is entitled to demand from its neighbours, near and remote, guarantees for its security, and that such a demand is not to be considered as an expression of mistrust. Governments with a clear conscience and really free from all aggressive intentions, cannot refuse to give, in place of declarations, more effective guarantees which would be extended to themselves and give them also a feeling of complete security.

Far be it from me to overrate the opportunities and means of the League of Nations for the organization of peace. I realize, better perhaps than any of you, how limited these means are. I am aware that the League does not possess the means for the complete abolition of war. I am, however, convinced that, with the firm will and close co-operation of all its members, a great deal could be done at any given moment for the utmost diminution of the danger of war; and this is a sufficiently honourable and lofty task, the fulfilment of which would be of incalculable advantage to humanity. The Soviet government has never ceased working at this task throughout the whole period of its existence. It has come here to combine its efforts with the efforts of other states represented in the League. I am convinced that in this, our common work, from now on the will to peace of the Soviet Union with its hundred and seventy million inhabitants—peace for itself and for other states—will make itself felt as a powerful factor. I am convinced that, as we observe the fruitful consequences of this stream of fresh forces into the common cause of peace, we shall always remember with the utmost satisfaction this day, as one occupying an honourable place in the annals of the League.

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*From the Speech at the Reception for the Representatives of the
Czechoslovakian Press
(January 3, 1935)*

Our Country Is a New Country

I am certain that before forming a definite opinion of our country you will make a study of it. You will then understand what tremendous work we have accomplished since the formation of our Union in every field of national life. You will, perhaps, also familiarize yourselves with our far-reaching programs, and you will then understand how much we have not yet done, how much still remains for us to do. We are filled with the firm determination to do everything, and to carry out our program to the end, and, as we are accustomed to express it in such cases, to overfulfil this program.

To change the entire regime of a state, social, economic and political, a regime established in the course of centuries, historically evolved, to abolish all this and create an entirely new social and economic system, and moreover in such a vast country as ours, with its immense territory and population of one hundred and seventy millions, is not an easy matter and naturally requires considerable time.

The Common Task Is the Struggle for Peace

The fulfilment of such a task demands above all peaceful external conditions, complete tranquillity in foreign relations. What the fulfilment of this task does not demand is any extension whatever of the frontiers of our state. All we have projected can be accomplished within the confines of the existing frontiers, where we have everything the earth can provide. We do not need to acquire anything beyond our borders in the way of new territory. We therefore do not want war. We do not want war, first, because we do not need war, because war cannot give us anything that we do not have, and, second, because war is harmful to us, for it may interfere with our constructive tasks. In this I see a certain similarity with your country, which, although in a different sense, is

also a new State. You have your internal tasks. You have, if I am not mistaken, realized your national aspirations, you do not aspire to the conquest of new territories, and for you war is unnecessary and undesirable for the same reasons as it is for us. Hence our community in one great task—the preservation of peace. . . . All the boundary posts on all the frontiers of Europe are props of peace, and the removal of even one such post will inevitably result in the collapse of the entire edifice of peace.

But we share with you not only the common aspirations for peace, but to a certain extent, even a common program for the ensurance of peace. Both our countries make it their premise that peace can be ensured only by collective effort, by collective and mutual insurance. Together with France, and Czechoslovakia, we have decided that an important factor in ensuring peace, not only in Eastern Europe, as it is customary to think, but in all Europe, is the realization of what is known as the Eastern Guarantee Pact. We do not regard the Eastern Pact as a maximum program; on the contrary, we regard it as the minimum that is required for ensuring peace, a minimum which must not be reduced. The community of our aspirations is likewise dictated by the undeniable circumstance that between our countries lie States whose "peaceful intentions", at the very least, inspire considerable apprehension. Whether we are being faced by a definitely outlined program of aggressive action, or with a readiness to utilize any situation that may arise for military adventures, for attempts to realize unachievable political dreams, in any case we must take such sentiments and possibilities into serious account. And thus our countries are faced with a big job in the carrying out of this common program. We have not joined a restricted and exclusive association whose shares we would like to retain in our own hands alone. No, we want to form an association for definite action, and are prepared to assign the shares of this association to all who want them.

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Speech on the Conflict between Ethiopia and Italy at the Eighty-Eighth Session of the Council of the League of Nations

(5 September, 1935)

Against the Aggressor

It is with deep regret that we have listened to the communication of the representatives of the United Kingdom and of France on the failure of their attempt to settle completely the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia, which would have allowed us to dismiss this question from the agenda and saved each of us the unpleasant duty of passing our individual judgment. This duty is the more unpleasant for me, as one of the parties to the conflict is a state with which the Soviet Union has been maintaining invariably friendly relations for over ten years, with which it sincerely desires to continue these relations, which it would least of all wish to cause any harm, collaboration with which, both in the League of Nations and outside it, for the maintenance of peace in Europe we highly appreciate, and, finally, a nation which enjoys in my country deepest respect and sympathy.

Like the great majority of my colleagues, I have to make on this occasion a statement on a question which does not directly affect the interests of our countries, but which may have the gravest consequences for the whole of international life, for the fate of the League of Nations, for the cause of general peace, and consequently, sooner or later, for our own countries. That is why I am bound to declare with regret my inability to agree to the attitude which the representative of Italy wishes us to adopt. It is true that he made no proposals, but the purport of his statement amounts to an invitation to the Council to declare its disinterestedness in the conflict, its indifference, and to pass it by, sanctioning the freedom of action which he requires for his government; but in this way, while basing his proposal on the non-observance and the violation of its international obligations by the other party to the conflict, he invites the members of the Council to repudiate in their turn their international obligations, to disregard the Covenant of the League of Nations on which, in no little degree, depends the whole edifice of international peace and the security of nations.

The incident of Walwal, which had caused this question to be placed on the agenda of the Council, being now happily settled, there is practically no more any concrete dispute between the parties. Nevertheless, we are faced by the direct threat of impending military operations between two members of the League, by a threat of aggression, which is not only not denied but, on the contrary, confirmed by the representative of Italy himself. Can we ignore this threat and forget the existence of Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant of the League? Would that not be a flagrant violation of the Covenant, would not its violation by the whole Council mean the complete repudiation and negation of the Covenant?

I may be reminded of a precedent when the Council of the League did not take all necessary measures for the prevention of a conflict between two members of the League. But this is exactly a thing to be remembered now, for we all still feel in what measure that case weakened the League of Nations, diminished its authority and contributed to the creation of the politically unstable, menacing situation in which the world finds itself and even, may be, to the arising of the present conflict. The repetition of that precedent would certainly have a cumulative effect and, in its turn, would stimulate new conflicts more directly affecting the whole of Europe. The thesis of the indivisibility of peace is, fortunately, gaining more and more recognition. It has now become clear to the whole world that each war is the creation of a preceding war and the generator of new, present or future wars.

I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the way of arguing of the representative of Italy. I am certain that there is no one here who feels sympathy with the internal regime of Ethiopia as it is described in the documents submitted to us; but, as regards the internal regime, the countries of the world nowadays present a multifarious variety, and very few of them have preserved great likeness between themselves. Nothing in the Covenant of the League entitles us, however, to discriminate between members of the League as to their internal regime, the colour of their skin, their racial distinctions or the stage of their civilization, nor accordingly to deprive some of them of privileges which they enjoy in virtue of their membership of the League, and, in the first place, of their inalienable right to integrity and independence. I

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venture to say that, for the development of backward peoples, for influencing their internal life, for raising them to higher civilization, other means than military may be found. I am bound to remind you that, in the unfortunate precedent I mentioned, there also were attempts at justifying military operations, by references to backwardness, internal disorder, bad administration and so on. There is no doubt that, at any attempt at aggression, similar or other justifications will be put forward. In my mind, the League of Nations should stand firm on the principle that there cannot be justification for military operations except in self-defence, in the same way as no such justification is admitted by the Briand-Kellogg Pact forbidding war as an instrument of national policy.

My observations are of a general character of principle and are directed, if I may say so, against the unknown aggressor. I reserve my opinion on the case, as it has been presented to us by both parties, until it has been examined closely in all its aspects.

The state I represent entered the League but a year ago, with the sole purpose and with the sole promise to collaborate in every possible way with other nations in the maintenance of indivisible peace. It is this purpose and this promise only that are guiding me today when I propose to the Council not to stop short in any efforts or decisions which may avert an armed conflict between two members of the League, thus accomplishing a task which is the *raison d'être* of the League itself.

*From the Speech at the Assembly of the League of Nations
(14 September, 1935)*

The Indivisibility of Peace and the Necessity of Collective Security

The anxiety which has been tormenting the world for the last three years is far from decreasing, but, on the contrary, is growing. It is not only the Ethiopian question that matters or that matters so much; there are other ominous dangers facing Europe and the whole world. We owe it, fortunately, to this anxiety that all peaceable countries, all sincere friends of peace, have convinced themselves of the indivisibility of peace and of the necessity of collective security. But collective

security afforded by the Covenant of the League of Nations is not sufficient. Of this we become more and more convinced with every attempt at the application of the Covenant. Hence the necessity for individual states, or rather groups of states, to take additional measures of security based on the Covenant. Such measures have found their universally recognized expression in regional pacts of mutual assistance.

The Soviet Union, too, has made its contribution to the system of regionally strengthening the peace of Europe. It spared no effort jointly with the governments of France and Czechoslovakia in order to put into practice a regional pact in the eastern part of Europe. Unfortunately, for reasons over which we had no control, we did not succeed in associating in this work of peace all the states belonging to that region, and we therefore could only conclude pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, having the same aim and the same character as a regional pact. There can be no doubt that these pacts have in a large degree contributed to the strengthening of the feeling of security, thus performing in the east of Europe the same functions as does the Locarno Treaty in the western part of Europe. Such pacts cannot be regarded as a threat to anyone but would-be violators of peace; they do not affect anybody's interests and are exclusively serving the cause of peace, and, consequently, the cause of humanity.

We know of another political conception that is fighting the idea of collective security and advocating bilateral pacts, and this not even between all states, but only between states arbitrarily chosen for this purpose. This conception can have nothing in common with peaceful intentions. Not every pact of non-aggression is concluded with a view to strengthening general peace. While non-aggression pacts concluded by the Soviet Union with its neighbours include a special clause for suspending the pact in cases of aggression committed by one of the parties against any third state, we know of other pacts of non-aggression which have no such clause. This means that a state which has secured by such a pact of non-aggression its rear or its flank, obtains the facility of attacking with impunity third states. No wonder that the advocates of such pacts stand also for the localization of war. *But he who says localization of war means freedom of war, its legalization.* A

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bilateral non-aggression pact may become in this way a means of security of aggression. We have thus two clearly-defined political conceptions—security of peaceable nations on one hand, and security of aggression on the other. Fortunately, the latter theory is common to a very few countries and stigmatizes them before the whole world as probable disturbers of the peace.

The conception of collective security has found an excellent acknowledgement and consolidation in the Anglo-French agreement of 3 February, which commends a scheme, not only consisting of a series of regional pacts, but provides also for their interconnection and interdependence. This scheme has met with the enthusiastic approval of the overwhelming majority of European countries, including the Soviet Union, and it has contributed in no small degree to the deepening of the feeling of security in Europe, just as every separate bilateral agreement concluded lately, on the contrary, added to existing uneasiness. That is why I listened with particular satisfaction to the speech of the British Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, who defended with extraordinary eloquence the idea of collective security, assuring us of the fidelity of the United Kingdom government to this idea. I welcome this speech as a good omen for the future of the League.

I might finish now my statement, but I feel that many in this Assembly may wonder why I have not spoken on the question which is mostly worrying and exciting them—the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. I preferred to dwell on general questions because this conflict does not shut out for me the whole international horizon with other dangers looming beyond it. I preferred to state general principles applicable to individual cases. You may be assured that, if all efforts for conciliation fail and the Italo-Ethiopian conflict comes before the Council again or before the Assembly, the Soviet delegation will pass its judgment with impartiality and also with courage, that will not be shaken by intimidation by way of abuses and attacks of the press or by any other methods. I think I defined in the Council with the utmost clearness the attitude, in principle, of the Soviet government towards conflicts of this kind. For the Soviet delegation there is no question of siding with one or the other party to the conflict, or of defending anyone's interests.

As you know, the Soviet government is, in principle,

opposed to the system of colonies, to the policy of spheres of influence and of mandates, to anything pertaining to imperialistic aims. For the Soviet delegation there is only a question of defending the Covenant of the League as an instrument of peace. This instrument has already been somewhat damaged by previous attempts, and we cannot allow a new attempt which would put it completely out of work. We may need it more than once and probably on still more serious occasions. If we leave this Assembly with the certainty that the states whose representatives have addressed us here have formally and solemnly pledged their governments to allow no new attempts against the League's Covenant as an instrument of peace, and to make use of it in all cases of aggression, irrespective of its origin and of its object, this Assembly may become a landmark in the new history of the League. Permit me to assure this Assembly that the state I represent will be second to none in the loyal discharge of assumed international obligations, more especially in the noble task of securing to all nations the blessing of peace which mankind never valued and appreciated so much as it does now, after its relatively recent ordeals. No more of such ordeals.

*Speech at the Ninetieth Session of the Council of the League of Nations
(23 January, 1936)*

On the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations of Uruguay with the Soviet Union

I would like to begin by assuring you, Mr. President, that the Soviet government would not deliberately take up the time of the Council of the League of Nations with the question of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if this affected only the interests of these two countries, more especially since the interests of the Soviet Union remain practically untouched by this rupture. You will have little difficulty in realizing that the one hundred and seventy million population of our Union is not likely to feel very acutely the absence of relations with remote Uruguay.

If you will pardon a slight digression, I should like to say

that I personally have long considered that modern technical developments with regard to means of communication have made obsolete the existing system of diplomatic relations consisting in the maintenance in every capital of permanent diplomatic missions. My government has more than once been faced with the question of doing away with diplomatic missions in certain countries when neither the importance nor the extent of diplomatic relations seemed to justify their upkeep. If it has not in such cases taken appropriate decisions, it is solely owing to its reluctance to discriminate between greater and smaller states or in any way to wound the *amour-propre* of the latter. It does, however, refrain from exchanging diplomatic missions when such considerations do not arise, and does not invariably appoint its representatives to all countries with which it has theoretically diplomatic relations. For instance, though diplomatic relations with the Republic of Colombia have existed theoretically upwards of six months, we have not hastened to exchange diplomatic missions with that state, so long as its government does not itself insist on this.

If, then, we find it necessary to place before the Council of the League of Nations the question of the rupture of diplomatic relations on the part of Uruguay, it is solely owing to the general interest of this matter.

We admit that every sovereign state is free to establish or not to establish diplomatic relations with other states, acting on its own discretion, according to its own conception of normal international life, of what is required for tranquility and peace between nations. There is also no harm when two states agree between themselves in a friendly way to discontinue the exchange of diplomatic missions, for economic or other practical reasons, and to carry on their diplomatic intercourse through other channels—say, through their representatives in third countries. Such cases are well known in international practice.

But it is quite another matter when one state breaks its relations with another state unilaterally, in a spirit of unfriendliness, of hostility, basing such action on certain claims or accusations. Such a rupture has always been regarded as one of the most inimical international acts, of which some convincing explanation is due to world public opinion if the

state perpetrating such a rupture fails in its responsibility. It is exactly this kind of rupture for which some preliminary procedure is foreseen in Article 12 of the Covenant. Since Uruguay and the Soviet Union are both members of the League, bound by the Covenant, and the rupture has not been preceded by any such procedure, we are confronted by a flagrant infringement of the Covenant of the League, and, moreover, in one of its fundamental articles, by a member of the League. My government considers that it might itself be accused of neglect of the Covenant if it did not draw the attention of the Council to this.

Granted that the present infringement of the Covenant has had no serious consequences and that it has been perpetrated by a country unlikely to hold up its action as an example to other states, we yet have no guarantee that indifference to such infringement will not serve as an encouragement to infringement in cases when the consequences might be extremely serious. The present international situation, on which I will venture to say a few words later on, makes this question of particular importance.

Facts

I will now turn to the facts of the case. Diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were theoretically established by an exchange of notes on 22 August, 1926, on the initiative of the Uruguayan government. The Soviet government, eliciting the fact that the Uruguayan government was in no great hurry to exchange diplomatic missions, reconciled itself to a state of affairs in which relations were maintained through the agency of the representatives of both states in other countries. When, however, in the summer of 1933, the Uruguayan government spontaneously expressed the desire to exchange missions, the Soviet government agreed to this, and, in March 1934, a Uruguayan mission arrived in Moscow, a Soviet mission arriving in Montevideo two months later.

Throughout the existence of these missions, neither controversies, conflicts, nor serious misunderstandings between the two states arose. The only subject of discussion between the Uruguayan mission in Moscow and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerned exclusively the matter

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of finding suitable quarters for the mission. Discussions between the Soviet Minister in Montevideo and the Uruguayan Foreign Office were limited to three points. The first concerned one Simon Radovitsky, an anarchist, imprisoned in Uruguay on a charge of terrorist attempts. The Uruguayan government, for reasons of internal politics, desired to deport Radovitsky to the Soviet Union, on the plea that he was born in Russia. As, however, Radovitsky is not a Soviet citizen, the Soviet government refused to admit him to the country. Somewhat surprisingly, this apparently insignificant matter caused an altogether disproportionate reaction on the part of the Uruguayan government. The President of the Republic himself took a personal interest in it, repeatedly endeavouring to obtain the consent of the Soviet Minister to the deportation of Radovitsky, actually taking his refusal as a personal offence, and making no attempt to conceal his resentment.

Next, our Minister had to make a protest in October last to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister against an attack on the Soviet Union by a reactionary Uruguayan newspaper in the course of a campaign against local Communists and anti-fascists, and against the application to Italy of sanctions. In a telegram of 26 October, 1935, the Soviet Minister, M. Minkin cabled to me as follows:

“In reply to my oral protest, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister asserted that he was unable to influence the press, but assured me that the government did not share the views expressed in the article. During the further conversation, the Minister remarked that the President still nourished resentment on account of Radovitsky, regarding the refusal to admit the latter to the Soviet Union as showing a lack of good feeling towards himself. The question of Radovitsky, added the Foreign Minister, is becoming here a political issue.”

Finally, in a telegram of 10 December, 1935, from M. Minkin, I read as follows:

“The Uruguayan Foreign Minister tells me that the President of the Republic would consider himself compensated for our refusal to admit Radovitsky if we would

buy two hundred tons or so of Uruguayan cheese. I would recommend, for the improvement of relations with President Terra, the purchase of a small consignment of cheese."

But the Soviet government, despite the recommendations of our Minister, did not see its way to purchasing Uruguayan cheese. In this connexion, M. Minkin cabled to us on 19 December:

"The secretary of the President informs me that our refusal to grant his request regarding cheese is interpreted as a fresh display of lack of consideration towards himself and may weaken his arguments in favour of the maintenance of relations between Uruguay and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

I have related all this so that you may see for yourselves that the only grievance advanced by the Uruguayan government, both in Moscow and in Montevideo, consisted in our refusal to admit Radovitsky and to purchase Uruguayan cheese. There has not been a single complaint of incorrect conduct on the part of the Soviet mission in Montevideo, or of its interference in internal affairs in Uruguay or any other South American Republic. Indeed, as I have just had the honour to read to you, on 26 October, 1935, the Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs assured our Minister that his government did not share the views accusing the Soviet government advanced by certain Uruguayan newspapers.

All this made still more surprising the note received by the Soviet Minister at Montevideo declaring that the Uruguayan government had resolved to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It is true that the note mentions not so much a rupture as an interruption in relations, and the Uruguayan Foreign Minister emphasized in an interview with the press that only a temporary interruption was intended. But we must not be misled by such hair-splittings, since a rupture may also be of a temporary nature (I see no difference between a rupture and an interruption of relations). We know not whether to seek in timidity or some other motive the cause for thus enriching diplomatic terminology with

the word "interruption" for what is an obvious diplomatic rupture, regarding which Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations definitely states:

"The members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration, or judicial settlement, or to inquiry by the Council."

Thus, Uruguay, in taking upon itself to break off relations with the Soviet Union, without submitting the conflict to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Council, has thereby infringed the Covenant of the League. This fact must be acknowledged, whatever the nature of the conflict, for the Article I have just quoted admits of no exceptions. If Article 12 mentions also resort to war, it does not follow that ruptures which do not lead to war are excluded from the effect of that article. It is exactly because a rupture of relations may sometimes result in war that Article 12 tries to exclude sudden ruptures from international practice, prescribing some preliminary procedure which may avert the rupture as well as its possible consequences.

The guilt of the Uruguayan government is the greater in that the reason given in its note for a rupture had not formerly been advanced either in any preliminary negotiations whatsoever, in correspondence with, or representations to, the Soviet government. Any grievances touched upon by the Uruguayan government in diplomatic conversations, regarding, as I have already stated, the admission of Radovitsky, or the non-purchase of cheese (if this latter can really be regarded as a grievance), were certainly not mentioned in the note of the Uruguayan government. We would, moreover, seek in vain, even in the note itself, for any serious cause for a rupture. The note is extremely verbose, and touches upon some controversial points, which have, however, nothing whatsoever to do with the matter before the Council of the League. I am prepared in the right place and at the right moment to discuss any point even of merely academic interest, but at the present moment I will confine myself to the question before the Council—the infringement by Uruguay of the Covenant of the League—and will not enter into the

fruitless discussion of problems which can never be settled by the Council of the League.

Two facts may be regarded as incontrovertible: first, the Uruguayan government has broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; second, the reason advanced by the Uruguayan government for a rupture was not submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council of the League, as stipulated in Article 12 of the Covenant. Even if the Uruguayan government had had a real grievance, this would not by any means do away with the infringement of the Covenant, or justify its action.

I feel it my duty, however, to state that the accusations against the Soviet government and its mission in Montevideo, mentioned in the Uruguayan note, are entirely unfounded.

The Uruguayan Accusations are Unfounded

As a matter of fact, there is not a single precise accusation, not one definite fact laid to the charge of the Soviet government, or of the Soviet mission in Montevideo, in the Uruguayan note. In this note, the Uruguayan government does not actually assert anything, merely expressing assumptions, and even these mainly not its own. For instance, the note contains the words: "It is definitely asserted" (by whom and when it is not said) that "the Soviet government instigated and supported the Communist elements in Brazil through the agency of the Soviet mission to our government." I declare categorically that this assertion, by whomsoever it was made, is absolutely untrue. Neither the Soviet government, the Soviet mission in Montevideo, nor any other agents of the Soviet government instigated and supported Communist elements, whether in Uruguay or in any neighbouring state, for the Soviet government is consistently true to its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. I challenge the Uruguayan government to produce evidence, if it has any, to the contrary. And I declare in advance that no such evidence can be forthcoming.

This is not the first time such accusations have been levelled against the Soviet government, but never yet—never, I repeat—in one single instance has evidence of the truth of such accusations been produced, setting aside documents forged by Russian counter-revolutionary emigrants and

kindred and fascist elements. I have little doubt that either the Uruguayan or the Brazilian government can easily obtain such documents, even at Geneva itself. Since their value on the European market has lately fallen considerably, they are probably to be bought at dumping prices, but I must warn would-be buyers that any such documents would have to undergo the most searching inspection by experts.

Another reference to the Soviet mission in Montevideo is to be found in the note to the effect that, "according to the information supplied by the Brazilian Embassy and that obtained by our own government, the Soviet Legation in Montevideo has issued bearer cheques for large sums for purposes which cannot be ascertained." And so the Soviet mission labours under the accusation of having transmitted unknown large sums at an unknown date to unknown persons, and, their purpose and destination being undiscovered, it is to be assumed that they were expended on the financing of revolts in Brazil! It seems to me that a legal training is not necessary for the comprehension of the utter irresponsibility and baselessness of such accusations. If the cheques were transmitted in Montevideo, surely it ought not to be hard to find out through the Uruguayan banks, on which these cheques were drawn, the exact numbers, amounts, dates and so on! The Uruguayan government did not even take the trouble to obtain and check such details, obviously because investigation would not only have shown the utter absurdity of the statements, but would have convinced the Uruguayan government that the Soviet mission in Montevideo, during the two years of its existence, received altogether for its own requirements—for equipment, the purchase of motor-cars, salaries—about 55,000 American dollars, of which sum it did not transmit any money anywhere outside Uruguay. In any case, we feel entitled to insist that the Uruguayan government produce proofs to the Council of the League regarding the only concrete fact advanced in its note.

Some Historical Information

If, however, there are no definite accusations in the Uruguayan note, there is a long discussion of the point that, seeing that not long ago there was a revolt in Brazil, and that there is a Soviet mission in Uruguay, there must be some connexion

between these two phenomena. Even if it were a question of a country in which perfect internal peace usually prevailed, in which there was always perfect harmony among the various sections of the population, and this peace and harmony were suddenly interrupted two years after the arrival in a neighbouring country of a Soviet mission, there would be no grounds for making this mission responsible for what occurred in that country. But I would ask you, gentlemen, to bear in mind that the country in question is Brazil, whose whole history is nothing but an uninterrupted chain of internal disorders, risings, mutinies, revolutions, conspiracies, upheavals, and *coup d'Etat* for the violent substitution of one set of rulers by others. There is no need to go into the history of Brazil since its independent existence; the history of the past fifty years will be quite enough.

From that history we see that, in 1879, there was a military *coup d'état* in Rio de Janeiro, led by Generals Fonseca and Peixotto. In 1891, a rising against President Fonseca, taken part in by the garrisons of Rio Grande do Sul and by the navy. In 1893, another rising in the navy, headed by Admirals Melio and de Gama. The civil war which began in 1891 went on without a pause till 1894. In 1890, a conspiracy was discovered, participated in by officers and deputies, and even by the Vice-President of the Republic. In the same year, another rising, and the attempt on the life of President Moraes. In 1904, another rising in Rio de Janeiro. In 1910, a rising in Manaes, a mutiny in the navy. In 1912, a rising in the navy under the leadership of "Father Cicero" in the State of Ceara. In 1922, risings in Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro. In 1923, a rising in Sao Paulo, under General Diaz. In 1924, another rising in Sao Paulo, led by Colonel Lopez. In the same year there was a rising in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and the march of the so-called "Prestes Column." In 1930, a rising in the southern states. In 1931, a rising of soldiers and workers in Pernambuco. In 1932, a rising of two regiments. In 1933, a rising in Rio Grande do Sul.

Obviously, all these risings and revolts took place long before the arrival in Montevideo of a Soviet mission, and, most of them, even before the establishment of the Soviet government in Russia. I cannot help mentioning that the present President of Brazil, M. Vargas, obtained power in 1930 as the result

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of a revolt. It is to be assumed that at least this revolt is not laid to the door of the Soviet government. It is a curious fact that, at the time of some of the risings I have enumerated, the same thing was said as in the present case—that the rebels were getting support, and even made their preparations, in Uruguay, where, however, there were at that time no Soviet representatives.

At the end of the Uruguayan note it says that, "in order to safeguard internal tranquillity in Uruguay itself, it was also necessary to put an end to the activities of the Soviet mission." But the history of Uruguay is as far from presenting a picture of internal tranquillity as that of Brazil. Again, taking only the last sixty years, we read of a revolt in 1876 led by Colonel Latorre, who, deposing Varela, becomes himself the unelected president. In 1880, he abdicates, declaring that it is impossible to rule Uruguay. In 1886, a rising under Generals Castro and Arredondo. Vidal abdicates, Santos becomes president, Arredondo retreats to Brazil. A new rising—Santos flees to Argentine; the victorious General Tajes becomes president. In 1891, a rising of "Blancos" in Montevideo. In 1897, another rising of "Blancos" in Montevideo; President Borda is killed. In 1898, a rising of artillerists; Cuestas becomes dictator. A new rising of two regiments in favour of the ex-President Herrera. In 1903, a "nationalist" rising against the elected President Battle y Ordóñez in six departments. In 1904, a new rising under General Saraiva ("Blancos") against "Colorados." In 1906, a rising of "Blancos" during the election of the president, in order to prevent the election of the "democrat" Battle y Ordóñez. In 1926 a revolt of the garrison in San Pedrito. In 1933, a *coup d'état* and the dictatorship of Terra. In 1935, a rising against the dictatorship of Terra. General Muñoz, with a huge division, entered upon Uruguay from Brazil.

I trust that the Uruguayan government does not blame the Soviet mission for all these risings, more especially for the *coup d'état* of 1933, which put its present president into power. You see, gentlemen, that risings and revolts in Brazil and Uruguay seem to be of quite frequent occurrence and obviously originate in profound internal causes. This being the case, what are the grounds for seeking to lay the blame of the last rising in Brazil to the door of the Soviet mission in

Montevideo? Does, really, the history of the Brazilians or the Uruguayans lead us to believe that they can be in need of guidance from outsiders in the art of risings, or have they not shown themselves to be past-masters of that art?

I must ask your pardon for this slight digression, for the purpose of giving a brief reply to the insinuations against my government contained in the Uruguayan note, and to show their utter absurdity. I must, however, once more remind the Council that it is confronted only with the question of a rupture of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that, even if there had been any reasons for it, a rupture is an infringement of the Covenant, inasmuch as it was not preceded by the procedure laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Danger for International Relations

I say, again, this question is of enormous general interest. Misunderstandings, mutual grievances and conflicts between states are of daily occurrence in international life. What, I ask you, would international life be like if these grievances and conflicts, instead of being discussed by the governments, led directly to a rupture of relations?

It is precisely in our time that such a practice would be fraught with the greatest dangers. Permit me to remind you, gentlemen, of the very grave Yugoslav-Hungarian difference dealt with successfully by the Council about a year ago. Would not the peace of Europe have been endangered if, instead of demanding, first explanations from Hungary and then appealing to the League, Yugoslavia had resorted to a rupture? Or to take another example. Not long ago there was discovered a conspiracy for perpetrating a fascist *coup d'état* in Estonia, and two states were suspected of having had a part in the organization of it. Would we not be faced by the gravest problem if Estonia had acted according to the Uruguayan method and broken off relations with the two states? It is obvious that the way of Uruguayan diplomacy can bring in its train nothing but the greatest dangers for international life.

The fact that Uruguay had recently broken off relations with Argentina and soon restored them with apologies—which would show that in that case, too, there was no serious ground

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for a rupture and that Uruguay seems to get into the habit of ruptures—can hardly be regarded as an extenuating circumstance.

Before concluding my statement, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to another aspect of the question. The Uruguayan government, in allowing itself to make insinuations against the Soviet government, was undoubtedly speculating in the prejudices nourished in reactionary and fascist circles in many countries against the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Uruguay is not the only country indulging in this sort of speculation. All countries notorious for their aggressive policy endeavour to screen in this way their aggressive nature. Under cover of this speculation the independence of China is infringed, and one after another of its provinces taken away from it. In Europe, another state is endeavouring to take cover behind this speculation for its vast organization of wars of aggression in many directions. Another European country which recently committed an act of aggression disapproved of by the Soviet government is attempting through its press to exploit these same prejudices. I venture to submit to you, gentlemen, that indulgence in this sort of speculation, in itself a weapon of aggression, may be of the utmost danger to world peace. On these grounds alone, the Council cannot be indifferent to the diplomatic methods of Uruguay.

It seems to me that the task of the League of Nations is to regulate diplomatic life, to direct the frictions and differences inevitably arising between states into definite channels in a spirit of reconciliation and international decency, and thereby to avert the danger of such differences developing into armed conflicts. The Council of the League cannot, therefore, pass over in silence the diplomatic methods of members of the League when they run counter to this, its task. I am therefore convinced that members of the Council will give the necessary attention to the question under discussion, and take a decision in the spirit of the League of Nations, the spirit of reconciliation, and of smoothing down international friction, refusing to be misled by prejudice, rejecting insinuations and baseless accusations, and keeping strictly to concrete facts, thus rendering a vast service in the interest of international tranquility, the stabilization of international relations and of good understanding.

between nations, on which, as Article II of the Covenant says, peace depends.

*Speech at the Ninety-First (Extraordinary) Session of the Council
of the League of Nations.
(17 March, 1936)*

*The Defence of International Treaties Is the Main Duty of the
League of Nations*

This is the third time, in the short period of eighteen months during which the Soviet Union has been a member of the League of Nations, that its representative on the Council of the League has had to speak on the subject of a breach of international obligations.

The first time was in connexion with the infringement by Germany of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The second time was on the occasion of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. The third, today, is in consequence of the unilateral infringement by Germany of both the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact.

In all three cases the Soviet Union was either formally disinterested because it took no part in the treaties which had been infringed, as in the case of those of Versailles and Locarno, or, as in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, its own interests were not in the least affected.

These circumstances have not in the past prevented, and will not in the present case prevent, the representative of the Soviet Union from taking his place among those members of the Council who register in the most decisive manner their indignation at a breach of international obligations, condemn it, and support the most effective measures to avert similar infringements in the future.

This attitude of the Soviet Union is predetermined by its general policy of struggling for peace, for the collective organization of security and for the maintenance of one of the instruments of peace—the existing League of Nations. We consider that one cannot struggle for peace without at the same time defending the integrity of international obligations, particularly such as have direct bearing on the maintenance

of existing frontiers, on armaments and on political or military aggression. One cannot struggle for the collective organization of security without adopting collective measures against breaches of international obligations.

We do not, however, class among such measures collective capitulation in face of the aggressor, in face of an infringement of treaties, or collective encouragement of such infringements, and still less collective agreement to a bonus for the aggressor by adopting a basis of agreement, or other plans, acceptable or profitable to the aggressor.

We cannot preserve the League of Nations, founded on the sanctity of international treaties (including the Covenant of the League itself), if we turn a blind eye to breaches of those treaties, or confine ourselves to verbal protests, and take no more effective measures in defence of international undertakings.

We cannot preserve the League of Nations if it does not carry out its own decisions and pledges, but, on the contrary, accustoms the aggressor to ignore its recommendations, its admonitions or its warnings.

Such a League of Nations will never be taken seriously by anyone. The resolutions of such a League will only become a laughing-stock. Such a League is not required, and I will go further and say that such a League may even be harmful, because it may lull the vigilance of the nations and give rise to illusions among them which will prevent them from themselves adopting the necessary measures of self-defence in good time.

The responsibility of the League of Nations and of its directing body, the Council, is all the greater the more simple is the breach of international obligations under discussion. The characteristic feature of all the three cases I have just mentioned is their simplicity—simplicity in the sense that the establishment of the very fact of a breach of international obligations represented no difficulty and could arouse no disputes and differences. When I speak of the absence of disputes and differences, I do not, of course, have in mind the particular state which is accused of breaking treaties. Such a state will naturally always either deny the breach or, at any rate, invent all kinds of arguments to justify its action. One cannot conceive of a case in which such a state would

openly declare that it has no justification and that it alone is to blame, and no one else.

The question under discussion at the present session of the Council even surpasses the preceding cases by its simplicity, in the sense I have indicated. Here we find, not only a substantial infringement of treaties, but the ignoring of a particular clause in a treaty, providing a method of settling disputes which may arise in the event of an alleged or actual infringement of the treaty.

Before drawing final conclusions as to the German government's actions, I think it only just to take into account all that has been said by Mr. Hitler in justification of these actions, or in depreciation of their significance.

The German government asserts that France was the first to break the Locarno Treaty in the spirit and the letter, by concluding a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union.

It applied for an explanation to the other Locarno Powers—namely, Great Britain and Italy. One must imagine that, if these Powers had agreed with the German thesis that the Franco-Soviet Pact is incompatible with the Locarno Treaty, Germany would have utilized their conclusions to the utmost. But, as these Powers came to a different conclusion, Germany peremptorily declares that France, Great Britain, Belgium and Italy—*i.e.*, the other Locarno Powers—are interpreting the Locarno Treaty incorrectly, and that the only correct interpretation is her own. Without doubt this is an extremely convenient method of resolving disputed international questions—when a country, convinced of the injustice of its case, confers upon itself, first the functions of a judge in its own cause, and then those of sheriff's officer.

The Franco-Soviet Pact is Compatible with the Locarno Treaty

That the German assertion of the incompatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty will not hold water follows with absolute clarity from the entirely defensive character of the Pact. The whole world knows that neither the Soviet Union nor France have any claims to German territory, and that they are not striving to change the frontiers of Germany. If Germany undertakes no aggression against either France or the Soviet Union, the Pact will not begin

to operate. But if the Soviet Union becomes the victim of an attack by Germany, the Locarno Treaty gives France, as any other member of the League, the unquestionable right to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union. In this event, an unmistakable definition of the aggressor is facilitated by the absence of a common frontier between Germany and the Soviet Union. If the German armed forces cross the boundaries of their own country, and pass through the states and the seas dividing the two countries in order to invade the territory of the Soviet Union, the German aggression will be quite apparent, and *vice versa*.

This is perfectly obvious to the German government too, and therefore it hastens to call to its assistance a far-reaching hypothesis of the possibility of a change of the social system in France. This hypothesis, brought into play by the German government, only confirms the artificial and forced character of the German line of argument as to the incompatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty.

But the German government does not place particular reliance on the force and persuasiveness of this line of argument, and itself puts forward another justification for its actions. It declares that the demilitarization of the Rhineland is itself unjust, contradicts the principle of the equality of states, and imperils the integrity of the German frontier. This argument sounds apparently more convincing, and in any case more sincere, than the sophistry about the Franco-Soviet Pact. In order to discuss this argument in detail, I would have to repeat here what I said in the League Council on 17 April, 1935, during the examination of the French government's complaint against the German government for the latter's breach of its international obligations regarding armaments. The League of Nations, as a political institution setting before itself the object of organizing and reinforcing peace, cannot settle questions, and still less justify a breach of international obligations, by an appeal to abstract principles. The criterion for the League's decisions must be, primarily, the degree to which the particular decision meets the requirements of the best possible organization of peace. A considerable number of members of the League, among whom the Soviet Union at that time was not to be found, thought, in 1919 and 1925, that the demilitarization of the Rhineland zone answered

these requirements. I do not think that the changes which have since then taken place in the ideology and foreign policy of Germany would permit one to assert that peace in Europe at the present time would gain from the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone, the less so if it is carried out unilaterally, in breach of obligations voluntarily undertaken by Germany. Neither the foreign policy of the present German government nor the preaching of aggression and international hatred, and the glorification of the spirit of war, initiated and ceaselessly maintained in Germany during the last three years, permit us to make such an assertion.

I shall not take up your time with the appropriate quotations from German periodicals, German text-books, German scientific works or German song-books. I will permit myself merely to remind you of the political testament of the present ruler of Germany, Herr Hitler, which you will find on page 754 of Volume II of the 1934 Munich edition of his book, *My Struggle*:

“The political testament to the German nation for its external activity will, and must always, proclaim: Never permit two continental powers to arise in Europe. In every attempt to organize a second military power on the German frontier, even though it be by the formation of a state capable of becoming a military power, you must see an attack on Germany, and you must consider it not only your right, but your duty, to prevent such a state coming into existence by all possible means, including the use of force of arms, and if such a state has already come into being, it must once again be shattered.”

These, gentlemen, are the purposes for which Germany requires the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone bordering on France. It is a question of setting up the hegemony of Germany over the whole European continent, and I ask you, must and shall the League of Nations condone the promotion of this objective?

What I read to you was not a chance article in the newspapers, but a document which its author himself, the present ruler of Germany, describes as the political testament giving the quintessence of all his foreign policy. What is the im-

portance, compared with this document, of individual political speeches and declarations, made with a political object, at particular moments, adapted to the psychology of particular sections of the peoples addressed, in order to attain particular temporary aims? Such speeches and declarations bear the same relation to the basic document I have read to you as the temporary tactical cessation of fire on one sector of a theatre of war bears to the main strategical aim of the whole campaign.

No One is Threatening Germany

As for the defence of Germany, if there is one state in the world which is threatened by no external danger it is Germany. I know of not a single country which makes any territorial claims on Germany, and know of no literature preaching an attack on Germany. Attacks on a state do not and cannot take place without preliminary preparations, without the preliminary presentation of territorial or other claims, without an attempt to justify these claims and to train up the people in the spirit of making them good. No such preparations are going on in any country, and therefore there is not, and cannot be, any idea of encircling Germany.

On the day that all doubts disappear as to Germany's desire for peace and sincere readiness to co-operate with the other European peoples in organizing peace; on the day that Germany agrees to give the same guarantees of its love for peace which other European peoples are willingly giving, the representative of the Soviet Union, which has always been the champion of the equality of peoples, both large and small—but an equality in peace—and which continues to cherish the deepest respect for and warmest sympathy with the great German people, would be the first to support an appeal against the imposition upon the German people of any inequality whatsoever, and against depriving it of any arms which other peoples possess.

I have examined both the arguments put forward by the German Government in justification of the breach of international obligations which it has committed. The German Government, however, has not confined itself to these arguments. Apparently it is not itself certain that they carry conviction, and realizes itself that it has caused a breach in

the existing system for the organization of peace. The German Government is therefore trying to create the impression of readiness to put right the wrong it has committed by proposing a new scheme, supposedly for a still better organization of peace.

The question may then arise: If the organization of peace will not only not suffer but even gain thereby, would it not be better for us to overlook some formal infringement of international treaties, and in that case is it worth while placing that infringement on record and registering condemnation? In the interests of impartiality, I will permit myself most briefly to touch on this side of the question as well.

I know that there are people who really do see a particular expression of Germany's love of peace in the offer to France and Belgium of a pact of non-aggression for twenty-five years, to be guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. These people forget that the Locarno Treaty which Germany has just torn up represented just such a pact of non-aggression, with the same guarantees, and its validity was not for twenty-five years, but for an indefinite period. The other difference was that the Locarno Treaty included supplementary guarantees for France and Belgium, in the shape of a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. Thus the alleged new proposal made by Germany amounts to the maintenance of that same Locarno Treaty, but with a reduction in its period of validity, and with a diminution of the guarantees for Belgium and France, which they enjoyed in virtue of the old Locarno Treaty. But these limited guarantees which Mr. Hitler is now proposing might be offered to France and Belgium by the guarantors of Locarno, if they so desire, even without Germany's consent and participation. Thus, Mr. Hitler's proposal amounts to this: while depriving France and Belgium of certain guarantees with which they were provided by the Locarno Treaty, he wants to retain for Germany all the benefits of that treaty in their totality.

But Mr. Hitler's "love of peace" does not stop at this. He is ready to sign pacts of non-aggression, not only with France and Belgium, but with his other neighbours—true, without anybody else's guarantee. The Soviet Union has itself signed pacts of non-aggression with all its neighbours (excepting Japan, which rejects such a pact up to this day).

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But the Soviet Union has always attached great importance to the point that these pacts should not facilitate aggression against third parties. We therefore always included in these pacts a special clause, freeing either of the contracting parties from any obligations under the pact if the other party commits an act of aggression against a third state. Such a clause, however, will be absent from the pacts proposed by Mr. Hitler, according to the model which he has indicated. And, without such a clause, the proposed system of pacts reduces itself to the principle of localization of war which is preached by Mr. Hitler. Every state which has signed such a pact with Germany is immobilized by her in the event of Germany attacking a third state.

This proposal of Mr. Hitler's gives me the impression that we are faced with a new attempt to divide Europe into two or more parts, with the object of guaranteeing non-aggression for one part of Europe in order to acquire a free hand for dealing with other parts. As I have already had to point out at Geneva, such a system of pacts can only increase the security of the aggressor and not the security of peace-loving nations.

The Policy of Collective Security versus the Policy of the Sword

Presuming, however, that the "peace-loving" proposals I have enumerated will not be reckoned sufficient compensation for a breach of international laws, Germany expresses her readiness to return to the League of Nations. In common with other Members of the League, we sincerely regret the incompleteness of the League, and the absence from it of some great countries, particularly Germany. We shall welcome the return into its midst of Hitler's Germany as well, if and when we are convinced that she has recognized those fundamental principles on which the League rests, and without which it would not only cease to be an instrument of peace, but eventually might be transformed into its opposite. Among these principles, in the first place, are the observance of international treaties, respect for the inviolability of existing frontiers, recognition of the equality of all members of the League, support of the collective organization of security and renunciation of the settlement of international disputes by the sword.

At the present time, unfortunately, we have still too fresh in our memory cases of the unilateral infringement by Germany of her international obligations and her refusal to submit to the methods for settling disputes provided by international treaties. We have not yet forgotten that, until quite lately, Mr. Hitler combated most categorically the idea of collective security. He still preaches the principle of inequality, not only of races, but of nations. He points without ambiguity to those lands which must be taken by violence from other peoples to be colonized by Germans. We know that comparatively recently, on 28 May, 1931, one of Mr. Hitler's principal co-rulers, Mr. Goebbels, wrote in his newspaper, the *Angriff*, that "the only instrument with which foreign policy can be made is the sword," and that Mr. Hitler himself wrote in the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, the official organ of his party, on 9 December, 1930, that, "in the long run, the sword will decide everything." Lastly, I must remind you once more of Mr. Hitler's political testament which I have already quoted, and in which the German people is recommended not to allow any other powerful States to exist side by side with Germany, but eventually to destroy them.

We cannot shake off the fear that a member of the League confessing such principles will have the opportunity of sabotaging the most valuable part of the League's activity, which is concerned with the organization of peace and the greatest security of all its members. Only when we receive convincing proof that our fears and doubts are henceforward groundless shall we consider the return of Hitler's Germany into the League to be a contribution to the cause of peace.

Analysing the sum total of Mr. Hitler's proposals, I come to the conclusion that they not only would represent no compensation for the harm done to the organization of peace by condonation of his breach of international treaties, but would themselves strike a blow at the organization of peace, and in the first instance at the League of Nations.

I have permitted myself to express my views with complete frankness. It was easier for me to do so than for my colleagues on the Council, because the manner in which Mr. Hitler allows himself to speak in public of the state I represent liberates me from the necessity of resorting to circumlocution

and diplomatic niceties. I have all the more right to do so because the whole sense of Mr. Hitler's statements, and of his proposals in the sphere of international political relations, amounts to the organization of a campaign against the peoples of the state I represent, and to the formation of a coalition against them of the whole of Europe—if possible, the whole of the world. His aggression may, in fact, aim at other countries in the immediate future. His attacks on the Soviet Union may, so far, serve merely as a smoke-screen for aggression which is being prepared against other states; but the very fact that he selects the Soviet Union for this purpose, as the target of his incessant attacks, and that he has done this again in connexion with his breach of the Locarno Treaty, gives me the right to speak openly and with especial energy of the inward essence of Mr. Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. In doing so I express my firm confidence that his proposals which follow from such a foreign policy will, as they now stand, never become the basis of an agreement between other members of the League.

The U.S.S.R. Supports the Measures of the League of Nations

Before concluding, let me express the hope that I shall not be misunderstood, and that the conclusion will not be drawn from what I have said that the Soviet Union is proposing only registration, condemnation, severe measures and nothing else; that it declares itself against negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the serious dispute which has arisen. Such a conclusion would present a completely false picture of our conception. We are not less, but, on the contrary, more, interested than others in the maintenance of peace, both today and for decades to come, and not only in one area of Europe, but throughout the whole of Europe and all over the world. We are resolutely against anything that might bring a war nearer by even a single month. But we are also against hasty decisions, dictated rather by excessive fear and other emotions than by a sober reckoning of realities—decisions which, while represented as eliminating the causes of an imaginary war today, create all the premises for an actual war tomorrow. We stand for an international agreement which would not only consolidate the existing foundations of peace, but, if possible, would likewise create new

foundations. We stand for the participation in such an agreement of all the countries which so desire. But we object to the idea that withdrawal from the League of Nations, brutal infringement of international treaties and sabre-rattling should confer upon a state the privilege of dictating to the whole of Europe its conditions for negotiations, of selecting the participants in those negotiations to suit its convenience, and of imposing its own scheme for an agreement. We are against negotiations proceeding on a basis which disorganizes the ranks of the sincere partisans of peace, and which must inevitably lead to the destruction of the only inter-state political organization—the League of Nations. We are of the opinion that the sincere partisans of peace are no less entitled than the breakers of treaties to propose their scheme for the organization of European peace. We are for the creation of security for all the nations of Europe, and against a half-peace which is not peace at all but war.

But, at whatever new international agreements we might desire to arrive, we must first of all ensure their loyal fulfilment by all those who participate in them, and the Council of the League must declare its attitude towards unilateral infringements of such agreements, and how it intends and is able to react against them. From this standpoint the greatest possible satisfaction of the complaint made by the French and Belgian governments becomes of exceptional importance. Taking cognizance of this, I declare in the name of my government its readiness to take part in all measures which may be proposed to the Council of the League by the Locarno powers and will be acceptable to the other members of the Council.

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*Statement by M. Litvinov regarding Fourth Session of Preparatory Disarmament Commission made to Representatives of Soviet and Foreign Press.
(22 November, 1927)*

1. The decision of the Soviet government to send a delegation to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission has called forth all sorts of commentary and unfounded speculation in certain circles abroad, as to the position the Soviet Delegation intends to take up in Geneva. On the one hand it is asserted that the Soviet government is sending a delegation to Geneva with the exclusive purpose of propaganda and agitation, on the other, it is said that the fact of sending a delegation to Geneva signifies some sort of a change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. both as regards disarmament, and the League of Nations. I should like, therefore, to give a brief definition of the position of the U.S.S.R. with regard to disarmament and thus put an end to the circulation by the bourgeois press of unfounded statements and tendentious rumours.

2. The Soviet government has never concealed its lack of confidence in the readiness and capability of capitalist countries to destroy the system of war between nations, and consequently to realize disarmament.

3. This lack of confidence has been sufficiently justified by the whole history of international relations since the World War from 1914-1918 (to which pacifists and pseudo-pacifists endeavoured to affix the tag of the "Last War") and by the uninterrupted and systematic increase of armed forces in capitalist states, the doubling and trebling of war budgets in comparison with 1913, and the progressive increase of the common burden of militarism.

4. The latest justification of this lack of confidence is the seven years fruitless work on disarmament of the League of Nations, which is supposed to make the guarantee of universal peace and the realization of disarmament its principal aim. It will be sufficient to remind ourselves that the League of Nations only arrived at the question of disarmament in 1924, i.e., in the fifth year of its existence, while the calling of a conference was postponed

to 1925. So far not only has the matter of disarmament not been advanced, but even the date of a conference cannot be fixed. In the same way the specifically distinguished question of naval disarmament still remained unsolved. The question of the diminution of war budgets, with which the League of Nations has been "occupied" since 1920, has also been postponed indefinitely. Instead of the real and appreciable disarmament which the masses of people in all countries demand, we still have so far as the only result of the League of Nations work meaningless declarations and a series of resolutions and proposals intended to serve the aims of one or other of the international political groupings.

5. Despite the opposition of capitalist countries the Soviet government has exerted all its energies during the ten years of its existence to achieve the realization of at least something in the sphere of general or even partial, but real reduction of the armaments which are such a terrible burden on the shoulders of the toiling masses. References to the first decree of the Soviet government, on 8 November, 1917, on the subject of peace, the proposal of the Soviet Delegation at the Genoa Conference in 1922 for the inclusion in the agenda of the question of general disarmament and, finally, the convocation by the Soviet government in the same year of a Conference in Moscow with the participation of the Western neighbours of the U.S.S.R. at which, in the capacity of chairman of the Russian delegation, I proposed a definite and practical plan of the proportional reduction of armed forces, a plan rejected by all the other participants in the Conference, will serve as corroboration for this assertion.

6. Receiving in 1925 the invitation of the League of Nations to take part in the Disarmament Conference it was preparing, the Soviet government answered with theoretical consent, declaring in its note of 16 January, 1926, that "welcoming any initiative and every attempt in the sphere of disarmament, it sincerely desires to take place both in the Disarmament conference and in its Preparatory Commission." The League of Nations, however, deprived the U.S.S.R. of the possibility of taking an actual part in the three sessions of the Preparatory Commission which have already taken place, by appointing them to be held in Switzerland, where, for well-known reasons, the Soviet Union could not, at that time, send its delegates. Now, owing to the removal of these causes, i.e., following on the settlement of the conflict with Switzerland, the Soviet government, in accordance with the decision referred to by me, is sending a delegation for participation in the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission, and the Disarmament Conference itself, if ever the latter should meet. By this decision the U.S.S.R. deprives its enemies of the power to attribute to it in any degree whatever the possible failure of the Conference, and its

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neighbours of the excuse to refuse to disarm on the grounds that the U.S.S.R. did not participate.

7. The Soviet state, of its very nature free from any imperialist designs and annexationist ambitions whatsoever, steadily pursues the policy of peace. It invited and still invites all its neighbours without exception, and not its neighbours only, in a spirit of real peaceableness, to conclude a pact of non-aggression. From the point of view of peace policy the Soviet Union continues to insist on the necessity for full and general disarmament. If the capitalist countries consider the realization of a plan for complete disarmament in one instalment or during the shortest possible term, unacceptable, the Soviet delegation agrees to the gradual execution of such a plan, during a term to be established at the Conference.

8. The Soviet delegation will come forward at Geneva with its own program. It will consider as its allies at Geneva any delegates who either adhere to this program, or come forward with proposals tending in the same direction. It will consider as one of its principal tasks the fixation of the attention of the commission, and later of the Conference, on the necessity for creating really solid and the most effective possible guarantees of peace, and will struggle against any attempts at distraction in the direction of questions of minor importance and fruitless resolutions or the attempt to convert the Commission or Conference into a weapon of the policy of any given state or group of states.

Speech by M. Litvinov delivered on 30 November, 1927, at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference

The government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics having been unable to participate in the three sessions which have already been held by the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, has entrusted its delegation to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission to make a declaration covering all questions connected with the problem of disarmament.

1. The government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting upon the removal of the causes giving rise to armed conflicts. Militarism and navalism are essentially natural consequences of the capitalist system. By the very fact of their existence, they intensify existing differences, giving a vast impetus to all potential quarrels and inevitably converting these into armed conflicts.

The people in all countries, however, enfeebled and impoverished by the

imperialist World War of 1914-18, are imbued with the determination to struggle against imperialist wars and for the guaranteeing of peace between the nations.

This is precisely what has made it possible for the Soviet government to accept the invitation of the League of Nations, the latter having expressed itself in favour of disarmament. In so doing, the Soviet government demonstrates in the face of the whole world its will to peace between the nations and wishes to make clear to all the real inspirations and true desire of the other states with regard to disarmament.

Despite the fact that the World War of 1914-18 was called "the war to end war," the whole history of post-war international relations has been one of continuous and systematic increase of armed forces in the capitalist states and of a vast increase of the general burden of militarism. So far none of the solemn promises of the League of Nations has been even partially fulfilled, while in all its activities in this regard the League of Nations has systematically evaded settling the question in a practical light.

All the work done by the Preparatory Commission in this regard has been, so far, of a purely decorative nature. Indeed, the League of Nations only approached the question of general disarmament in 1924. It was decided to call a Conference on general disarmament on 1 May, 1925, but up to the present not only has the matter of general disarmament not advanced a single step but the date of the Conference has not even been fixed.

Likewise, the League of Nations has been fruitlessly engaged upon the question of the limitation of war budgets since 1920.

The reluctance to put into practice the policy of disarmament was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts were made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question evoking endless and fruitless arguments on so-called military potential, affords an opportunity for the indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question: the actual dimensions of disarmament.

There can be no doubt that by setting the question thus at the coming Disarmament Conference not only will it be impossible to achieve the curtailment of existing armaments but states belonging to the League of Nations may even receive legal sanction for increasing their armaments.

The Soviet government has systematically endeavoured to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavours have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other states. The Soviet government—the only one to show in deeds its

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will to peace and disarmament—was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, devoted to questions of the curtailment of naval armaments. The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference on 10 April, 1922, was rejected by the Conference. Despite this opposition, the Soviet government has never relaxed in its determined endeavours with regard to disarmament. In December 1922 a Conference was called in Moscow, by the Soviet government, of representatives of the border states for the joint discussion of the problem of proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet government agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments despite the fact that this would not affect many great Powers always ready, whether under the obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of the other countries represented at the Moscow Conference should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet state. A definite scheme for the limitation of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet government. This scheme was, however, rejected.

Despite the sceptical attitude of the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics towards the labours of the League of Nations, it accepted the invitation of 12 December, 1925, to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of M. Vorovsky, Minister Plenipotentiary, and the subsequent acquittal of the assassins by the Swiss Court, prevented the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics from attending the previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has authorized it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament.

2. The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is authorized by its government to propose the complete abolition of all land, naval and air forces.

The government of the Union suggests the following measure for the realization of this proposal:

(a) The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces and the non-admittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever.

(b) The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means for chemical warfare and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops or in military or general stores.

(c) The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels.

(d) The discontinuance of calling up citizens for military training either in armies or public bodies.

(e) Legislation for the abolition of military service either compulsory, voluntary or recruited.

(f) Legislation prohibiting the calling-up of trained reserves.

(g) The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases.

(h) The scrapping of military plants and factories and of war industry equipment in general industrial works.

(i) The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both on state budgets and those of public bodies.

(k) The abolition of military, naval and air ministries, and the dissolution of general staffs and military administrations, departments and institutions of every kind.

(l) The legislative prohibition of military propaganda and military training of the population and of military education both in state and public bodies.

(m) The legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction with a view to the removal of incentives to the invention of the same.

(n) Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the state.

(o) The withdrawal or corresponding alteration of all legislative acts, both of national or international scope, infringing the above stipulations.

3. The delegation of the Union is empowered to propose the execution of the above program of complete disarmament as soon as the Convention in question comes into force, in order that all the necessary measures for the destruction of military stores be completed in a year's time.

The Soviet government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case, however, of capitalist states rejecting immediate actual abolition of standing armies, the Soviet government, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of a practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all contracting states, by gradual stages, during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

National funds, freed from war expenditure, to be employed by each state at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes.

4. Whilst insisting upon the views just stated, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion of the question of the limitation of armaments whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed.

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5. The delegation declares that the government of the Union fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application to military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately while insisting on an early date being fixed for its ratification by all states and considers that, in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it would be necessary to raise the question of the establishment of workers' control over those chemical industries susceptible of being rapidly converted to war purposes in states having a highly-developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our program of disarmament, but realize that its radical and exhaustive nature may make it appear at the first glance complex, difficult of realization and perhaps even Utopian. This, however, is merely because the problem of complete disarmament has always been treated as a forbidden subject and never yet thoroughly dealt with. We understand perfectly that the realization of this program may not be compatible with certain political interests, chiefly those of the great Powers, the interests of war industries or those of the numerous groups of speculators, but I contend that in itself the problem of complete disarmament presents no difficulties and is capable of rapid and easy solution.

It is in any case a great deal simpler, and would require far less time to work out in detail than the schemes which have so far been used as a basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission. I confess that on acquainting myself with the findings of this Commission, I was aghast at the complexity, confusion and multiplicity of the questions with which that of disarmament had become involved. The Commission has, in effect, devoted several sessions to the discussion of the enumeration and headings of the clauses to make up an international convention for limitation of armaments. Unanimity has only been achieved with regard to certain trivial and common points. The overwhelming majority of the clauses—or rather their headings—evoked dissensions which have so far failed to be reconciled either by the Commission itself or by private negotiations between the governments concerned. If and when, however, these dissensions have been reconciled the Commission will still only be at the threshold of its real difficulties. The Commission will have to agree to the satisfaction of all as to what constitutes security for each country, and individually, the extent and importance of its international obligations, its geographical peculiarities and other special features, before the level of its effectiveness, technical armaments, military and air vessels, etc., can be established.

The mere enumeration of these questions will suffice to bring before us

the utter hopelessness—more, the Utopianism—of expecting this question to be solved within any imaginable period.

The latest manifestations of international life, various international treaties recently concluded, lead not to the unification but rather to the still further division of the European and non-European countries into political groupings and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, and do not afford the slightest grounds for optimism as to the outcome of the questions before the Preparatory Commission.

To crown all, attempts are still being made to delay for a long time to come the work of the Preparatory Commission pending the solution of a series of political questions not less confused and complex than those I have already mentioned.

One thing is certain; if the present basis of the Preparatory Commission's work is not changed, it is—even if not exploded by the abundance and weight of its own internal differences—condemned to years, if not decades, of work either completely sterile or productive of quite intangible results.

We live in a time in which the outbreak of fresh wars is no mere theoretical danger. This is not merely our opinion; many responsible statesmen in capitalist countries have expressed the same fears quite recently. The imminence of war is making itself felt everywhere. If it is to be averted, something will have to be done. In our opinion, the best guarantee of security for all peoples and all countries is immediate complete disarmament. This problem should be faced immediately and solved in the shortest possible time. Those countries postponing the solution of this problem are taking upon themselves an enormous responsibility. I therefore beg to move on behalf of the Soviet delegation the following resolution:

“Whereas the existence of armaments and the tendency they show to growth by their very nature inevitably leads to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful productive labour and bringing in its train countless disasters;

“Whereas armed force is a weapon in the hands of great Powers for the oppression of peoples in small and colonial countries; and

“Whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war.

“The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference resolves:

“(1) To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft Convention for complete and general disarmament on the principles proposed by the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics;

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"(2) To propose the convocation, not later than March 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided for in paragraph (1)."

We are fully aware that certain circles will endeavour to stigmatize our program and resolution as propaganda. We are quite ready to accept this challenge and declare that we are making propaganda for peace and shall continue to do so. If the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is not a suitable place in which to make peace propaganda, then apparently we are here under a misunderstanding. The Soviet government pursues, and has always pursued, a resolute peace policy which it has always shown, and is still showing, in deeds as well as in words. Only a few days ago, when the clouds of war seemed to be darkening the horizon on the East of Europe more ominously than ever, everything in its power was done by the Soviet government to avert a calamity. It brought all possible arguments to bear upon the Lithuanian government to persuade it immediately to declare the cessation of the state of war between Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet government was also instrumental in persuading Lithuania's other two neighbours to offer the same advice, and steps were also taken by it in Warsaw tending towards the maintenance of peace. This peace policy of my government gives us a special right to declare that we shall not let a single opportunity slip for making the most intensive propaganda for peace and disarmament.

Speech by M. Litvinov delivered 19 March, 1928, at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Draft Convention of Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament, sent by the delegation of the U.S.S.R. to the Secretary General of the League of Nations a month ago, is entirely based upon the main theses presented by the Soviet delegation at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission in November last.

I have the honour to draw the attention of this Commission to the fact that the draft Convention provides for land, naval, and air forces in all states to be put into a condition, not later than one year from its coming into force, rendering it difficult to employ them for warlike purposes, thus considerably limiting the possibilities of armed conflicts even before the carrying out of complete disarmament.

I consider it unnecessary to dwell in detail on the separate points of our draft Convention, since the latter was accompanied by a special explanatory note, sent to all members of the Commission.

I venture to remind the Commission that no attempts to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposals were made at its fourth session. During the extremely brief discussion of this question not a single serious argument against the Soviet proposal nor any practical criticism of it was put forward. The Soviet delegation is naturally unable to accept as criticism such remarks as have been heard, namely: that the Soviet Draft Convention is "too simple," or that, even if complete disarmament were accomplished the peoples would, all the same, fight among themselves in disarmed and disorganized masses with sticks, penknives, etc. The cautious attitude and the refusal to discuss our proposals at the Fourth Session of the Commission, displayed by the other delegations may be partly explained by the novelty and unexpectedness of the Soviet proposals, although attempts were made to cast doubts even upon the novelty of our proposals. M. Benes, I seem to remember, referred to a Norwegian proposal similar to ours supposed to have been made to the League of Nations. Now, I took the trouble to verify this statement, but was unable to find any traces whatsoever among the material of the League of Nations, including those with which the Disarmament Section of the League was so kind as to furnish me at my special request, of any proposals for general and complete disarmament.

At the Third Committee of the Assembly of the League in 1924 the Norwegian delegation mentioned wishes expressed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union regarding the reduction of war budgets by one-half in the course of ten years. Even this was qualified by the stipulation that war expenditure incurred by individual states under the Covenant of the League of Nations should not be included in war budgets subject to reduction. There was not a word as to the abolition of the other half of war budgets, nor anything whatsoever about the reduction of armed forces and materials for war. The Danish delegation, referring to the same Inter-Parliamentary Union, expressed a desire for the reduction of land armed forces in all countries in accordance with the resolutions of the St. Germain Peace Treaty, i.e., allowing each state to keep an army of 5,000 per million inhabitants, and naval armaments in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, i.e., 2,000 or 4,000 metric tons per million inhabitants. According to these calculations, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, for example, would be entitled to an army of almost 735,000 men, which would be an increase of 175,000 to its present standing army, and 200,000 metric tons to its navy, while China would be entitled to a standing army of something like 2,000,000. Such have been the most drastic ideas with regard to disarmament so far expressed in the League of Nations. I say "ideas" for none of these have been crystallized into the form of proposals or resolutions or made the object of serious discussion. Lord Esher's plan,

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aspiring only to the reduction of land and air armed forces, had also nothing in common with the idea of complete general disarmament. It may therefore be considered irrefutable that the proposal for complete and general disarmament has been put in a definite form before the League of Nations, and indeed brought into the sphere of international relations, for the first time, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will always be proud to call this initiative its own. If, however, I dwell upon this point, it is from no motives of mere sentiment, but because it seems to me that in certain League of Nations circles, an erroneous conception exists that the Soviet delegation is wasting the Preparatory Commission's time on proposals already discussed and rejected by the League. Such an erroneous conception, unless corrected, might react unfavourably on the further procedure with regard to our proposal.

The Soviet delegation, anxious as it was to speed up the consideration of its draft Convention and thus bring nearer the beginning of real disarmament, nevertheless agreed to the postponement of the consideration of its proposals until the fifth (current) session, bearing in mind their novelty and desirous to give an opportunity for all members of the Commission and their governments to make themselves ready for their practical consideration. With this aim, the Soviet delegation provided the Secretary-General of the League of Nations with the draft Convention, accompanied by an explanatory note, a month before the beginning of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission, for despatch to the respective governments, and now considers itself entitled to ask for the practical consideration of its proposals without further delay.

The Soviet delegation considers it essential once more to emphasize the fact that nothing but the fulfilment of the Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament proposed by the government of the U.S.S.R. is capable of solving in a satisfactory manner the problem of general security and peace. This would also in itself solve a series of other vexed international problems, such as the freedom of the seas, and so on. At the same time, the execution of the Soviet scheme would not come up against the difficulties inevitably connected with partial disarmament. By way of example I would cite the matter of control, for it is perfectly obvious that it must be infinitely easier to control total than partial disarmament.

I would further emphasize the fact that the basis of disarmament as proposed by the Soviet delegation being uniform and applicable to all states, is therefore the most equitable and the least likely to arouse opposition from individual states. It is precisely this, in my opinion, which constitutes the obvious simplicity of our proposal, although, strange to say,

some of its opponents have endeavoured to make an added objection of this very simplicity.

The scheme offered for the consideration of the Preparatory Commission represents a single organic whole, which cannot be split up into separate parts. It is wholly penetrated by a single idea, and therefore requires, first and foremost, consideration and acceptance of its underlying principles.

The Soviet delegation therefore considers it indispensable that general discussion should result in a reply—not merely theoretical but quite clear and definite—being given to the question: Does the Preparatory Commission accept the principle of general disarmament during the period mentioned in the Convention? and, Does it accept the proposal as to that rate of disarmament which would make war impossible in a year's time? The Soviet delegation considers that all other delegations and their governments have had time enough, if they cared to, to study both the underlying idea of the Soviet proposal and the draft Convention in its finished form.

During the three and a half months which have elapsed since the fourth session of the Praparatory Commission, the Soviet delegation has had ample opportunity to convince itself that the idea of complete disarmament has been met and accepted with enthusiasm by the broadest masses of both hemispheres and by all progressive and peace-loving elements in human society. The innumerable addresses and resolutions of sympathy from labour parties and multifarious organizations, groups and societies from all parts of the world which I am still receiving testify, among other things, to this. I will not take up your time by enumerating all of them, but will venture to read only one—a collective address I received here a few days ago, signed by representatives in thirteen countries of a hundred and twenty-four organizations (chiefly women's) whose total membership runs into many millions. This document, showing as it does the lively response among women evoked by the Soviet's proposals, derives special importance from the extension of women's political rights now proceeding in some countries. Their declaration is as follows :

“On behalf of the growing world opinion, embodied in the organizations which we represent, we gratefully welcome the courageous proposals of the Soviet government for complete and general disarmament, and note with satisfaction that they are to be discussed in detail by the Preparatory Commission at its next meeting on March 15.

“Being convinced that these proposals represent the will of the great mass of people in every country, who are determined to make an end of war, and that where the will exists practical means can be realized for giving it effect, we urge with all the strength at our command that the members of the Commission should examine the Russian proposals

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with the utmost care and with the determination to place before the International Disarmament Conference, when it meets, some concrete scheme for the complete disarmament of the world within a definite period of time."

This document bears one hundred and sixty-three signatures of the secretaries of the respective organizations.

The Soviet delegation entertains not the slightest doubt as to the acceptability and desirability of its proposals for the broad masses of the population, who now look to the governments and the bourgeois groups and classes supporting them to make the next move. Mere theoretical discussions and arguments about disarmament no longer meet the case—it is time to take practical steps towards the realization of disarmament. It seems to me that there has been more than enough of discussion of disarmament. I shall venture to furnish members of the Commission with a few data from which it will be seen that, as well as the General Assemblies of the League of Nations and the Council of the League, the thirty-eight sessions of which occupied themselves with the question of disarmament, no fewer than fourteen different commissions and other League organs devoted over a hundred and twenty *sessions*—not sittings, mark you, but sessions—to this question of disarmament, on which one hundred and eleven resolutions have been passed by general assemblies of the League and the Council of the League alone. Turning to the results of this vast quantity of work, the documentation of which has taken reams of paper, we are forced to the conclusion that not a single step of real importance has been taken towards the realization of disarmament. The Soviet delegation considers that an end should be put to a situation which may discredit the very idea of disarmament. It would be loath for its proposals to serve merely for the multiplication of commissions and sub-commissions and other organs, which would simply add to the existing resolutions with the same negligible results so far achieved. The Soviet government has not sent its delegation to Geneva for this sort of work. Absorbed in the vast problem of rebuilding an enormous State, with a population of one hundred and fifty millions, on entirely new principles, and in the creation of a new social-economic structure in the face of the open opposition of the whole of the rest of the world, and in the most unfavourable circumstances, it would never have turned aside from this work if its attitude to the problem of peace were not everything that is serious, practical, and sincere, and if this problem were not the keystone of its whole policy. In this connection, I may be permitted to mention, by way of illustration of the Soviet government's serious attitude to the questions under discussion here, the fact that, although it did not take part in the League of Nations Conference which

passed the Protocol regarding the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, only adhering to the latter at the last session of the Preparatory Commission, it was one of the states (three in all) to ratify this Protocol, still unfortunately a dead letter owing to its non-ratification by other states, the majority of which are Members of the League.

We are aware that shallow persons and equally shallow Press organs pretend to see inconsistency between the peace-loving proposals of the Soviet government and the maintenance and improvement of the Red Army. As a matter of fact the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics already has a smaller army, not to mention its navy, than any other State in proportion to its population and the extent of its frontiers, while, if we consider individual security—the favourite theme of this Assembly—it must be admitted that the Soviet Union is in a less favourable position than any other state. It has almost the whole of the world against it in unconcealed hostility to the new State. A glance at the Press of any country on any day —full of attacks, invectives and libels on the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics—will serve to show the extent of this hostility.

A number of countries have to this day not recognized the existence of the Soviet government, now in its eleventh year, and non-recognition can only be construed as an act of hostility. But even those countries recognizing the Soviet state not infrequently indulge, with few exceptions, in hostile manifestations which are often grave tests of the patience and peaceableness of the Soviet government. The new Soviet state has seen its territory invaded by foreign troops which caused detriment to the state from the results of which it has not yet recovered. A part of the territory of the former Russian Empire the population of which unmistakably aspires towards the Soviet Union is still occupied by foreign troops, preventing it from exercising its right of self-determination. All this notwithstanding, the Red Army has remained during the ten years of its existence, and will continue to remain, exclusively a weapon of defence. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics does not require an army or navy for any other purposes, all aggressive or imperialist aims or ambitions being completely foreign to it.

In any case the Soviet government has declared and still declares through its delegation in Geneva that it is ready to abolish all the military forces of the Union in accordance with its draft Convention as soon as a similar decision is passed and simultaneously carried out by the other states. The Soviet government declares once more that it is ready for this, and asks the other governments represented here if they are also ready.

The Soviet government expects a reply to this question at the present session of the Preparatory Commission at which all the more important

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states are represented. No sub-commissions or any other auxiliary organs—in fact no body of a lesser composition and authority than the Preparatory Commission—can give an answer to this question. The Soviet delegation hopes that this answer will be given quite openly, publicly, in the full light of day and under the control of public opinion. This reply should, of course, be brought up for final sanction by the International Disarmament Conference, an early date for the convocation of which is urged by the Soviet delegation.

The proposals formulated by myself in two questions are so clear as neither to demand nor admit of preliminary diplomatic negotiations and conversations between different countries and groups of countries.

In conclusion I will venture once more to repeat the two main questions underlying our proposals :

1. Does the Commission agree to base its further labours on the principle of complete and general disarmament during the periods proposed by us? And

2. Is it prepared so to carry out the first stage of disarmament as to make the conduct of war, if not an absolute impossibility, of extreme difficulty in a year's time?

Only when unequivocal and affirmative replies have been given to those questions will it be possible to enter upon the detailed consideration of the Soviet Draft Convention.

The Soviet delegation considers itself entitled to count upon special support from the delegation of that government which is now publicly making a proposal for the prohibition of war. The sincerity of this proposal could not be more convincingly confirmed than by the adherence of its authors to the Soviet Draft Convention for complete disarmament, pursuing the aim not merely of the moral prohibition but also of the abolition of the possibility of war. Since armed forces have no other *raison d'être* but the conduct of war, and since the prohibition of war would make them quite superfluous, it would appear that consistency and logic must dictate to the government concerned the support of our proposal.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that all delegations here present realize the responsibility and importance of solving this great question, and realize also its vast consequences for the fate of humanity, and that, therefore, no delegation will refrain from publicly expounding the point of view of its government.

II

Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament.

(Submitted by the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission of the International Disarmament Conference.)

CONVENTION

Being animated by the firm desire to safeguard general peace;

Considering that the existence and increase of armed forces constitute an immense danger and must inevitably lead to further armed conflicts;

Considering that attempts to go too deeply into the question and to examine in detail every factor relating to the existence and increase of armaments have ended in failure or have retarded the solution of disarmament questions:

The contracting states

.....

.....
Solemnly acknowledge that the only true method which can contribute to the safeguarding of peace is the general and complete abolition of all armed forces, and conclude the present Convention, having for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

.....

.....
Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed that complete disarmament shall be undertaken, as from the date of entry into force of the present Convention, and shall be terminated within a period of four years so as to restrict the possibility of armed conflicts from the first year onwards.

CHAPTER I

EFFECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES

Article 1

All military units and formations, as well as all the effectives of the land, naval and air forces, whether of the home country or of its overseas posses-

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sions, shall be disbanded within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, and shall not in future be allowed in any form, whether open or secret.

The disbandment of the effectives shall be carried out in four successive stages:

- (a) In the first year, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, one-half of the effectives in service, whether officials, officers, or other ranks, shall be disbanded, and
- (b) In the following years the remaining effectives in equal parts.

Remark.—By effectives of the armed forces is meant effectives serving with the colours in the active army as well as the trained military reserves in each of the contracting states entered on the muster rolls of the various military and public organizations.

Article 2

The Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation, as well as general staffs, all military schools and all kinds of military commands, institutions and establishments shall be abolished, except as provided for in Article 5 of the present Convention, within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, and may not be reconstituted.

Article 3

Within a period of one year as from the entry into force of the present Convention, all returns and documents relating to military trained reserves, and kept by government institutions and public organizations, shall be destroyed.

Within the same period, all laws concerning the organization of recruitment shall be repealed.

Article 4

Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all documents relating to the mobilization of armed forces shall be destroyed; all mobilization measures shall be prohibited in future.

Article 5

For four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, it shall be permissible in accordance with a special convention to maintain staffs, commands, institutions and establishments to the extent strictly necessary for the application of the technical measures required by the disbandment of the armed forces and by the performance of the necessary administrative and economic work relating to disarmament.

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Article 6

All the files concerning the disbandment of the armed forces shall be forwarded to the civilian Ministries, within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention.

All the files and archives of the Ministries of War, Marine, and Aviation, of the army units and of the staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, shall be destroyed within the same period.

Article 7

The personnel of the disbanded armed forces shall be provided with employment in other spheres of social and economic work. Until they are provided with employment, they may be provisionally maintained at the expense of the general state budget.

When the aforesaid persons are awarded pensions based on the number of years of service, the years spent in military service shall be reckoned as spent in the service of the state.

Article 8

The credits assigned for the upkeep of the armed forces, either in the state budget or out of the funds of the various associations, must be confined to the sums strictly necessary for the upkeep of armed forces remaining in actual military service in accordance with a special Convention.

Within four years the budget for the upkeep of the armed forces must be abolished, and may not figure under any heading in the state budget.

Article 9

Within a period of one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all laws concerning military service, whether compulsory, voluntary, or by recruiting, shall be abrogated.

The conditions of service in the armed forces until the completion of total disarmament shall be laid down in special regulations by each of the contracting states.

Article 10

Immediately after the entry into force of the present Convention the following shall be prohibited by law:

1. Special military publications:

- (a) Scientific research and theoretical treatises.
- (b) Works on military history.
- (c) Manuals of military training.
- (d) Military regulations.
- (e) Manuals of all kinds for the study of the technical implements of war.

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2. The military training of the population, including the calling up of trained reserves, and military propaganda among the population.
3. The military training of young people, either by the state or public associations.

CHAPTER II

MATERIAL

Part I. Land Armaments

Article 11

Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, the reserves of arms, ammunition and other instruments of armament and destruction enumerated below, and at the disposal of the Ministry of War shall be destroyed. Tanks, poisonous war materials and the appliances by which these materials are diffused (gas-projectors, pulverizers, balloons, and other apparatus), whether in service or in reserve, shall first be destroyed.

The arms strictly necessary for the effectives remaining with the colours may be retained by the armed forces of each of the contracting states. The proportion between the armed forces of each state and the quantity of technical implements of war enumerated in the list given below shall be determined in a special Convention.

In the second, third and fourth years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, the destruction of all types of armaments shall be carried out by consecutive stages in proportion to the limitation of personnel.

After the completion of disarmament in each of the contracting states the minimum quantity of arms and ammunition required for all kinds of police forces and for personal use may be retained in accordance with Articles 39, 43, and 44.

List of war material to be destroyed

1. Automatic and magazine rifles.
2. All kinds of machine-guns, including machine-rifles and light and heavy machine-guns.
3. Mine-throwers and grenade bomb-throwers.
4. Revolvers and automatic pistols issued to troops.
5. Rifle and hand grenades.
6. Rifle and military revolver ammunition.

7. Guns of all calibres and types, and ammunition for same, whether complete or in component parts.
8. Tanks.
9. Gunpowder and explosives employed for exclusively military purposes.
10. All poisonous materials for war, as well as the appliances by which they are diffused, such as gas-projectors, pulverizers, balloons and other apparatus.
11. Flame throwers.
12. All technical military implements not enumerated above and intended for the wounding and destruction of man by man, as well as all parts of the articles enumerated above.

Article 12

All orders placed by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation for any of the armaments enumerated in the Annex to Article 11 of the present Convention shall be cancelled.

War material for the manufacture of which orders have been placed abroad shall be destroyed in the country in which it is manufactured.

Article 13

Compensation shall be paid for loss due to the cancelling of the orders mentioned in Article 12, and of the orders for the special naval and air force armaments enumerated in Articles 21 and 27, placed by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation. Such compensation shall be given either in conformity with the legislative practice of the several contracting states or in accordance with the terms of the contracts.

Article 14

Armoured cars and all other armoured means of transport except tanks, must be disarmed, that is to say, stripped of their armour plating and their weapons which must be destroyed. This must be effected within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

Article 15

Revolvers and-sporting guns (of a non-military pattern), intended respectively for personal defence and sport, may be left in the hands of private persons in virtue of special permits. The number of these revolvers and sporting-guns which each of the contracting states may possess shall be fixed by a special convention in proportion to the number of the population.

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Article 16

Explosives capable of being used for industrial, agricultural or other socially useful purposes shall not be liable to destruction, but shall be handed over by the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation to the respective economic organizations within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

Part II. Naval Armaments

Article 17

Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention, all capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers, and submarines shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments.

Article 18

All other vessels and floating material constructed for the special purposes of war and enumerated in the annexed list, together with naval aircraft, shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments within four years, withdrawal proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with a special convention.

List of vessels to be disarmed:

1. Coast defence battleships.
2. Torpedo craft of all types.
3. Monitors.
4. Gunboats of over 3,000 tons.
5. Floating batteries.
6. Hydroplanes of all types.

Note: Vessels and their armaments may be retained under the conditions laid down in Articles 43 and 44 of the present Convention for the establishment of a maritime police force and for the protection of frontiers.

Article 19

The personnel of vessels withdrawn from the naval establishments shall be immediately disbanded.

At the end of three months from the removal of the vessels from the naval lists, the ordnance of such vessels and their mines and torpedo appliances shall be rendered useless in accordance with special technical arrangements; the reserve naval ordnance intended for these vessels, and torpedoes and mines, shall be destroyed.

During the nine following months the ordnance rendered useless and the mines and torpedo appliances shall be removed from the vessels and destroyed.

Article 20

Within three months of the removal from the naval establishment of vessels which cannot be employed for pacific purposes, all the machinery on board shall be rendered useless in accordance with special technical arrangements. During the following nine months, the machinery on board shall be removed, after which the vessels themselves shall be entirely dismantled.

Article 21

As from the entry into force of the present convention, the existing naval programmes shall be cancelled; any new construction of warships shall be forbidden.

All warships under construction or undergoing repair on orders given either in the home country or abroad shall be disarmed in the same way as vessels of the service fleet of the contracting states.

Article 22

The armament of vessels belonging to the mercantile marine shall be destroyed in the same way as that of warships during the first year of the coming into force of the present Convention.

It shall be forbidden in future to adapt and arm vessels belonging to the mercantile marine for military purposes.

Part III. Air Armaments

Article 23

During the first year of the coming into force of the present Convention, heavy bombing aircraft, torpedo-carriers and dirigibles shall be removed from the air force lists.

Article 24

All other military aircraft not mentioned in Article 23 above and which, by reason of their specifically military properties, cannot be used for social or economic purposes shall be destroyed within four years, destruction proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with special technical arrangements.

Article 25

Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention all stocks of aircraft bombs and other weapons intended to be discharged from aircraft shall be destroyed.

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Article 26

The whole of the armament of military aircraft which are to be preserved for social or economic uses must be removed and destroyed at the end of three months from the time of their withdrawal from the air force effectives. Such aircraft shall be then handed over to the respective civil organizations.

Article 27

All the aircraft belonging to the active air force must be disarmed as well as all aircraft which are in reserve or under construction on orders given in the home country or abroad.

Article 28

The arming of aircraft and all fittings for mounting weapons on aircraft shall be prohibited in future.

Aircraft intended for peaceful purposes may only be retained to an extent which is strictly in accordance with the real economic or social requirements of each country. The number to be allowed to each contracting state shall be determined by a special convention.

Part IV. Fortifications and Bases

Article 29

Within three years of the entry into force of the present Convention, the whole of the armament of fortresses and other fortified works and of naval and air force bases shall be rendered useless in conformity with a list contained in a special convention.

During the following year, the armament shall be removed and destroyed and the fortifications dismantled and demolished; it shall in future be forbidden to construct new fortified works of any kind.

Part V. Armament Industries

Article 30

With the entry into force of the present Convention, all state and private undertakings shall cease to produce any of the armaments enumerated in the list annexed to Article 11 or any of those mentioned in Articles 19, 23, 24 and 25; preparations shall be made to convert these undertakings for purposes of peaceful manufacture.

Until these undertakings are re-equipped for peaceful purposes or until the workers in armament undertakings have found employment in other

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enterprises, these workers shall be supported by the state, which shall provide for their requirements out of the defence Budget.

Article 31

During the first year following the entry into force of the present Convention, the plans, testing apparatus, and models intended for armament industries shall be destroyed.

Article 32

Within two years of the coming into force of the present Convention, factories and enterprises engaged in the manufacture of war material and also arsenals shall cease to operate, except in the cases provided in Article 34 of the present Convention.

In State or private undertakings, all frames, machines, tools, and appliances intended exclusively for the manufacture of war materials enumerated in the Annex to Article 11 of the present Convention and in Articles 19, 23, 24 and 25, shall be destroyed.

Article 33

It shall be forbidden in future to restore any factories, enterprises, and arsenals engaged in the manufacture of war materials or to prepare any state or private productive undertakings for the manufacture of the war material enumerated in Articles 11, 19, 23, 24 and 25.

Article 34

In order to produce the minimum of arms and ammunition necessary for the police forces of all kinds provided for in Chapter III of the present Convention, and for the personal use of citizens for the purposes referred to in Article 15 of the present Convention, each contracting state shall be authorized to retain the necessary undertakings, of which the number, productive capacity, and method of production, as well as the arrangements concerning the trade in arms, shall be laid down in a special convention.

Article 35

The production of the explosives required for the building and mining industries shall be regulated by the several contracting states in strict conformity with economic requirements, and shall be subject to control in virtue of a special convention.

Article 36

It shall be forbidden by law to patent any form of armament, or any means of destruction.

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CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION OF PROTECTION

Part I. Protection on Land

Article 37

The effectives of the Customs guards, local police and forest and other guards, in each of the contracting states and the amount of their armament, shall not for a period of four years after the conclusion of the present Conventions exceed the number and amount as at 1 January, 1928; these effectives shall not be organized in such a way that they can be utilized for war.

Article 38

On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, the maintenance of a protective and police service, the personnel of which shall be engaged by voluntary contracts of service, shall be authorized in the territory of each of the contracting states, for the purpose of customs and revenue police supervision, internal police and the protection of state and private property, the amount of weapons and simple armament strictly necessary may also be retained.

The effectives of these categories of services shall be laid down in a special convention and shall be proportionate to the population of the several contracting states, the length of the means of communication, the existence of objects which are deemed by the state to require protection, the development of forestry, etc.

Article 39

Magazine rifles firing ten rounds and pistols of a calibre not exceeding 0.8 cm. may be retained for arming the police forces and guards.

Reserve ammunition may be stored in places laid down in a special Convention, but must not exceed 1,000 rounds per rifle, and 100 rounds per pistol.

The annual supply of munitions must not exceed the amount strictly required to replace worn-out armament and the actual consumption of ammunition.

Part II. Protection at Sea

Article 40

On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, a maritime police

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service shall be organized which shall exercise its functions in conformity with a special convention and which is intended for the necessary protection of the natural products of the sea and of submarine cables, the suppression of piracy and of the slave trade, and other objects which may in future form the subject of international protection on the high seas.

Article 41

With a view to protection at sea, the waters of the globe shall be divided into sixteen zones, as enumerated below.

List of Zones of Protection

<i>Number of Zone</i>	<i>Name of Zone</i>	<i>Boundaries of Zone</i>	<i>States responsible for protection in a given zone</i>
1	Baltic Sea	The whole zone of the Baltic Sea, including the Cattegat and the Skager Rack; the zone is bounded on the west by long. 8° E. of Greenwich.	
2	North Sea	This zone (beginning with the north) is bounded by: lat. 70° N. from long. 4° W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Norway; the west and south coast of Norway as far as long. 8° E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as its intersection with the German coast, the German, Dutch, Belgian, and French coasts as far as Cape St. Mathieu; the line joining this cape to the Lizard; the south and then the east coast of G.B. as far as long. 4° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as its intersection with lat. 70° N.	

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Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
3	Eastern sec- tion of the Arctic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: long. 170° W. of Greenwich from the North Pole as far as the intersection of that meridian with lat. 66° 30' N.; this parallel as far as the coast of the U.S.S.R., Finland and Norway as far as lat. 70° N.; this parallel as far as long. 4° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the North Pole.	
4	Western Sec- tion of Arctic Ocean	The zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: long. 4° W. of Greenwich from the North Pole to the intersection of this meridian with lat. 60° N.; that parallel to its intersection with the east coast of Canada; the east and north coasts of Canada and Alaska as far as lat. 66° 30'; that parallel to its intersection with long. 170° W. of Greenwich; that meridian as far as the North Pole.	
5	Mediterranean Sea	The whole zone of the Mediterranean. It is bounded on the north-east by the line Sed-El-Bahr—Kum-Kaleh; on the south-east by the north entrance of the Suez Canal; on the west by the line joining Cape Spartel and Cape Trafalgar.	

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Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
6	North-east Section of the Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the N.) by: lat. 60° N. from long. 30° W. of Greenwich to long. 4° W. of Greenwich; this meridian to its intersection with the north coast of G.B.; the north and west coasts of G.B. as far as the Lizard; the line joining the Lizard and Cape Mathieu; the west coast of Europe as far as Cape Trafalgar; the line joining Cape Trafalgar and Cape Spartel; the west coast of Africa to the Equator; the Equator to long. 30° W. of Greenwich; that meridian as far as lat. 60° N.	
7	North-west of Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the North) by: lat. 60° N. from the east coast of Canada to long. 30° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as the east coast of S. America; the east coast of S. America, Central America and North America as far as lat. 60° N.	
8	South-east Section of the Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from long. 20° W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Africa; the west coast of Africa as far as Cape Agulhas (long. 20° E. of Greenwich);	

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Number	Name of Zone of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
		The meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 20° W. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the intersection of this meridian with the Equator.	
9	South-west Section of the Atlantic Ocean	This zone is bounded (starting from the north) by: the Equator from the east coast of South America to long. 20° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 70° W. of Greenwich from the South Pole as far as the intersection of this meridian with the south coast of Tierra del Fuego; the south and east coasts of Tierra del Fuego and S. America as far as the Equator.	
10	Black Sea	The whole zone of the Black Sea, including the Sea of Marmora; the zone is bounded on the south-west by the line Sed-El-Bahr—Kum Kaleh.	
11	Northern Section of the Indian Ocean	The boundaries of this zone (starting from the North-west): The south entrance of the Suez Canal; the west, south and east coast of Arabia and the south coast of Asia as far as the north entrance of the Malacca Straits; the west coast of Sumatra and the	

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Number of Zone	Name of Zone of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
		south coasts of the islands of Java, Sumbawa, Flores and Timor as far as the eastern extremity of the island of Timor; a line drawn from the eastern extremity of the island of Timor to Cape Londonderry (Australia) as far as lat. 11° S.; along this parallel as far as the coast of Africa; the east coast of Africa as far as the south entrance of the Suez Canal.	
12	Southern Section of the Indian Ocean	The zone is bounded, starting from the north, by: lat. 11° S. from the east coast of Africa to a line drawn from the eastern extremity of the island of Timor to Cape Londonderry (Australia). This line as far as Cape Londonderry (Australia). The west and south coasts of Australia as far as long. 143° E. of Greenwich; along this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 20° E. of Greenwich from the South Pole as far as the south coast of Africa (Cape Agulhas); the south and east coasts of Africa as far as lat. 11° S.	
13	North-west Section of the Pacific Ocean	The zone is bounded, starting from the North, by: lat. 66° 30' N. between the coast of the U.S.S.R. and long. 170° W. of Greenwich; this	

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Number of Zone	Name of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
		meridian as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as long. 155° E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as lat. 11° S.; this parallel as far as the east coast of Australia; the north coast of Australia as far as Cape Londonderry; a line drawn from Cape Londonderry to the eastern extremity of the island of Timor; the north coast of the Sundari islands; Timor, Flores, Sumbawa, Java, and the east coast of Sumatra as far as the north entrance of the Malacca Straits; the west, south and east coasts of the Malay Peninsula and south and east coasts of Asia as far as lat. $66^{\circ} 30'$ N.	
14	North-east Section of the Pacific Ocean	This zone is bounded, starting from the north, by: lat. $66^{\circ} 30'$ N. from long. 170° W. of Greenwich to the west coast of Alaska; the west coast of North, Central and South America as far as the Equator; the Equator as far as long. 170° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as lat. $66^{\circ} 30'$ N.	
15	South-west Section of Pacific Ocean	This zone is bounded, starting from the north, by: the Equator from long. 155° E.	

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Number	Name of Zone of Zone	Boundaries of Zone	States responsible for protection in a given zone
		of Greenwich to long. 135° W. of Greenwich; long. 135° W. of Greenwich as far as the South Pole; long. 143° E. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the south coast of Australia; the south-east coast of Australia as far as lat. 11° S.; this parallel as far as long. 155° E. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the Equator.	
16	South-east Section of Pacific Ocean	This zone is bounded, starting from the north, by: the Equator from long. 135° W. of Greenwich to the west coast of South America; the west coast of South America and the west and south coasts of Tierra del Fuego as far as long. 70° W. of Greenwich; this meridian as far as the South Pole; long. 135° W. of Greenwich from the South Pole to the Equator.	

NOTE: Protection on inland seas washing the coasts of two or more states shall be regulated by special agreement between such states.

Article 42

The safeguarding of the international interests mentioned in Article 40 shall be entrusted, in accordance with a special convention to regional groups of states having access to the waters enumerated in the list annexed to Article 31 of the present Convention.

Article 43

Supervision shall be exercised by maritime police vessels with a tonnage not exceeding 3,000 tons and armed with not more than two guns, the

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calibre of which shall not exceed 50 mm. The crews of police vessels shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment.

A maximum of 20 rifles or pistols may be retained for the armament of the crew in conformity with Article 39 of the present Convention.

Article 44

Customs supervision in territorial waters shall be exercised by unarmed vessels of the maritime Customs police having a tonnage of not more than 100 tons.

The number of the above mentioned vessels in the possession of each contracting state shall be determined by a special convention and shall be proportionate to the length of coastline.

The personnel of the maritime Customs police may be armed with rifles and pistols and shall serve on the terms laid down in Article 43 of the present Convention.

NOTE: The limits of territorial waters shall be fixed by a special agreement.

CHAPTER IV

CONTROL

Article 45

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Convention, there shall be organized a Permanent International Commission of Control, Commissions of Control in each of the contracting states, and local Commissions of Control.

Article 46

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entrusted with:

(a) The supervision and control of the normal and proportional progress of disarmament, with the general co-ordination of measures for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention and with the notification to each state of offences against its stipulations.

(b) The preparation of an agreement for bringing pressure by non-military measures upon any states which disturb the normal progress of disarmament as laid down by the present Convention and conventions supplementary thereto.

(c) The selection of localities, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical agreements.

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(d) The selection of centres for the manufacture of arms, the volume of such manufacture and the regulation of the trade in arms.

(e) The publication of information concerning progress in the work of disarmament.

Article 47

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and the trade unions and other workmen's organizations of all the states participating in the present Convention.

Later, the Permanent International Commission of Control may be supplemented by representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between states and which have pursued this aim with success provided that these organizations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control. The seat of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be at . . .

Article 48

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts belonging to all the states acceding to the present Convention.

Article 49

The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control; it shall give opinions and shall deal with all especially technical questions referring to the execution of the present Convention.

Article 50

The Commission of Control in each of the states shall consist of representatives of the Permanent International Commission of Control appointed by the Commission, representatives of public associations, trade unions and workmen's organizations, and of representatives of the peasants and the rank and file of the armed forces in the state in question. The appointment of members of the Commission of Control shall be confirmed by the Permanent International Commission of Control. The seat of the Commission of Control shall be the capital of the state concerned.

Article 51

The Commissions of Control in each state shall co-ordinate the disarmament work of the local Commissions of Control in absolute conformity

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with the present Convention and in accordance with the instructions of the Permanent Commission of Control.

Article 52

The local Commissions of Control shall consist of representatives of municipal and public organizations, trade unions and workmen's associations, and of representatives of the peasants and of the rank and file of the army.

The number of local Commissions of Control, their headquarters and the radius of their activities shall be determined by the Commission of Control of the state in question. The latter Commission shall approve the composition of the local Commissions of Control.

Article 53

The local Commissions of Control shall proceed directly with the work of disarmament within the radius of their activities in accordance with the instructions of the Commission of Control in their country.

Article 54

The following may not be members of central or local Commissions of Control.

(a) Professional ex-soldiers and officials of the Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation.

(b) Owners of and large shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the trade in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

Article 55

All the contracting states shall seek to give the widest publicity to the progress of disarmament and shall afford the organs of the Permanent International Commission of Control every facility for the full investigation of all activities of the State, of public associations and of private persons which are connected with the application of disarmament, or which, in the view of the Permanent International Commission of Control or its organs, give rise to doubts concerning the observance of the undertakings solemnly entered into with regard to disarmament and the discontinuance of all military preparations.

Article 56

The decisions of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be taken by a majority vote and shall be binding on all the contracting states.

Article 57

The costs of maintenance of the Permanent International Commission of Control and its organs, as well as the expenses relating to the work of control, shall be defrayed by all the contracting states in a proportion to be settled in a special convention.

The expenses of the national and local Commissions of Control shall be defrayed by each of the contracting states.

CHAPTER V

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS; BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION; RATIFICATIONS

Article 58

Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, all the contracting states shall enact legislation providing that a breach of any of the stipulations of the Convention shall be regarded as a grave offence against the state.

At the same time, all acts of national or international importance which are contrary to the above-mentioned clauses shall be repealed or amended.

Article 59

Within nine months of the entry into force of the present Convention, the following conventions shall be concluded:

(a) In conformity with Article 8 of the present Convention, a convention on the number of staffs, commands, establishments and institutions left to each of the contracting states until the completion of full and general disarmament.

(b) In conformity with Article 29 of the present Convention a convention giving a list of the fortresses, fortifications and naval and air bases to be destroyed.

(c) In conformity with Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the present Convention, a convention concerning the storage and production of, and trade in, a minimum quantity of war material.

(f) In conformity with Articles 41, 42, 43, and 44 of the present Convention, a convention concerning protection at sea, the allocation of the areas of protection at sea and the number of vessels required for maritime police and customs purposes.

(g) A convention laying down the constitution of the Permanent International Commission of Control and of its organs, as well as the allocation of the costs connected therewith.

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(h) A convention regarding the measures of non-military pressure to be taken against states disturbing the normal progress of disarmament as provided for in the present Convention and in the supplementary agreements thereto.

Note.—The International Commission of Control shall be responsible for arranging to summon the states participating in the present Convention to a Conference for the conclusion of all the supplementary conventions mentioned in the present article.

Article 60

In the case of a direct breach of the present Convention by one of the contracting states an extraordinary assembly of the representatives of the contracting states participating in the present Convention shall be summoned as expeditiously as possible by the Permanent International Commission of Control to decide upon the steps to be taken.

The steps taken to exercise pressure must not be of a military character.

All disputes between states shall be settled by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 61

The present Convention shall enter into force as from its ratification by all the states in conformity with the legislative practice of each of the contracting states.

Article 62

In order to determine the attitude to be taken in regard to states not ratifying the present Convention, the contracting states shall convene a World Congress in the month of..... 192....., at.....

Article 63

The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of one of the states in the five continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions of Article 61 shall be notified to all the contracting states by.....

Memorandum Explaining the Draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament

1. The Draft Convention on General, Complete and Immediate Disarmament is based on the destruction of the principal elements which form the armed strength of a country, that is to say, the organized armed forces

on land, on sea and in the air, their material, and the industries connected with the production of armaments.

The Draft Convention further provides that, at the expiry of a year after its coming into force, the land, naval and air forces of all countries shall be reduced to an establishment which would be useless for warfare, thus limiting the possibility of armed conflict, even before disarmament has been completed.

2. The Draft Convention merely sets forth the general principles of disarmament applicable to the armed forces of all countries, without going into the detail of each, on the supposition that, when the essential principles have been adopted, all these details will be dealt with in a subsequent discussion of the whole question of disarmament. Thus in any case there is no need to work out technical details, this being a matter for a special body to be set up after the Convention has come into force.

3. Chapter I of the Draft Convention embodies the principles of disarmament so far as they relate to effectives.

For the first year it provides for the discharge of half the total establishment of officers, officials, and other ranks, the closing down of military schools, Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation, military staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, and, at the same time, the destruction of mobilization plants for the armed forces and trained reserves.

By these means, armies and fleets will be reduced to a condition in which they cannot easily be used for attacks by one country on another. What is left of them will be principally occupied in effecting disarmament in connection with the destruction of material, which requires a certain amount of personnel for various kinds of work.

In this connection, questions concerning the organization of armed forces for carrying out the first stage of disarmament are looked upon as domestic questions for each country.

As regards armies organized on the territorial system, with small cadres periodically supplemented by variable effectives, disarmament will be carried out on the same principle, namely, that at the end of the first year 50 per cent of the cadres and 50 per cent of the trained reserves included in the variable effectives will be discharged.

For the rest, Chapter I of the Draft Convention develops and explains in detail the proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R. delegation at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

4. Chapter II contains the most important provisions regarding the destruction of material:

(a) This chapter again deals with the principal aspect of disarmament during the first stage—the destruction of all reserve stores intended for

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mobilization, of which the first to be destroyed are to be those that might be employed against the civil population.

(b) After the first stage of disarmament, the army of each country will retain such arms and munitions as are strictly necessary for the establishment maintained during the succeeding years. The scale of technical war material will be limited by a special convention. The object of this limitation, as of all measures contemplated in Chapter I is to prevent the armaments maintained during those years from being used for purposes of war.

(c) By the destruction of material is meant its reduction to a condition in which it cannot possibly be used for purposes of war.

The technique of the destruction of material will be worked out later in all its details, on the principle that the utmost possible use should be made of material which has value for purposes of other than military production, and for the increased welfare of peoples.

(d) Article 15 of the Draft Convention provides that sporting guns of non-military pattern and revolvers for sporting purposes and for self-defence may be retained. In view of the general social situation, these measures are particularly necessary in countries where communications are undeveloped.

(e) As regards naval armaments, the Draft Convention provides in the first place for the destruction of capital ships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., all of which are mostly used in the pursuit of imperialistic aims. The classes of warships enumerated above are removed from the effective battle fleet by the immediate discharge of the entire ship's company, which will limit the possibility of using such vessels; thereafter all the ship's ordnance will be rendered useless and then removed and destroyed (the first to be removed will be the indispensable parts of the guns, gun-laying apparatus, fire control apparatus, mine-laying and torpedo firing apparatus, etc.) When the material is rendered useless, the ammunition, mines and torpedoes will at the same time be destroyed. It will thus become impossible to use these warships for war purposes without lengthy preparation.

The draft convention allows of the use of disarmed warships as merchant vessels when necessary alterations have been made.

By dismantling warships is meant their disarmament by the removal of their armour-plating, the destruction of the special apparatus such as turrets, gun platforms, control positions (*roufs de guerre*), aircraft platform, war signalling apparatus, and any other special devices for war purposes.

(f) The disarmament of military air forces involves in the first place the destruction of heavy aircraft as engines of war. Taking into con-

sideration the social importance of aircraft as a means of communication, the Draft Convention does not make the destruction of the material essential to disarmament, since some of the aircraft can be converted to social and economic uses; but as there is no great difficulty in fitting aircraft for bomb dropping and as this can be done very quickly, the number of aircraft in the civil fleet must admittedly be proportionate to the country's genuine needs, and this is provided for in Article 28 of the Draft Convention.

(g) Fortifications and bases must be destroyed, since they can be used as bases for aggression.

(h) The question of the destruction of war industries is particularly complicated, because a highly developed industry contains great potential forces for the production of armaments. Here, again, however, there are a number of essential appliances by the destruction of which the manufacture of armaments can be made very difficult. These include drawings, measuring instruments, models, frames, machines, tools, and appliances specially designed for the manufacture of armaments. Further the actual demilitarization of military factories, their use for the manufacture of non-military products, the employment in other factories of plant that is not specifically military, and the destruction of everything necessary for mobilization preparations, will make it a very complicated matter to use these factories for war purposes.

5. Chapter III deals with the organization of protection, and, in this connection, in order to prevent any possibility of using the various forces for military purposes or as a nucleus for disguised military forces, the establishments of the police forces or militia, gendarmerie, and other kinds of guards must be kept strictly within their present limits throughout the period of four years provided for the completion of general disarmament. Subsequently, the establishments of the Customs and revenue guards and local police will be fixed by a special convention on a scale proportionate to the population, length of communications, property to be protected, and development of forestry.

Police forces of every kind must be armed with modern weapons of the simplest pattern, because if a more complicated armament were retained, it might be easier for these formations to be used as armed forces in attacks by stronger upon weaker countries. Naval policing is regarded not as a matter to be dealt with separately by each country, but as providing for the needs of a whole group of countries, so that it cannot possibly be turned to imperialistic ends. Maritime police will only be provided with the armament strictly necessary for the performance of their duties.

6. Although complete and general disarmament is wholly conditional

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upon the good will of all countries it seems necessary to make definite arrangements for its successive stages and for the maintenance of proportions, and to establish a special body to work out the technical details of disarmament and settle any disputes which may arise. With this object, Chapter IV of the Draft Convention, lays down the principles of the control which is based upon the widest reciprocity, full publicity, and participation in the work by those classes of the population which are most interested in the speedy completion of disarmament.

As there is at present in the world no authority whose decisions must be obeyed by all countries, this status might be conferred upon a Permanent International Commission of Control—which of course presupposes the goodwill and the consent of all countries. The composition of this Commission would be a guarantee of the impartiality of its decisions, and, as there would be a Committee of Experts attached to it, technical questions could be quickly settled.

7. Chapter V contains suggestions for the conclusion of supplementary conventions on various questions connected with disarmament, and indicates the procedure for ratifying conventions and settling any questions arising out of violations.

It is this group of questions that are the most complicated; but the Draft Convention does not allow of any military pressure being brought to bear on any country, because such measures are apt to give rise to serious international conflicts, and it is hoped that most countries are so genuinely anxious to effect complete and general disarmament that other means will always be found to compel any country seeking to violate the obligations it has assumed to discharge them faithfully.

Speech by M. Litvinov delivered on 22 March, 1928, at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

I should like to begin by expressing my gratitude to those delegates who have responded to my appeal and expressed their attitude to the proposals presented by the Soviet delegation. I note with satisfaction that this was done by nineteen of the delegates present. Special gratitude is due from me to the honourable representative of the British Empire for giving the discussion such a wide scope and bringing forward a series of questions of the first importance in connection with our proposals. I welcome the frankness with which he spoke, and shall endeavour, while observing the same courtesy and respect, to reply with equal frankness.

The honourable representative of the British Empire, however, introduced into the debate certain questions which I myself might have hesi-

tated to bring up fearing that they might be regarded as irrelevant to the matter in hand. Since the initiative is his, however, I trust he will not take it ill if I express the point of view of the Soviet delegation and my government with regard to these questions. Lord Cushendun was not content to investigate the Draft Convention and our elucidation of it, but went out of his way to look for ulterior motives inspiring the Soviet government to appear with dramatic suddenness before the Commission and present drastic proposals for disarmament. He also questioned the spirit in which the delegation came here, and why the Soviet government has up till now taken no interest in, or as he preferred to put it, sabotaged the matter of disarmament. I will not ask the honourable delegate for the British Empire by what right he puts such questions to me, whether he recognizes my own right to cross-examine him as to the sincerity of his government, whether the British government has sent its delegation here from sheer love of peace or for any other motives, what it has so far done for the cause of disarmament, and whether he would stigmatize as sabotage the fact that his and other governments have so far done nothing to solve a series of questions and dissensions arising in the sphere of the Commission, thus making it impossible for it to proceed to a second reading of its own Draft Convention and get on with its labours on the lines already laid down by the Commission itself. Such questions on my part would be perfectly in order by way of reciprocity, in view of the equal rights of the delegations represented here. I prefer, however, instead of indulging in idle questions, to satisfy his curiosity in reply to his questions.

The Soviet government has interested itself in the problem of the establishment of peace and the banishment from national life of that scourge of human society, war, ever since it came into power. It was the first government among the belligerent states to bring to an end the participation of its citizens in the great massacre, appealing to the other belligerent states to follow its example. When the Soviet state underwent a fresh attack from the then allies, of which Great Britain was one, while continually making proposals for peace, it responded immediately to the invitation to go to the Prinkipo Islands to conclude a truce, being ready to make vast sacrifices for the sake of bringing to an end the fresh bloodshed imposed upon it. Quite independently of the League of Nations, on its own initiative, the Soviet government suggested, as long ago as 1922, at the first International Conference at Genoa, in which it participated, that the first question discussed be that of general disarmament. Other states unfortunately considered it more important to spend time over the discussion of the question of restoring the private property of certain foreign firms suffering from the Russian Revolution. I do not

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intend to enumerate the other steps taken by the Soviet government in regard to disarmament as I have already mentioned them in this Commission at the November session. During the more than ten years of its existence, the Soviet government has never attacked any of its neighbours, has declared no war upon anybody, and has taken no part in warlike adventures of other states. On the first invitation of the League of Nations it agreed to take part in the labours of the latter in regard to disarmament despite its well-known attitude to the League itself. Had it been a member of the League of Nations it would have been bound to do this by its own undertakings, whether it sincerely desired disarmament or not. The fact that the Soviet government having no obligations whatsoever towards the League voluntarily co-operates with you in this Commission seems to me additional testimony to its sincerity and good faith. As I already pointed out at the November session, the responsibility for the non-participation of the Soviet government in the first three sessions must be entirely laid at the door of the League of Nations. Arriving here the Soviet delegation made up its mind to take the most active part in the labours of the Commission, showing initiative wherever it considered the initiative of others to be lacking or inadequate, and endeavouring to the best of its ability, to speed up and stimulate the work on disarmament and for the cause of general peace. The Soviet government, in sending a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, was inspired by no motives other than the desire to contribute to the freeing of the peoples from the heavy burden of militarism and the curse of war. In any case, the record of the Soviet government in the sphere of peace is one qualifying it more than any other government to come forward with proposals for disarmament.

Having voluntarily submitted to the cross-examination of the honourable representative of the British Empire, I am ready to reply also to his question as to whether our attitude to the League of Nations or, as he prefers to put it, our sabotage of the League of Nations, justifies our participation in the discussion of the questions before us here. Now, the Soviet government has never attempted to conceal its attitude to the League of Nations, even mentioning this in its replies to invitations to take part in this Commission. The Soviet government has frequently and publicly given the reasons for such an attitude to the League of Nations, pointing out all that it considers inequitable, unacceptable, and reprehensible in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Assemblies, and the various decisions of the Council of the League with regard to international questions. I hardly think the prestige of the League of Nations, of which Lord Cushendun is so careful, would be added to were I to recapitulate all this

here. Suffice it to say that the Soviet government sees no obstacle to its own participation in this Commission and the coming Disarmament Conference in the fact that the Commission is assisted by the League of Nations. This does not, of course, imply that the Soviet government has undertaken to submit to any instructions or rulings emanating from the League or the Council of the League. It will only consider itself bound by acts drawn up by the Commission and the Convention which it may sign together with other governments. As, however, Lord Cushendun can scarcely fail to be aware, ours is not the only delegation from a government not belonging to the League of Nations. An excellent illustration of the attitude of such delegations to the jurisdiction of the League is afforded by the declaration made to the third session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission by the honourable representative of the Government of the United States at present among us, to the following effect:

"The fact that my government is not a member [of the League] imposes certain very definite limits as to the undertakings which it is in a position to give in connection with a Convention of this sort."

And further:

"Any convention, in order to be acceptable to my government, must take full account of the fact that it cannot accept the jurisdiction of the League of Nations."

I am unable to understand the exact purpose of Lord Cushendun's questions about our sabotage of the League of Nations, for this question does not seem to imply that the government of Great Britain would really like to see the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics a member of the League of Nations. Indeed, such a desire would be by no means in accordance with the policy of the present government of Great Britain with regard to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. In any case, in inviting the Union to take part in the labours of this Commission, the Council of the League was perfectly aware that the government of the Soviet Union was not a member of the League and had no intention of joining it.

Lord Cushendun objected to an article quoted by himself from *Izvestia*, which he considered displayed a sceptical or ironical attitude to the work of the members of the League in the sphere of disarmament. This scepticism was expressed here by the Soviet delegation also; the writer in *Izvestia* has perhaps merely put it more bluntly. I am, however, unable to understand why this article should worry the honourable representative of the British Empire and the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. It depends upon the Commission itself, by the results of its work, to give the paper the lie. The Soviet delegation would be the first to rejoice if this were done. But it is not only in Soviet circles that scepticism is shown with regard to

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the disarmament work of the League of Nations. I have before me a Paris paper, of an extremely reactionary tendency, for the twentieth of this month. In it I read:

"The League of Nations could only be harmless if it admitted to be what it really is, an academy of pacifism, and if its priests admitted that their anti-war lectures are about as effective as the incantations of negro necromancers against storm."

In my opinion, this scepticism and irony might serve as a stimulus for the League and for our Commission, inciting them to do everything possible to show its undeservedness.

The honourable representative of the British Empire tried to imply that the complete or partial solution of the problem of disarmament outside the League of Nations is most reprehensible—indeed very little short of blasphemy. He went so far as to include among the achievements of the League of Nations the Washington Convention on the reduction of naval armaments, appearing to forget that the League of Nations had nothing whatsoever to do with the Washington Convention. More, the so-called "Conference of Three" on naval disarmament held in Geneva itself, was also not connected with the League of Nations, and did not even avail itself of the organs of the League of Nations. If I am not mistaken, the negotiations still going on between the participants of this Conference are being held outside the orbit of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament.

The honourable representative of the British Empire, in passing under survey our Draft Convention, pointed indignantly to the lack in it of any reference whatsoever to the League of Nations, to the depositing of ratification papers in Geneva, or the registration of the Convention with the League of Nations. This, however, becomes quite comprehensible if it is borne in mind that the project emanates from a government not formally recognizing the League of Nations. Moreover, the reproaches of the honourable member for Great Britain will appear incomprehensible when I remind you that a series of international documents in the drawing up of which members of the League, including the British Empire, took part, have not been deposited with the League of Nations. To the best of my knowledge, the Straits Convention, for example, drawn up not far from Geneva—in Lausanne, to be exact—was deposited not at Geneva, but in Paris. Similarly the Acts of the Washington Naval Convention have not been deposited at Geneva. The Protocol on Poison Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, recently ratified by the Soviet Union and by Italy (but not as yet ratified by Great Britain), is also deposited, not at Geneva, but in Paris, despite the fact that the Protocol was passed at a Conference convened by

the League of Nations. The same is true of the Conference on the question of the trade in arms, of which the League of Nations was the initiator. Moreover, with the exception of one article, all mention of the League of Nations was omitted from this Convention on the insistence of the United States whose government threatened to refrain from ratification unless this was done. In the note of this government on 12 September, 1923, we find the words:

"The articles of the Convention which relate to the League of Nations are so closely interwoven with the Convention as a whole as to make it impossible for my government to ratify the Convention."

I may also refer to Sir Austen Chamberlain's protest against the registration of the Anglo-Irish Treaty with the League of Nations, although both these states are members of the League. If non-reference by the Soviet government—not a member of this League—is, in the opinion of the honourable representative of the British Empire, an insult to and neglect of the League, how much more ought this reproach be made by Lord Cushendun to his own government, participating in the acts I have enumerated which ignore the League of Nations.

In his endeavour to discover specific features in the Soviet government which might disqualify it from taking part in the work of disarmament, the honourable representative of the British Empire asks the Soviet delegation what is its attitude to civil war—does it condemn it or admit it to be legitimate? If I were to follow the example of the honourable representative of the British Empire and seek out the ulterior motive in this question, I might assume it to have been put with a view to provoking the Soviet delegation to make an open defence here of civil war and revolution, in order the next day to accuse it of propaganda. I am, however, far from imputing such motives. It is, nevertheless, an entirely superfluous question, since the most cursory acquaintance with our Draft Convention (and Lord Cushendun has shown us that he has studied it) would convince anyone that it refers only to international war. It never occurred to us, and we had no grounds for believing, that the League of Nations intended to include under the questions of disarmament and security the prevention of civil war and the class struggle. I may say without the slightest hesitation that the Soviet government would never have agreed to participate with the British or any other government here represented in the working out of questions regarding the class war or the struggle against revolution. Indeed it would be naive to expect such work from a government which owes its existence to one of the greatest revolutions in history and was called into being to protect the achievements of this revolution. The governments represented here will apparently have to settle their internal social con-

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flicts without our participation. I confess my entire inability to see the connection of this question with our project for total disarmament. Did Lord Cushendun wish to imply by this question that armies are required not only for national defence, but also for the putting down of possible revolutions? Such an argument against our project would be quite inconclusive from any point of view, since it has become common knowledge that both the March and November revolutions took place with the active participation of vast armies, brought up to war-time pitch. In any case, if the honourable representative of the British Empire and other delegates touching upon this point attribute great importance to the question of social security, they will probably, when the time comes, develop their point of view more fully. I apologize to the Commission for touching upon this theme, which it may consider irrelevant, but I would remind it that it was the honourable representatives of the British Empire, and not I, who broached the subject.

The honourable representative of the British Empire not only faces us with questions, but also imposes upon us preliminary conditions, and desires to get from us some sort of assurances before he agrees to consider our Draft Convention. The Soviet government is called upon to assure him that it will refrain from provoking armed risings in other countries. The honourable representative of the British Empire appeared at the same time to imply that this was irrefutably the established practice and policy of the Soviet government. The honourable representative of the British Empire saw fit to use the question of disarmament publicly to accuse the Soviet government once more (as his own government has already done times without number) of so-called propaganda. Lord Cushendun apparently does not realize the unreasonableness of persisting in the use of a weapon long rendered innocuous by the exposure in so many countries of scores of offices and bureaux, largely staffed by Russian emigrés, for the specific purpose of drawing up forged documents for foreign governments, proving alleged propaganda by the Soviet government or its agents in foreign countries. One of these documents has already received the historic nickname of the "Zinovieff Letter," and references have been made to it in the House of Commons even during the last few days. The fraudulency of this document has long ago been established, if only by the fact that the British government at the time refused the demand of the Soviet government to have it investigated by any arbitration court. A demand for the investigation of this document made a few days ago by one hundred and thirty-two British Members of Parliament has been rejected by their government. A former Prime Minister of Great Britain referred in parliament to this document on Monday last as follows:

"This letter was the subject of what was generally admitted now to be a political fraud, a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cool calculation and preparation in our political history."

Such are the documents on which the British government bases its accusations of propaganda and internal interference. With regard to interference in internal affairs, I fear the Soviet and the British governments have not yet found a common language to work out what precisely may be considered as interference. The British government is inclined to consider a speech uttered or an article printed in Moscow regarding the policy or internal affairs of another country as interference, while not admitting as interference the arbitrary stationing of naval squadrons in foreign ports (Shanghai) the firing on foreign ports and towns with all the consequences entailed to the population (Nanking, 1927), the demand that the government of an independent country cease operations against an insurgent subject (Sir Percy Lawrence's ultimatum to the Persian government, 1924), and the demand for his legal reinstatement (note to the Persian government, 1927), the limitation of the army of this country (note to the Persian government, 1921), etc. The Soviet government cannot, of course, agree to such a conception of what constitutes interference in the affairs of others. But, gentlemen, you will ask me, what has this ancient Soviet-British dispute got to do with disarmament? I am forced to reply that it has nothing to do with it. It was not I who brought it up, but the representative of the British government, and I should consider it a mark of disrespect and discourtesy to him to ignore any of his questions.

The delegates of the British, Japanese, French, Netherlands and other governments wondered if our project for complete disarmament was in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, if not, if they had the right or ought to spend the time on its consideration. To this question all these delegates apparently gave a negative reply, corroborated by no less an authority than M. Politis. If this however is so indisputable and if complete disarmament is contradictory to the principles and aspirations of the League of Nations, we are unable to understand why the Preparatory Commission did not reject our proposals at the November session, why it decided to investigate them, and why it is now spending time over this question. Apparently, however, the delegates I have mentioned are far from sure of the correctness of their replies, from a political point of view, if not juridically speaking. And indeed, we have always been told that the League of Nations was created mainly, if not exclusively, for the purpose of ensuring general peace. Although Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant only mentions the limitation of armaments, it appears to us that merely minimum obligations were intended, and

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this article should by no means be allowed to serve as an obstacle to further and complete disarmament should this be desired by the members of the League. It seems to me that a better means for discrediting the League of Nations could scarcely be found than the assertion that it is the barrier to total disarmament. Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man. You are rendering your League a poor service, gentlemen, if you make a fetish of it, and subject it to the entire will of your governments. The Covenant of the League of Nations is not a law for all time. The League itself, by the way, has several times considered altering its Covenant. It will suffice to refer to the fact that, on the confirmation by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its fifth ordinary session, on 2 October, 1924, of the Geneva Protocol, the Assembly decided to invite the Council to nominate without delay a Committee for the preparation of the revision of the alterations to the Covenant demanded by this Protocol. If you agree to the principle of total disarmament, and appreciate as they deserve all the blessings it would entail, or, let us rather say, the sum total of ills it would abolish, you will agree, of course, to sacrifice this or that Article of the Covenant. Those who say that our project infringes the Covenant of the League, inasmuch as, by abolishing armaments, it deprives the League of the power to apply military sanctions, forget that these sanctions imply armed attacks by one state on another, which the abolition of armaments would make impossible, so that the article on sanctions would itself become an anachronism. I do not mention the fact that the obligation for individual members of the League to participate in military sanctions is disputed by members of the League themselves. The Soviet delegation does not consider itself bound by the Covenant or any rulings of the League, and therefore did not consider it necessary to take them into consideration in its Draft Convention. If I venture to comment upon the Covenant of the League or any of its decisions, it is because I am anxious to understand your position and to prove the acceptability of our Draft Convention even from the point of view of members of the League. As for the competence of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, we are here not as technical experts, and not only as members of the Commission, but also as members and responsible representatives of our governments. If the Commission is called upon to seek out methods of partial disarmament, and if its members appear before those whom they represent with a declaration that they have found a way for total disarmament, there will hardly be found anyone to censure them for this, the more so as the decisions of this Commission are mere recommendations to the governments.

My opponents, with the possible exception of the honourable representative of the British Empire, criticized our disarmament project less for what

it contained than for what it did not contain. Our scheme, we are told, affords neither economic nor social security; it does not guarantee a just peace, does not destroy international distrust, does not point the way to the solution of international disputes—is, in fact, not a panacea. These reproaches would be just if we had undertaken to provide a universal remedy against all the ills and defects of human society, and to turn this vale of tears into an earthly paradise. We cannot recommend you any such panacea, for we know you would not entertain it for a moment. We are trying to find a means of abolishing one evil—one of the greatest it is true—the Moloch of war, and we want to try and find a common language with yourselves in so far as you way that you also are endeavouring to rid humanity of this ill. Within these limits—broad, but not infinite—our proposals, in our opinion, meet the purpose for which they were framed.

The gist of the arguments repeated here against the general idea of our project is that either the peoples will “rage furiously together” both without arms or with primitive weapons, or that the more industrially developed countries will be able very rapidly to substitute for the destroyed armaments new ones, and, in infringement of the Convention, enslave the weaker countries. It seems to me, by the way, that our opponents have already dropped the first of these arguments. I should like to call attention to the fact that the country which I represent has at its frontiers states numerically stronger than itself, such as China and India, with their hundreds of millions of inhabitants, and yet we have no fear of invasion by the organized masses of these countries. Other nations have still less reason than we for this fear. The second argument will also not hold water, for as it is, the weaker states, while obliged to maintain armed forces and resist possible attack by stronger states, are at the same time in complete dependence on the latter for their military supplies, besides being weak both technically and as regards their human resources. Articles 30—36 of the Soviet Draft Convention propose the abolition of military industry and all elements of military production. The experience of the World War has shown that, even in countries with a powerful industry, like the United States, it required from twelve to twenty months to organize war industry (declaration of the United States delegation to the Sub-Commission on Disarmament). Fresh equipment for armies cannot be created at a moment’s notice. Granted the time taken, this cannot go unnoticed, especially if the international and local control provided for in our Draft Convention functions well. We know, for example, that the limitation of war industry was carried out as a result of the Versailles Treaty, and that fairly thoroughly, even in the case of a highly-developed industrial country such as Germany, while in this instance what was aimed at was rendering innocuous a conquered country. How much easier it

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would be to control war industry given the complete abolition of the corresponding means of production!

The last-named objections seem to be rooted in profound international distrust, distrust of the mutual readiness to observe international conventions. It can be employed, and with even greater force, against the reduction of armaments, for what would be the good of an International Disarmament Commission, even along the lines of a Draft Convention worked out by a Preliminary Commission, establishing limits for armed forces and war supplies in every country, if we suspect that this Convention will not be observed and the equilibrium established arbitrarily upset? Here would be real grounds for your fears for the security of individual countries.

The honourable representative of Italy spoke, among other things, of the necessity not only of peace, but of a just peace. I must admit I do not quite understand what he means by this. Does he mean that the present peace is not just, and should be altered? But peace can only be altered by one of two ways: by war, or by revising the existing peace and other international treaties. As I am quite sure he did not intend to point to the necessity of a violent alteration to the present peace, I should like to tell him that our project by no means excludes the revision of the peace treaties, and that he could raise this question in the League of Nations, of which Italy is a member, or at another international conference, equally well after the realization of our project. If he is not thinking of the violent alteration of the peace, he obviously does not require the preservation of armaments for the revision of the treaties.

I will now turn to the remarks with regard to individual articles of our Draft Convention, returning for a moment to the speech of the honourable representative of the British Empire. He found a multiplicity of technical and other defects in our Draft Convention; he found that several articles do not even answer the purposes of its authors, that it is not written in language suitable to legislative act, and that many of its articles, which he was good enough to enumerate, are open to serious criticism. He asked with astonishment how I could think of imposing such a faulty Draft on the Disarmament Commission, stipulating at the same time for its acceptance, wholesale, without consideration, or its rejection. Lord Cushendun would have saved himself much time and labour and considerably shortened his speech if he had not built up all his arguments on false premises. I do not know why he made up his mind that the Soviet delegation had decided to present the Commission with something like an ultimatum. The Soviet government has itself received ultimatums, but, so far, has not sent any to anyone else, and it never entered our heads to do so here. Lord Cushendun himself justly mentioned my covering letter to the League of

Nations Secretariat, in which I proposed that our Draft Convention be accepted as a basis for discussion. In the speech introducing the Draft Convention I referred not less than three times to the conditions under which I considered its study and consideration expedient. It follows that I did not exclude for a moment the consideration of the Draft as a whole and in detail. I simply insisted that the Draft Convention should not be examined until and if the Commission accepted the principles underlying it. After all, what would be the good of discussing the question as to the type of ships to be preserved for coast defence if we had not decided the question of the destruction of other military vessels? What would be the good of our discussing the question of the international defence of marine zones before we had decided what individual naval forces of the various countries were to be destroyed? The examination and consideration of the Draft Convention without having established any ruling principles would indeed be an unworthy waste of our time.

Valuing the time of our Commission, and anxious to save it from the discredit of fruitless work that could not lead to anything, I warned it against wasting time over the Draft Convention before we had agreed upon a working basis. Furthermore, as the honourable representative for Italy remarked, all the articles of the Draft Convention were subordinated by us to the basic idea of the complete destruction of armaments. Take away this fundamental idea and the individual articles of the Convention lose all value for us. This is why I call the Draft a single whole incapable of disintegration. We, of course, claim no copyright for the Draft, and any of its articles may be adopted by anybody for any scheme of disarmament, but this will not be the Soviet scheme, and the Soviet delegation and government cannot undertake responsibility for any such. The Draft may be found to contain articles answering to the interest of this or that state. Great Britain may consider, for instance, that the article on the destruction of submarines accords with her interests; other states may find other articles suitable for themselves, and as a result disputes may arise with which, gentlemen, you are already familiar from the history of the first reading of your own Convention. Once, however, we all agree to use complete disarmament as a basic principle, disputes about individual points can have no serious significance. I am quite ready to admit that our Draft Convention is not perfect, and that, pursuing the common aim of complete disarmament, we might collectively considerably amend and improve it. All those articles which evoked the astonishment and criticism (shall I say derision?) of the honourable representative of the British Empire are not essential and allow of disputation and compromise.

Lord Cushendun aimed most of the slings and arrows of his criticism at

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Chapter III of the Draft, entitled "The Organization of Protection." I can assure you, Mr. President, that, in drawing up this chapter, the specific interests of our country were the last things to influence us. On the contrary, we would rather have ignored entirely the question of police defence. It is not, however, in vain that I am already participating for the second time at a session of the Preparatory Commission, and I am sufficiently imbued with your practical spirit and what you call a sense of reality. I knew the enormous significance attached by the countries you represent to the question of internal safety, the protection of property, etc., and therefore it was with a view to the interests of your countries and their possible desires that I ordered the drawing up of a special article on protection. I have no doubt whatsoever that, if I had omitted to do this, I should have been still more severely criticized, perhaps by none other than the honourable representative of the British Empire himself, for forgetting such an important body as the police. Lord Cushendun concentrated on the question of the arming of the police. He implied that our Draft Convention was specially adapted to the conditions of life in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, where the police would appear to be better armed than the police in other countries. As a matter of fact, the militia in the Soviet Union are armed with revolvers precisely as are the police in most European countries. I have an idea that the police in the country in which we are at present are also provided with firearms. Lord Cushendun assures us, and I do not for a moment doubt him, that the police in his country are armed only with truncheons, but I do not doubt either that in cases of necessity the troops might be called to their assistance. Moreover, in the *Manchester Guardian* for the nineteenth of this month, I read, for instance, the following communication from Belfast:

"In connection with the demonstration at Moy, a large force of police was concentrated in the district to prevent a repetition of an outrage perpetrated in August last when a group of nationalists marching in procession along the main street in order to take part in a similar demonstration were dispersed by shots. The principal roads were lined with police, while Crossley tenders full of armed constables were always on the move."

Thus we see that in Ulster, which is a part of the British Empire, the police constabulary are armed. Further, the following information was communicated by Reuter's Agency on 3 February last from Bombay: "The armed police suffered an attack by the demonstrators and were obliged to open fire"; and I have before me a telegram from Madras to the effect that, "as a result of the firing by the police upon the insurgents . . ." etc. Lord Cushendun will thus see that the police are not armed only in

the Soviet Union, and that at least in parts of the Empire represented by him the police are actually forced not only to carry, but to employ, firearms. I trust he will agree that my precautions regarding the police were not superfluous from his own point of view. Lord Cushendun was also amused at the point concerning the protection of means of communication. The British delegate, of course, has no doubt of the necessity to protect sea communications and even control by his governments of countries situated on marine routes. I venture, however, to inform him that while protection of means of communication may not be required where the railways system is highly developed, in countries with no towns or even large villages within a distance of 100 miles of each other, the presence at railway stations of only a single police officer, if only in case of crimes being committed in trains, would scarcely be considered by him superfluous. The objects requiring protection mentioned in the Draft are intended to cover such institutions as State Banks, Treasuries, and Mints, requiring, of course, special protection. If, in examining our Draft Convention the honourable representative of the British Empire would like to propose still more drastic reduction of armaments for protection and for the police, the Soviet delegation will do its utmost to meet him on this point.

In this connection, a very legitimate question was put by the honourable representative of the Netherlands, expressing the fear that, in arming the police in proportion to the population, the bigger countries might be in possession of a considerably greater armed force than the smaller, which might be used for warlike purposes. The Soviet government intends to defend the interests of weaker states in the most energetic manner, and the Soviet delegation is therefore ready to change the proportion in the interests of the weaker states. If the Soviet delegation were to present any scheme for partial disarmament whatsoever, it would propose the very principle of a higher degree of disarmament for the bigger countries, including the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, than for weaker states. I should add that the provision in our Draft Convention for forms of protection should not bear the character of military organization and that, as far as the police are concerned, they should be subjected to local authorities and not concentrated under a central administration, still less command. With regard to the types of weapons for protection forces this is a technical question to be decided by the experts, since in some cases, such as combating contrabandism, rifles might be required, in others revolvers, and in yet others side-arms, as the honourable representative of Cuba points out. The honourable representative of the British Empire did not ignore the question of personal defence of citizens, but implied that only those in my own country, where the state safeguards their lives inadequately, stand in need

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of such defence. I make so bold as to declare that the citizen of the Soviet Union does not carry arms on his person, and does not need them, for crime statistics there are no higher, if not lower, than in other countries. Lord Cushendun must, however, be well aware that shops trading in arms exist in all countries, and that these arms are bought for some purpose or other by private citizens also. The honourable representative of Japan has told us that it was dangerous to go out unarmed in certain tropical countries. Other dangers exist in other countries. Representatives of the Soviet government have been attacked and killed in extremely civilized countries. A Soviet courier has been called upon to defend the diplomatic mail, arms in hand, outside the frontiers of our Union, in European countries, some of which were members of the League of Nations. If, however, the representative of the British Empire proposes total prohibition of the carrying of arms by private citizens, including even sporting rifles, the Soviet delegation will not quarrel with him on this point. Our Draft Convention provides for a series of legislative measures on the part of every state. Lord Cushendun asked how free legislative assemblies could be forced to submit to the rulings of the Convention. It is now my turn to express astonishment. It cannot be that the honourable representative of the British Empire is not aware that an international convention ratified by the corresponding legislative assembly is law for the given country, and that the legislative assembly ratifying the convention by so doing undertakes to carry out the necessary legislative acts provided in such a convention.

All these questions could have been given tranquil and all-round consideration and our delegation would naturally have been happy to have given all the explanations necessary, but, since Lord Cushendun has already broached all the questions and made critical remarks on them, I was unable to leave them unanswered.

I would once more point out that the question of the types of vessels provided under Articles 43 and 44 present no obstacle whatsoever for agreement. I would mention by the way that I am informed by my naval experts that the vessels of the tonnage mentioned in the Draft Convention are fully capable of coping with their tasks in the various countries. For example, I have a list of some vessels belonging to Great Britain:

Mersey type trawlers, 665 tons; 11 knots; rated as fishery protection gunboats.

Arleux, Arras, Givenchy, 136 tons net; 10 knots, fishery protection; Atlantic and Pacific; Canadian Government.

In the United States of America there are:

Eagle boats, 500 tons; 18 knots; some of them transferred Coastguard.

1st class cruising cutters (new construction) 2,075 tons; 16 knots.
 25 Coastguard destroyers; 1,090 to 1,110 tons; 29.5 knots.

Cruising cutters (*Haida*, *Madoc* and others), 1,780 tons; 16 knots.
 Ex-submarine chasers, 75 knots; 11 knots.

All these vessels function in the same way as provided by our Draft Convention.

I cannot refrain from pointing out one remark on the part of the honourable representative of the British Empire with regard to Article 10, of which he himself would doubtless admit the unfairness. In mentioning the proposed prohibition of scientific research and theoretical treatises, he did not think it necessary to mention that the reference was to specifically military publications and not to general scientific ones. He found the article concerning military school books extremely humorous. I do not know if he is equally derisive of the proposal brought before the Assembly of the League on 16 September 1925, to the effect that:

"The League of Nations would propose that its Members take measures, with a view to moral disarmament, for the revision of school histories in such a way as to gradually diminish the number of pages devoted to military events, especially in the case of those pages in which wars of conquest, etc. are glorified."

The other articles attracting attention of the honourable representative of the British Empire, such as those concerning the number of copies of ratification papers, the place for their preservation, the place for the meeting of this International Control Commission, etc. are scarcely likely to provoke serious dissension. On detailed consideration of our draft plan, Lord Cushendun would have the opportunity of suggesting other wishes and offering proposals with regard to such questions as how to deal with those troublesome neighbours to whom he referred with such feeling. Before, however, going into these comparatively unimportant articles, I should like to know if he accepts in principle the first thirty-six which embody the principle of complete disarmament. On this point he was unfortunately a little evasive. He spoke of complete disarmament as the ideal to which the whole of humanity aspires and for which it has longed since the very dawn of history. We have not, however, met together here to discuss our remote ideals, but to decide which of these ideals, to which humanity has apparently been aspiring for several thousand years, can now be put into practice, and which must be given another thousand years to mature.

The honourable representative of the Netherlands asks if I consider the further discussion of our proposal of any use. Of course, if the majority or a considerable number of the delegations present consider the principle

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of complete disarmament unacceptable for their governments, then all further discussion is superfluous. Unfortunately, not all the speakers gave a quite clear answer to this question, and, while criticizing our disarmament scheme severely, many speakers nevertheless qualified this by remarks as to the usefulness of its further discussion. Our delegation attributes such vast importance to the idea of general disarmament that it will always be ready to give further elucidation and participate in further discussion of our proposals, but, I repeat, such discussion is desirable and expedient only if the Commission declares its acceptance of the principle of total disarmament. In that case I shall propose proceeding to the point by point reading of our Draft Convention. In the case of the rejection of this fundamental principle, I shall not only not insist upon consideration of the Draft, but shall myself oppose it as a complete waste of time. It is now for the Commission to let me have its decision.

Mr. President, I am aware that in asking for a decision, I am making a request which, while it is essential, is purely formal, and I cherish no illusions whatsoever as to its outcome. The speeches which have been pronounced here on the subject of disarmament have done nothing to increase our optimism. This time we really did begin our work in the Commission with some degree of optimism. We knew that one of the biggest states had come forward with a proposal for the prohibition of war, and, having our own conception of logic and consistency, considered ourselves entitled to reckon on the support of this government for our proposal; but the representative of this government did not consider it necessary to lay his point of view before us, unless we are to consider convincing his declaration here that he believed in one scheme and not in another. On the one hand, the criticism of our Draft Convention was based on profound international distrust, on the assumption that a solemnly accepted international convention is bound to be infringed, while on the other, we are assured that when two neighbours, armed to the teeth, give a solemn promise not to attack each other, only then can the preservation of peace be hoped for. But, when those neighbours supplement their solemn promise by undertaking to disarm and by actually disarming, we are told that not only will this not increase for them both the existing security, but it will actually decrease it. Thus, we learn disarmed nations are still more dangerous to each other than armed! *Credo quia absurdum!* Of course, this can be believed, since nothing is too strange to be true, but it is a little difficult to grasp.

I was a little surprised to hear the honourable representative for Poland say that our idea could only be seductive for the average man, the man in the street. But it is this very man in the street, the average man, of whom

the honourable representative for Poland spoke so contemptuously, on whom the burden of militarism lies, and who is called upon to offer sacrifices to the Moloch of war. We, the Soviet delegation, do not claim to represent the so-called upper circles of society; we are here to represent the workers and peasants, whose interests we understand and value. No manner of doubt exists for our government that these interests demand the radical solution of the question of disarmament and war. I think I can assure the honourable representative for Poland that the fears he expressed of the advocates of peace placing exaggerated hopes in the present session of the Preparatory Commission are, to say the least, exaggerated.

Whatever may be the fate of our Draft Convention in the present session of the Preparatory Commission, we still believe that general and immediate disarmament is the only effective guarantee of peace, corresponding not only to remote ideals, but to the urgent daily needs of humanity.

If at the present moment the indubitable fact that the sympathy of the broad popular masses is entirely on the side of the idea of total disarmament is questioned, we are, nevertheless, profoundly convinced that the time is not far distant when this sympathy will penetrate to the consciousness of all the governments represented here and cause them to take up a very different attitude to our proposals.

Extracts from the Speech of M. Litvinoff on 23 March, 1928, at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference.

In its note of 16 January, 1926, in reply to the invitation from the Council of the League of Nations to send a delegate to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet government attributed great importance to all endeavours to reduce the dangers of war and lighten the burden of militarism weighing down the shoulders of the popular masses. I said at the fourth session, in my declaration of 30 November last, that, while insisting in every way on the necessity for total disarmament "the Soviet Delegation was ready to take part in every consideration of the question of reducing armaments in so far as practical measures really aimed towards general disarmament were really under consideration." In accordance with these declarations the Soviet Delegation is now forced to ask itself, faced with the *fait accompli* of the rejection by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of its Draft Convention for total disarmament, what ought to be its next step towards the achievement of the aim it has set itself, which still remains and always will remain total general disarmament. Since most of the delegates here countered our proposals for general total disarmament with the idea of partial gradual

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disarmament—that is to say the reduction of present armaments by easy stages—the Soviet delegation has decided to look for common ground with the other delegates if only in the sphere of such partial disarmament. Let the other delegates regard such disarmament as an end in itself, beyond which they consider it impossible or inexpedient to go—the Soviet delegation will regard it as the first stage on the way to total disarmament. The lack of an ultimate aim in common with the other delegations ought not to be allowed to prevent us from working together for the achievement of the immediate aim—the *reduction* of armaments—if we can only hit upon a common idiom if only in this limited field.

The Soviet delegation considers that the substitution of the principle of total by that of partial disarmament by no means tends to the abolition of armed conflicts, although it is ready to admit that it is possible that it might tend to the diminution of their frequency, inasmuch as the increase of armaments is in itself one of the causes of the incidence of war.

The reduction of armaments may moreover have extremely desirable effects in easing the burden of militarism and relaxing the screw of taxation for the people of all countries, as well as freeing human forces for more productive labour and budgetary means for more useful ends. The reduction of armaments, if it proceeds along the channels which will be suggested by the Soviet delegation, might also result in minimizing the horrors of war.

The Soviet delegation notes that the Preparatory Commission has not at its disposal any scheme for partial disarmament which might serve as the object of immediate consideration.

While refraining from any criticism of those schemes which got so far as a first reading (although the Soviet delegation could say a great deal about them if it had the opportunity), we regard it as established that they evoked in the Commission itself dissensions to this day impossible to reconcile, despite the fact that twelve months have passed since their first reading. I therefore have the honour to inform the Preparatory Commission that a Draft will be presented by the Soviet delegation and distributed to the delegates (Annex 5) through the Secretariat of the League of Nations to-morrow morning, or, if it is convenient, even to-day.

In conclusion I consider it necessary once more to declare that we regard our proposal merely as a first step towards the carrying out of total disarmament, and that the Soviet delegation reserves to itself the right to present a fresh proposal for further reduction of armaments not later than two years after the acceptance of this new draft Convention. The delegation also reserves to itself the right, independently of acceptance or non-acceptance of this Draft Convention, to return to its original Draft Convention for

total and general disarmament at the coming International Disarmament Conference.

Draft Convention on the Reduction of Armaments submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission.

Considering that the immense growth in armaments and in militarism imposes a general and heavy burden on the peoples of the entire world and lowers the level of their culture and their material well-being;

And, considering that the atrocious struggle between the various states for predominance in armaments and the tendency to increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes are one of the factors which increase the possibility and the likelihood of armed outbreaks;

And, desiring to protect to the fullest possible extent the peaceful population of workers against the immediate dangers which threaten their life and property in the event of the outbreak of armed strife;

The contracting states have decided, with the object of taking a first serious and genuine step towards general and complete disarmament, to conclude the present Convention by appointing as their representatives:

who, having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Whereas a comparatively small number of the most powerful states, which aspire to a role of world domination, which expend on land, naval and air armaments a large proportion of the national budgets, and which possess the power at any moment to increase unduly the armaments which support their aggressive policies by availing themselves of highly developed industries have at their disposal by far the greater proportion of land, naval and air armaments.

The contracting states recognize that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest states which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.

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CHAPTER I

ARMED LAND FORCES

Section 1. Effectives

Article 1

In accordance with the preamble to the present Convention, the contracting states, when effecting the reduction of the armed land forces, agree to divide all states into the following main groups:

(a) Group A: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 200,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, of having in the cadres of the armed forces more than 10,000 regular officers or more than 60 regiments of infantry (180 battalions).

(b) Group B: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 40,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the cadres of the armed forces more than 2,000 regular officers or more than 20 regiments of infantry (60 battalions);

(c) Group C: All other states maintaining armed forces inferior in number and composition to the figures given for Group B.

(d) Group D: States disarmed after the World War.

Remarks: 1. In all the calculations mentioned above account shall be taken of the total number of the armed land forces maintained by the state in question in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies, including military police, military gendarmerie corps and depot guards.

The number of the police forces organized on a military basis, gendarmerie, Customs guards, train guards, forest guards, and other armed corps organized for the needs of the Customs preventive service, for the maintenance of order within the country, and the protection of government and public property shall be determined by means of a special Convention.

2. By persons "serving with the colours in the active army" are understood all persons serving permanently in the cadres of the armed forces and all persons serving in the army cadres as conscripts.

3. By "officers" (commanders) are understood all persons who have received specific military training and are described as "officers" (commanders) under the military law of the contracting countries.

Article 2

Recognizing that, among the methods of reducing armed land forces, the simplest and the fairest for all the states concerned, and that which, at the same time, least affects the system of organizing, recruiting and training such forces, consists in applying the same co-efficient of reduction

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to all states in the same group (Article 1 of the present Convention), the contracting states agree to fix the co-efficient at the following figures:

- (a) States in Group A shall reduce their armed land forces by one-half.
- (b) States in Group B by one-third.
- (c) States in Group C by one-fourth.

Remarks: The proportionate strength of the armed land forces for states in Group D shall be fixed under special conditions to be determined by the Disarmament Conference.

Article 3

The armed land forces of the contracting states shall be reduced by applying the co-efficients mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention to the following totals:

(a) To the aggregate total of the effectives serving with the colours in the active army, men belonging to the variable militia formations, the territorial formations, the organized reserves and other military formations receiving military training with the colours or elsewhere; officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks shall be reckoned separately in each case;

(b) To the number of the organized units and corps of the main categories of field troops in the regular or territorial armies, in the militia forces, in the organized reserves and in other military formations which can be employed immediately without an order for mobilization or which exist and are recognized in peace time as cadres of the armed forces in war.

Article 4

The number of the effectives and units and the corps of the land forces which the contracting parties must not exceed shall be laid down in a supplementary convention based on the following principles:

(a) The coefficients of reduction mentioned in Article 2 of the present Convention shall be applied to the several states according to the group to which they belong (Article 1 of the present Convention) separately in the case of:

(1) Each category of armed land forces (regular, army, territorial, militia, organized reserves, etc.);

(2) The total number of armed land forces stationed in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies;

(3) The total number of regular officers and regular non-commissioned officers and officers of the variable effectives.

(4) The number of units and corps of each category of troops.

(b) In accordance with the foregoing, the following tables shall be

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annexed to the supplementary Convention. Each table shows, after the reduction of each category of armed forces, the remaining number of units and corps of infantry, field artillery and cavalry which make up the general effectives classified under the headings of officers, non-commissioned officers, and voluntarily enlisted other ranks (total number), of the administrative services, civic education service, intendance, chaplains' department etc.

Table I: Maximum home forces.

Table II: Maximum overseas forces stationed in the home country.

Table III: Maximum forces of dominions and other overseas possessions.

Table IV: Maximum forces of the home country stationed in the several colonies, dominions or other overseas possessions.

Table V: Maximum of the total forces of each state.

(c) The aforesaid co-efficients of reduction used in calculating effectives will be applied to the effectives of the armed forces as shown in the returns on 1 January, 1928.

Article 5

With the object of limiting the accumulation of trained reserves, the contracting states agree:

(a) To reduce in each class, according to the co-efficients of reduction given above, the aggregate number of men who have received military training and of officers who have received military training either with the colours or elsewhere.

(b) To pass legislation prohibiting the existence of any civil bodies organized on a military basis by specialized instructors drawn from the army, and the assembly of such bodies for training, as also the military training of the civilian population at the instance of civil associations.

Section 2. Material

Article 6

For the armament of land forces the existing patterns shown in the tables at 1 January, 1928, shall be retained, except tanks and heavy artillery with very long range, which are essentially designed for aggression.

Article 7

All implements of war directed primarily against the civilian population which does not directly take part in the armed conflict (military aircraft

and chemical weapons) must be destroyed as provided in the special Convention.

Article 8

The quantities of arms for the land armies shall be strictly limited according to:

(a) The needs of the army in time of peace;

(b) The number of trained reservists in each year-class, the number of such classes being the same for all countries in any one group (Article 1 of the present Convention) and not exceeding ten classes for countries in Group A, with a subsequent progressive increase of 50 per cent and 100 per cent respectively for Groups B and C.

Article 9

The maximum number of weapons allowed for every thousand trained reservists shall be fixed for each country in strict conformity with the normal proportions existing in the principal arms in different countries and for different forms of armament.

Article 10

The actual maximum quantities of arms allowed for troops at depots and elsewhere in the territory of the state, which quantities may not be exceeded, shall be fixed on the bases laid down in Articles 8 and 9 of the present Convention, by an additional Convention and by annexed tables according to the list in paragraph (b) of Article 5 of the present Convention. Each table must contain general summarized figures under the following heads:

(1) Rifles, carbines and pistols.

(a) Automatic.

(b) Non-automatic.

Note: Automatic rifles, carbines and pistols are to be classified as light machine-guns.

(2) Machine-guns:

(a) Heavy.

(b) Light.

(3) Artillery.

(a) Light field guns (76 mm. guns and 122 mm. howitzers).

(b) Heavy field guns (105 mm. guns and 150 mm. howitzers).

(c) Heavy guns and howitzers (over 150 mm. and up to 204 mm.).

(d) Mortars and trench-mortars of all patterns.

(e) Guns accompanying the infantry.

(aa) Guns and howitzers.

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- (bb) Mine-throwers, grenade-throwers and bomb-throwers.
- (4) Armoured cars.
- (5) Spare parts, machinery, gun carriages and gun barrels.
- (6) Cartridge (for rifles and pistols).
- (7) Grenades (hand and rifle).
- (8) Shells for guns of the calibres and patterns mentioned above.
- (9) Armes blanches.

Article 11

All arms in the territory of the contracting states over and above the quantities specified in Article 9 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.

CHAPTER II

NAVAL FORCES

Article 12

In accordance with the principles set forth in the preamble to the present Convention the contracting states agree to effect a reduction of their naval forces on the following basis:

- (a) Countries which on 1 January, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage exceeded 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-half, such reduction to affect both the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet and the tonnage in each of the following classes of warship:

Capital ships.

Other warships of displacement exceeding 10,000 tons.

Light Forces.

Submarines.

- (b) Countries which on 1 January, 1928, had a fleet whose aggregate tonnage was less than 200,000 tons shall reduce their naval forces by one-fourth of the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet.

- (c) As soon as the present Convention comes into force, aircraft carriers shall be struck off the establishment of the navy. Within six months they must be disarmed and so converted as to make it quite impossible for them to be used for warlike purposes.

Note: The strength of the naval forces of those countries which were disarmed after the war of 1914-18 shall be fixed in accordance with special principles to be laid down by the Disarmament Conference.

Article 13

The maximum specific tonnage which must not be exceeded by the contracting states shall be fixed in accordance with the above mentioned

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principles by a special Convention, to be concluded within three months from the day on which the present Convention comes into force.

Article 14

The division of the fleet into vessels which are to be struck off the naval establishment and vessels which are to remain on the establishment, the names of the vessels being given (within the limits of the tonnage allowed under Article 12 of the present Convention) shall be effected by each contracting party. Within one year from the coming into force of the present Convention, those warships which each party designates to be struck off the establishment of the navy must be disarmed and put into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes.

Note: the disarmament of warships comprises the removal of the armour, guns and torpedoes, the destruction of special fittings, armoured turrets, conning towers, fire-control instruments, communications for use in battle and aircraft-launching devices.

Article 15

The procedure for striking vessels off the naval establishment and putting them into such a condition that they cannot possibly be used for warlike purposes shall be fixed by an additional technical agreement which shall be attached to the present Convention and shall be concluded in accordance with Article 13 of the present Convention.

Article 16

The contracting states agree that, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, warships (both those which are to be constructed in future and those which are now on the stocks) shall only be constructed to replace vessels of the corresponding classes or categories which have been retained on the establishment of the fleet after the reduction has been effected as provided in Articles 12 and 13. Such vessels must satisfy the following conditions:

(a) Except in case of total loss, no vessel may be replaced until it has reached the age-limit as specified below:

Capital ships

Other warships of over 10,000 tons

Cruisers of over 7,000 tons

Cruisers of under 7,000 tons

Flotilla Leaders

Torpedo-boat destroyers

Torpedo-boats

Submarines

} 25 years.

} 20 years.

15 years.

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(b) The maximum standard displacement for a warship shall be fixed at 10,000 metric tons. Vessels of more than 10,000 tons displacement now included in the naval forces shall be struck off when they reach the age-limit specified in paragraph (a) of this article, but in any case not later than.....

(c) The maximum calibre of the guns mounted in warships shall be fixed at 12 inches (304.8 mm.).

(d) No warship may be fitted with appliances for the carrying of aircraft.

(e) The maximum limits for vessels by classes and categories are laid down as follows:

<i>Class or category of vessel.</i>	<i>Standard displacement.</i>	<i>Calibre of guns.</i>	<i>Age-limit.</i>
Capital ships	10,000 tons	12 inches	25 years
Coast defence vessels		304.8 mm.	
Cruisers of over 7,000 tons		8 inches	25 years
		203.2 mm.	
Cruisers of under 7,000 tons		6 inches	20 years
		152.4 mm.	
Flotilla leaders			
Torpedo-boat destroyers	1,200 tons	4 inches	20 years
Torpedo-boats		101.6 mm.	
Submarines	600 tons	4 inches	15 years
		101.6 mm.	

Note: The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, with engines and boilers, equipped ready for the sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements and supplies of every description that are intended to be carried in war, including fuel and reserve feed water for engines and boilers. The calculation must be made in metric tons.

Article 17

The contracting states agree to assume the following obligations:

(a) Not to use for warlike purposes warships which have been struck off the establishment of the fleet and replaced by new constructions (except in cases which may be specially provided for in supplementary technical agreements).

(b) Not to hand over or sell their warships to foreign countries if the

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latter can use them as warships supernumerary to the establishment laid down for each state by the present Convention.

(c) Not to build or allow to be built in their territories any warships exceeding any of the limits laid down in Article 16 of the present Convention.

(d) Not to cause new vessels to be constructed in foreign yards over and above the limit laid down for each contracting state.

(e) Not to equip merchant vessels with any apparatus or appliance enabling such vessels to be used for warlike purposes.

Article 18

The contracting states agree to limit the quantity of shells and torpedoes as follows:

(a) For guns of calibres from 8-12 inches (203.2 to 304.8 mm.), 200 rounds each.

(b) For guns of calibres from 4-7.9 inches (101.6 to 200.7 mm.), 500 rounds each.

(c) For guns of calibres less than 4 inches (101.6 mm.), 1,000 rounds each;

(d) For each torpedo-tube two torpedoes.

Article 19

All supplies of ammunition and torpedoes over and above the quantities specified in Article 18 must be destroyed.

CHAPTER III

AIR ARMAMENTS

Article 20

Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all military dirigibles and aircraft (whether heavier or lighter than air) shall be disarmed and placed in a condition precluding their utilization for military purposes.

Note: The disarmament of aircraft belonging to the armed forces includes the removal of guns, machine-guns and special appliances for the discharge of bombs and other instruments of destruction.

Article 21

In conformity with the preamble to the present Convention, the contracting states agree, when carrying into effect the reduction of air armaments, to divide all states into the following main groups:

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(a) Group E. States having more than 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces.

(b) Group F. States having from 100 to 200 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces.

(c) Group G. States having fewer than 100 aeroplanes in service in their armed forces.

States in Group E shall reduce their air forces by one-half; states in Group F by one-third, and states in Group G by one-quarter, with a simultaneous reduction of the engine power of each aeroplane to 400 h.p. on ground.

Article 22

In addition to the standard laid down in Article 21 reserve machines and engines for these machines, up to a number not exceeding 25 per cent of the total number of aeroplanes in service after their reduction, may be maintained in the establishment of the air forces.

Article 23

All other machines, whether in service or in reserve, together with the engines for the machines, in excess of the limits laid down in Articles 21 and 22 of the present Convention shall be destroyed.

Article 24

When applying Articles 21, 22 and 23 of the present Convention, aeroplanes with engines of over 400 h.p. shall be the first to be destroyed.

Article 25

All arming of civil aircraft and all fittings enabling them to be armed or to be utilized for war are prohibited.

Article 26

With regard to the types of aeroplanes and their armaments, Article 6 of the present Convention shall apply. The armament of military air forces is included in the standards laid down in Article 10 of the present Convention.

Article 27

All stocks of air bombs and other instruments of destruction intended to be discharged by aircraft shall be destroyed within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention. It shall, henceforth, be prohibited to manufacture or retain them in the army or in the reserve of the military air forces.

Article 28

The effectives of the military air forces must be reduced in proportion to the decrease in the number of machines in service.

Article 29

The precise maximum numbers of machines in service and in reserve, of the engines intended for their use, and of the military air force effectives, classified as officers, pilots, and other personnel serving on board aircraft which must not be exceeded by the contracting states, shall be fixed in conformity with Articles 21 and 28 of the present Convention in a supplementary Convention. To the latter shall be annexed the following tables:

Table I: Maximum armed air forces stationed in home country.

Table II: Maximum armed air forces stationed in each colony, dominion or other oversea possession.

Table III: Maximum of all armed air forces.

Article 30

With a view to restricting the production of military aeroplanes and the trade therein, the contracting states agree to conclude, within three months from the entry into force of the present Convention, a supplementary Convention on the limitation to be imposed on the manufacture and trade in war aeroplanes in proportion to the legitimate requirements of the new effectives of the military air forces as fixed in the tables indicated in Article 29.

CHAPTER IV

CHEMICAL METHODS OF WARFARE

Article 31

All methods of and appliances for chemical aggressions (all asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors, pulverizers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and for bacteriological warfare, whether in service with troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of entry into force of the present Convention.

Article 32

The industrial undertakings engaged in or adapted for the production of the means of chemical aggression or bacteriological warfare indicated in Article 31 of the present Convention shall be converted to other uses within

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one year from the entry into force of the present Convention on the basis of an additional technical agreement.

Article 33

The contracting states undertake, within three months of the entry into force of the present Convention, to ratify the Protocol on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare signed at Geneva in 1925.

CHAPTER V

ARMAMENTS BUDGETS

Article 34

The total amounts of the armaments budgets calculated at their true values shall be reduced in proportion to the reduction of land forces in Groups A, B and C of air forces in Groups E, F and G, and of naval forces as provided for in Articles 12 and 13 of the present Convention. The said reduction in budgets shall also apply to the items of expenditure on personnel (pay, clothing, victualling, quarters) and those relating to orders for implements of war and ammunition and to their upkeep.

Article 35

No secret funds intended to disguise extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war and the strengthening of armaments may be excluded from state budgets.

In conformity with the above stipulation, all expenditure on the upkeep of the armed forces of each state shall be brought together in a single chapter of the state budget; it shall be open to publicity in all respects.

Article 36

The reduction of the armaments budgets shall be carried out as from the year 1929 *pari passu* with the reduction of armed forces and of war material. As from 1930, the maximum figures of these budgets shall be fixed separately for each of the contracting states. Thereafter no increase shall be made in them.

CHAPTER VI

TIME LIMITS FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 37

The reduction of land, naval and air armaments, in conformity with Articles 2, 5, 11, 21, 22, 23 and 28 of the present Convention shall be carried

out by the contracting states in the course of two years, the first year being devoted to preparatory work and the second to the practical application of all measures relating to the reduction of armaments.

Article 38

All the other measures for the reduction of armaments shall be carried out within the periods provided for in the relevant articles of the present Convention (Articles 20, 27, 31, 32 and 36).

CHAPTER VII

CONTROL

Article 39

Within three months from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, a Permanent International Commission of Control shall be organized with the following duties:

(a) Supervision, control, and general co-ordination of the measures relating to the application of the present Convention, and the notification to each state of breaches of the provisions of the present Convention.

(b) The preparation of an agreement concerning the pressure to be brought to bear upon states which may fail to carry out the provisions of the present Convention and of the supplementary Conventions and technical arrangements completing it.

(c) The selection of the places, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material, and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical agreements.

(d) The study of questions relating to further reductions of armaments and the preparation of international agreements relating thereto.

(e) Communication to the contracting states and the public of information concerning progress in the work of reducing armaments.

Article 40

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workers' organizations of all states participating in the present Convention.

The Permanent International Commission of Control will later include representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between states, and which have pursued this aim with success, provided that these organizations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

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Article 41

The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts, belonging to all the states acceding to the present Convention. The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 42

The following may not be members of the Permanent International Commission of Control:

(a) Professional soldiers and officials of Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation.

(b) Owners of and shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the traffic in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

Article 43

With a view to ensuring genuine control, the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entitled to carry out investigations on the spot in the event of reasonable suspicion of a breach of the present Convention and of the subsequent supplementary agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to appoint for this purpose special Commissions of Inquiry.

Article 44

In enterprises for the production of war material or in enterprises capable of being utilized for the manufacture of armaments, a permanent labour control may be organized by the workers' committees of the factories or by other organs of the trade unions operating in the respective enterprises with a view to limiting the possibility of breaches of the corresponding articles of the present Convention. A similar control shall be set up in the various branches of the chemical industry, of which a list shall be drawn up by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 45

The contracting states undertake to furnish the Permanent International Commission of Control, within the time limits fixed by it, with full information as to the situation of their armed forces, in accordance with the list and tables prescribed by the present Convention, and the subsequent supplementary agreements on the reduction and limitation of armaments,

as well as with particulars of the number of aeroplanes and dirigibles in civil aviation registered as such in the territory of each of the contracting states.

Article 46

The statutes of the Permanent International Commission of Control, the procedure for examining complaints concerning the non-observance of the obligations entered into for the reduction and limitation of armaments, the organization of the procedure to be followed in local investigations, and the nature of labour control in regard to production (Article 44) shall be settled by means of a supplementary Convention within not more than three months from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention.

CHAPTER VIII

RATIFICATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION

Article 47

The present Convention shall enter into force as from the date of its ratification, in conformity with the legislative practice of the contracting states, by all the states in Groups A and B for the reduction of land armaments, as laid down in Article 1 of the present Convention, or in the first group for the reduction of naval armaments, as laid down in paragraph (a) of Article 12 of the present Convention.

Article 48

All subsequent supplementary Conventions to be concluded in consequence of the present Convention shall be signed and ratified within not less than six months from the date of the entry into force of the latter.

Article 49

The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of a state in each of the five Continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions laid down in Article 47 shall be notified to all the contracting states by

Convention for the Definition of Aggression

His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of the Estonian Republic, the President of the Latvian Republic, the President of the Polish Republic, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Execu-

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tive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, and His Majesty the King of Afghanistan;

Being desirous of consolidating the peaceful relations existing between their countries;

Mindful of the fact that the Briand Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all states have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries;

And judging it expedient, in the interest of the general peace, to bring into force, as between their countries, precise rules defining aggression, until such time as those rules shall become universal;

Have decided with the aforesaid objects, to conclude the present Convention, and have duly authorized for the purpose:

His Majesty the King of Roumania: Mr. Nicholas Titulescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Estonian Republic: Dr. Oskar Kallas, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London;

The President of the Latvian Republic: M. Waldemaras Salnais, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Polish Republic: M. Edouard Raczyński, Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary;

The President of the Turkish Republic: Tevfik Rustu Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs;

His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia: Fatollah Khan Noury Esfandiary, *Chargé d'Affaires* in London;

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan: Ali Mohammed Khan, Minister of Education;

who have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report

dated 24 May, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Politis report) to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which report was made in consequence of the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Article 2

Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that state which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

- (1) Declaration of war upon another state;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
- (5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

Article 3

No political, military, economic or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification for aggression referred to in Article 2. (For examples, see Annex.)

Article 4

The present Convention shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its laws.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by each of the High Contracting Parties with the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by two of the High Contracting Parties, the present Convention shall come into force as between those two Parties. The Convention shall come into force as regards each of the other High Contracting Parties when it deposits its instruments of ratification.

Each deposit of instruments of ratification shall immediately be notified by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to all the signatories of the present Convention.

Article 5

The present Convention has been signed in eight copies, of which each of the High Contracting Parties has received one.

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In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done in London, 3 July, 1933.

(L.S.) (Signed) N. TITULESCU
(L.S.) (Signed) O. KALLAS
(L.S.) (Signed) WALDEMARAS SALNAIS
(L.S.) (Signed) E. RACZYNSKI
(L.S.) (Signed) TEVFIK RUSTU
(L.S.) (Signed) MAXIM LITVINOV
(L.S.) (Signed) ALI MOHAMMED KHAN
(L.S.) (Signed) F. NOURY ESFANDIARY

Annex to Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Definition of Aggression

The High Contracting Parties, signatories of the Convention relating to the definition of aggression,

Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the rule laid down in Article 3 of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to furnish certain indications for determining the aggressors.

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

A. The internal condition of a state.

e.g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

B. The international conduct of a state:

e.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign state or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial or other obligations towards foreign states; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present Convention can never legitimate any violations of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

(L.S.) (Signed) N. TITULESCU
(L.S.) (Signed) O. KALLAS
(L.S.) (Signed) WALDEMARAS SALNAIS
(L.S.) (Signed) E. RACZYNSKI
(L.S.) (Signed) TEVFIK RUSTU
(L.S.) (Signed) MAXIM LITVINOV
(L.S.) (Signed) ALI MOHAMMED KHAN
(L.S.) (Signed) F. NOURY ESFANDIARY

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PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

It is hereby agreed between the High Contracting Parties that should one or more of the other states immediately adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accede in the future to the present Convention, the said accession shall confer on the state or states in question the same rights and shall impose on them the same obligations as those conferred and imposed on the ordinary signatories.

Done at London, on 3 July, 1933.

(Signed) MAXIM LITVINOV
W. SALNAIS
N. TITULESCO
ALI MOHAMMED
F. NOURY ESFANDIARY
O. KALLAS
E. RACZYNSKI
T. RUSTU

Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance (2 May, 1935)

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the French Republic,

Inspired by the desire to consolidate peace in Europe and guarantee its benefits to their countries, by ensuring more fully the exact application of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant which are directed towards the maintenance of national security, territorial integrity and political independence of the states,

Having decided to devote their efforts to preparations for the conclusion of a European agreement pursuing this object and, pending this, to promote, in so far as it depends on them, the effective application of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant,

Have decided to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their representatives:

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Vladimir Potemkin, Member of the Central Executive Committee, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the President of the French Republic;

The President of the French Republic: M. Pierre Laval, Senator, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, upon an exchange of their credentials found to be in proper form and good order, have agreed on the following decisions:

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Article 1

In the event that the U.S.S.R. or France should prove to be an object of a threat or in danger of an attack from some European state, France, and likewise the U.S.S.R., undertake to proceed mutually to immediate consultation to the end of taking measures for the enforcement of the provisions of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 2

In the event that, under the conditions provided for in Article 15, Paragraph 7 of the League of Nations Covenant, the U.S.S.R. or France should prove to be, despite the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, the object of an unprovoked attack from some European state, France and the U.S.S.R. mutually will immediately render one another assistance and support.

Article 3

Taking into consideration that, according to Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, every member of the League who resorts to war contrary to obligations undertaken in Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, is thereby regarded as having committed an act of war against every other member of the League, the U.S.S.R. and France mutually undertake, in the event that one of them should prove to be under these conditions, and despite the sincerely peaceful intentions of the two countries, the object of an unprovoked attack from some other European state, to render one another immediately assistance and support, acting in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant.

The same obligation has been undertaken in case the U.S.S.R. or France should prove to be an object of an attack from some European state under conditions provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 17 of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 4

Since the obligations fixed above correspond to the duties of the High Contracting Parties as members of the League of Nations, nothing in this Treaty will be interpreted as a limitation of the task of the latter to take measures capable of effectively safeguarding the general peace, or as a limitation of the duties arising for the High Contracting Parties out of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 5

This Treaty, the Russian and French texts of which will be equally valid, will be ratified and the ratification documents will be exchanged in

Moscow as soon as possible. It will be registered in the League of Nations Secretariat.

It will enter into force from the moment of the exchange of ratification documents and will remain in force for five years. Should it not be denounced by one of the High Contracting Parties with at least one year's notice prior to the expiration of this period, it will remain in force for an unlimited period, and each of the High Contracting Parties will have the right to terminate its action by making a statement to that effect with one year's notice.

In confirmation of which the authorized representatives have signed this Treaty and attached their seals thereto.

Done in Paris in two copies.

2 May, 1935.

Soviet-Czechoslovakian Treaty of Mutual Assistance

(16 May, 1935)

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, inspired by a desire to consolidate peace in Europe and to guarantee its benefits to their countries by insuring more fully the exact application of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant aimed at the maintenance of national security, territorial integrity and political independence of the states,

Having decided to devote their efforts to the preparation and conclusion of a European agreement pursuing this object and, pending this, to further, in so far as it depends on them, the effective application of the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, have decided to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their representatives:

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Sergei Alexandrovski, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Czechoslovakia

The President of the Czechoslovakian Republic: M. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Who, upon an exchange of their credentials, found to be in proper form and good order, have agreed on the following decisions:

Article 1

In the event that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Republic of Czechoslovakia should prove to be an object of threat or in danger of an attack from any European state whatsoever, the Republic of Czechoslovakia and likewise the U.S.S.R. mutually undertake to enter into immediate consultation with the purpose of taking measures for the

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enforcement of the provisions of Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 2

In the event that, under the conditions provided for in Article 15, Paragraph 7 of the League of Nations Covenant, the U.S.S.R. or the Republic of Czechoslovakia should, despite the sincerely peaceful intentions of both countries, prove to be the object of an unprovoked attack from any European state whatsoever, the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. mutually will immediately render one another assistance and support.

Article 3

Taking into consideration the fact that, according to Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, every member of the League who resorts to war, contrary to obligations undertaken in Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, is thereby regarded as having committed an act of war against every other member of the League, the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Czechoslovakia mutually undertake, in the event that one of them should, under these conditions, prove to be the object of an unprovoked attack from any European country whatsoever, despite the sincerely peaceful intentions of the two countries, to render one another immediately assistance and support, acting in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant.

The same obligation is undertaken in case the U.S.S.R. or the Republic of Czechoslovakia should prove to be the object of attack on the part of a European state under conditions provided for in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 17 of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 4

It is established that, without detriment to any of the above decisions of the present Treaty, in the event that one of the High Contracting Parties should prove to be an object of attack on the part of one or several third powers, under conditions which do not form a basis for the rendering of assistance and support within the limits of the present Treaty, the other High Contracting Party undertakes, during the conflict, not to render, directly or indirectly, assistance and support to the attacking or attacked country. Furthermore, each of the countries declares that it is not bound by any agreement of assistance, which might be in contradiction to the present obligation.

Article 5

Since the obligations established above correspond to the duties of the High Contracting Parties as members of the League of Nations, nothing in

this Treaty will be interpreted as a limitation of the task of the latter to take measures capable of effectively safeguarding the general peace, or as a limitation of the duties of the High Contracting Parties arising out of the League of Nations Covenant.

Article 6

This Treaty, the Russian and Czechoslovakian texts of which will be equally valid, will be ratified and the ratification documents will be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible. It will be registered in the League of Nations Secretariat.

It will enter into force from the moment of the exchange of ratification documents and will remain in force for five years. Should it not be denounced by one of the High Contracting Parties with at least one year's notice prior to the expiration of this period, it will remain in force for an unlimited period and each of the High Contracting Parties will have the right of terminating its action by making a statement to that effect with one year's notice.

In confirmation whereof the authorized representatives have signed this Treaty and attached their seals thereto.

Done in Prague in two copies.

16 May, 1935.

*Statement on Conversations between Mr. A. Eden and J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov
(1 April, 1935)*

Conversations have taken place in Moscow in the last few days between Mr. Eden, Lord Privy Seal, and M. M. Litvinov, Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, upon the principal elements of the present-day international situation, including the proposed Eastern Pact and the other questions set forth in the Anglo-French *communiqué* of 3 February, as well as regards the further development and improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.

During this visit, Mr. Eden was received by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov and was able to exchange views with them on the same subjects.

In the course of the conversations, which were conducted throughout in an atmosphere of complete friendliness and frankness, Mr. Eden informed M. M. Litvinov of the recent talks between the British Ministers and the Head of the German Government. It was agreed that these talks had helped to clarify the European situation.

Mr. Eden and J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov were of the opinion that in the present international situation it was more than

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ever necessary to pursue the endeavour to promote the building up of a system of collective security in Europe as contemplated in the Anglo-French *communiqué* of 3 February and in conformity with the principles of the League of Nations.

It was emphasized in the conversations by J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov that the organization of security in Eastern Europe and the proposed Pact of Mutual Assistance do not aim at the isolation or encirclement of any state, but at the creation of equal security for all participants, and that the participation in the Pact of Germany and Poland would therefore be welcomed as affording the best solution of the problem.

The representatives of the two governments were happy to note, as the result of a full and frank exchange of views, that there is at present no conflict of interests between the two governments on any of the main issues of international policy, and that this fact provides a firm foundation for the development of fruitful collaboration between them in the cause of peace. They are confident that both countries, recognizing that the integrity and prosperity of each is to the advantage of the other, will govern their mutual relations in that spirit of collaboration and loyalty to obligations assumed by them which is inherent in their common membership of the League of Nations.

In the light of these considerations, Mr. Eden and J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov were confirmed in the opinion that the friendly co-operation of the two countries in the general work for the collective organization of peace and security is of primary importance for the furtherance of international efforts to this end.

*Statement on the Conversations of Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov with Pierre Laval,
French Foreign Minister
(16 May, 1935)*

During the conversations which took place in Moscow on 13, 14 and 15 May, J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov and Pierre Laval expressed their satisfaction with the signing in Paris on 2 May, 1935, of a Treaty which defined the obligations of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and France and established the interpretation proper to them. The representatives of the U.S.S.R. and France had the opportunity of stating the existence of friendly confidence established between their countries by the above-mentioned Treaty, which exerted a beneficial influence on the consideration of all questions of Soviet-French relations,

and also of a general European character arising in the sphere of co-operation of both governments.

Both sides took up the above-mentioned consideration with the fullest sincerity, and were able to become convinced that their constant efforts, manifested in all the diplomatic undertakings in view, are with complete obviousness directed towards one vital aim—towards the maintenance of peace through the organization of collective security.

During the exchange of opinions complete identity of views was established by both sides on those obligations which, in the existing international situation, arise for states which are sincerely devoted to the cause of preserving peace and which have already given undoubted proof of their love of peace by their readiness to participate in creating mutual guarantees.

Precisely in the interests of preserving peace, these nations are obliged, above all, in no way to weaken their means of national defence. In this respect, J. V. Stalin, in particular, expressed full understanding and approval of the policy of national defence carried out by France with the object of maintaining her armed forces on the level corresponding to the needs of her security.

The representatives of the U.S.S.R. and France, on the other hand, confirmed their determination, in the process of their further co-operation, not to leave unutilized any means capable, with the help of all governments supporting the policy of peace, of creating political conditions without which it is impossible to restore the confidence among nations, so necessary from the point of view of the material and moral interests of the peoples of Europe.

The representatives of both nations established further that the conclusion of a Treaty of mutual assistance between the U.S.S.R. and France by no means diminishes the importance of the immediate realization of a regional East European Pact embracing previously-indicated nations, and containing obligations of non-aggression, consultation, and refusal to aid the aggressor. Both governments decided to continue their joint efforts to seek diplomatic means most suitable to this aim.

In giving publicity to the above-mentioned joint decisions, the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and France declare with all responsibility that they demonstrate thereby the devotion uniting them in the constructive work which, by no means excluding anyone from participating therein, can find its complete realization only under conditions of the sincere co-operation of all interested countries.

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Statement on the Conversations of Dr. Edouard Benes with J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and M. M. Litvinov (11 June, 1935)

Dr. Edouard Benes, Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, held several conversations with M. M. Litvinov, Peoples' Commisar for Foreign Affairs, and also a conversation with Stalin and Molotov, during his sojourn in Moscow.

The participants in the conversations expressed their complete satisfaction with the state of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovakian Republic, and those considerable successes which followed upon the *rapprochement* between the two countries during the past year, as well as with the results of their collaboration in helping to strengthen universal peace.

It was recognized that the treaties and agreements concluded between the two governments created a firm basis for the continuation of this co-operation and, likewise, for the successful development of economic relations.

Special attention was given to the desirability of a systematic *rapprochement* of the two countries in the fields of science, literature and art.

It was decided to instruct the necessary existing organizations, or those to be created, in both countries, to begin working out suitable, concrete measures for the realization of the aim which both governments have for strengthening the intellectual ties between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovakian Republic.

During the conversations, the present international situation in Europe, from the point of view of the interests of peace, was discussed in detail.

The representatives of both states were compelled to state that the feeling of anxiety for the fate of universal peace, which has taken hold of the nations of Europe during the past few years, has not only not subsided, but, on the contrary, has become more tense as a result of the opposition to measures for guaranteeing the security of European countries by means of collective efforts at various international conferences and during meetings of statesmen in Geneva.

The identity of views of the participants in the conversations on the exceptional significance, at the present time, of the actual realization of a universal, collective organization of security on the basis of the indivisibility of peace, was established.

Recognizing that the pacts of mutual assistance recently concluded between the U.S.S.R. and France, and between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, are a partial realization of these measures, the participants in

the conversations confirmed the determination of their governments to continue their efforts to remove obstacles which stand in the way of a broader collective organization of security.

Their sincere endeavour to strengthen peace for the well-being of all the nations of Europe was recognized as the basis of the co-operation of both countries.

Protocol of Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic
(12 March, 1936)

On 12 March, 1936, in Ulan-Bator, V. K. Tairov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one side, and M. Amor, Chairman of the Little Khural of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, and M. Gendun, Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, on the other side, signed the following protocol:

PROTOCOL

The governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic,

Following from the state of constant friendship existing between their countries since the liberation, with the support of the Red Army, of the territory of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic in 1921 from the whiteguard detachments which were connected with the armed forces which invaded the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by the desire to support the cause of peace in the Far East and to assist the further strengthening of the friendly relations existing between them,

Have decided to formulate, in the form of the present protocol, the gentlemen's agreement, existing between them since 27 November, 1934, providing for mutual support by all measures in the matter of averting and preventing the danger of a military attack, and also of rendering each other assistance and support in the event of an attack by any third party on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the Mongolian Peoples' Republic,

And for which aim have signed the present protocol.

Article 1

In the event of a threat of an attack on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

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or the M.P.R. on the part of a third power, the two governments undertake immediately to consider jointly the situation that has arisen and take all those measures which should be necessary for the protection and security of their territories.

Article 2

The governments of the U.S.S.R. and of the M.P.R. undertake in the event of a military attack upon one of the contracting parties to render each other every assistance including military assistance.

Article 3

The governments of the U.S.S.R. and of the M.P.R. regard it as a matter of course that the troops of either Powers, which, upon grounds of mutual agreement, in fulfilment of obligations defined in Articles 1 and 2, may find themselves upon the territory of the other party, shall withdraw from the said territory as soon as the emergency has ceased, as happened in 1925 with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the M.P.R.

Article 4

This protocol comes into force from the moment of its signature, and will have effect for a period of ten years from this time.

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